

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

INTERNAL USE ONLY

This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable.

No. 11

9 AUGUST 1974

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS	1
GENERAL	20
EASTERN EUROPE	22
WESTERN EUROPE	28
FAR EAST	30
WESTERN HEMISPHERE	40

25X1A

Destroy after backgrounder
has served its purpose or
within 60 days.

CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, AUGUST 9, 1974

The Case Against Richard Nixon: A Catalogue of Charges and His Replies

By PAUL L. MONTGOMERY

During the three summers and two winters of what clearly has been the biggest political scandal in the history of the United States, Richard M. Nixon was investigated more heavily and charged with wrongdoing more frequently than any of his 36 predecessors.

From the time of the arrest of the Watergate burglars early on the morning of June 17, 1972, the allegations against the President and his aides built to a tidal wave that — 26 months later — overwhelmed him.

The burglary and its subsequent cover-up were always the center of the wilderness of investigations, but as time went on and evidence accumulated the inquiry seeped over into at least 13 separate areas of Presidential activity aside from Watergate.

Millions of words of testimony and thousands of documents and transcripts were amassed by the Watergate grand jury and special prosecutor, the Senate Select Committee on Watergate and the plethora of subsidiary bodies. For Mr. Nixon, the ultimate forum was the House Committee on the Judiciary, authorized on Feb. 6, 1974, by a vote of 410-4 to conduct an impeachment inquiry.

In six months of examining the evidence of the other investigations, and opening new lines itself, the staff of the committee made a massive synthesis of the charges against the President and the facts to support them. At the end, the committee voted to recommend impeachment of the President for his conduct in the Watergate matter and for involvement in the three other unrelated activities.

The first article charged that Mr. Nixon, "using the powers of his high office, engaged personally and through his subordinates and agents in a course of conduct or plan designated to delay, impede, and obstruct the investigation" of the Watergate burglary and "to cover up, conceal and protect those responsible." The second article said the President "has repeatedly engaged in conduct violating the constitutional rights of citizens" and "impairing the due and proper administration of justice." The third article charged him with having "willfully disobeyed" the committee's subpoenas for tapes and documents. Two other articles, dealing with the secret bombing of Cambodia and Mr. Nixon's income taxes and personal finances, were not approved by the committee.

What follows is an accounting of the charges against Mr. Nixon—based on the Judiciary Committee's documents and proceedings, supplemented by statements that postdated the committee's deliberations—and of his responses to them—based on statements by Mr. Nixon, his lawyers and other defenders.

Watergate

On May 27, 1972, and again on June 17, agents of the Committee for the Re-election of the President broke into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in the Watergate in Washington to install wiretaps and collect other political information. Basically, Mr. Nixon was charged with having used the office of the Presidency over at least the next two years to conceal the responsibility of the White House and the re-election committee for the burglaries.

No direct evidence has been introduced that Mr. Nixon knew in advance of the burglaries. But the committee cited evidence that the plan underlying the burglaries had been approved by John N. Mitchell, the campaign director, and H. R. Haldeman, the President's chief of staff in the White House. The first article of impeachment approved by the House committee charges, however, that Mr. Nixon partici-

pated actively in thwarting investigations of the crime and covering up the responsibility of his aides in it.

John M. Doar, the committee's special counsel, wrote that the evidence "strongly suggests" that Mr. Nixon decided shortly after the arrest of the burglars on June 17 to pursue a policy of concealment and containment. He further said that in late March, 1973, Mr. Nixon took over personal direction of the cover-up.

The committee, in its vote, made no direct correlation between the overt acts by the President and the generalized charges in the first article of impeachment. It was clear, however, that the majority accepted Mr. Doar's summation of the specific charges. These broke down roughly into eight areas:

GENERAL PLAN AND POLICY. After the committee hearings, Mr. Nixon admitted that on June 23, 1972, he had instructed Mr. Haldeman to stop the Federal Bureau of Investigation inquiry into the sources of funds for the Watergate burglars (the funds had come from campaign contributions). The President said his aides, to thwart the F.B.I., should use the excuse that the investigation would endanger operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite C.I.A. assurances that this was not so, the aides pursued that course and succeeded on June 28 in stopping the F.B.I. effort to trace the money.

The summation of evidence for the committee also cited numerous instances in transcripts of Presidential conversations in which Mr. Nixon had indicated that he acquiesced in the cover-up. To Mr. Mitchell on June 30, 1972: "Well, I'd cut the loss fast. I'd cut it fast." To John W. Dean 3d, his counsel, on Sept. 15, 1972: "So you just try to button it up as well as you can . . ." To Mr. Dean on March 21, 1973: "It's better just to fight it out, and not let people testify, so forth and so on." To Mr. Mitchell on March 22, 1973: "I want you all to stonewall it, let them plead the Fifth Amendment, cover-up or anything else, if it'll save it—save the plan."

Critics also cited a moral insensitivity in Mr. Nixon's conversations that could indicate his approval of the cover-up. On March 21, 1973, for example, in recorded personal reminiscences, Mr. Nixon gave contrasting assessment of two aides—Jeb Stuart Magruder, who had decided to tell the truth to investigators, and Gordon Strachan, who the President described as "in a straight position of perjury." He called Mr. Magruder "a rather weak man who had all the appearance of character but who really lacks it when the, uh, chips are down," while he found Mr. Strachan "a real, uh, courageous fellow through all this."

Mr. Nixon has never made an attempt to rebut charges involving each overt act of which he was accused. The Judiciary Committee staff made a summation of 243 incidents or series of incidents, and the reply of the President's lawyer, James D. St. Clair, dealt only with 34 incidents with no correlation with the staff summation.

Mr. St. Clair's final statement was, "The President had no knowledge of an attempt by the White House to cover up involvement in the Watergate affair."

In his last account of Watergate, on Aug. 5, when he admitted that he had previously concealed his order on June 23, 1972, to stop the F.B.I. investigation, Mr. Nixon said it was a "serious act of omission for which I take full responsibility and which I deeply regret." He said he had not told Mr. St. Clair of the incident when his lawyer was defending him.

"I was aware of the advantages this course of action would have with respect to limiting possible public exposure of involvement by persons connected with the re-election committee," the President said.

Mr. Nixon, however, reiterated that if the evidence was looked at in its entirety, rather than as isolated incriminating statements, it would show he had made mistakes but had committed no impeachable offense. This was a theme that ran through his defense as the tapes of his conversations were made public.

In the Aug. 5 statement, Mr. Nixon said that "the basic truth remains that when all the facts were brought to my attention I insisted on a full investigation and prosecution of those guilty." He did not mention that, as a result of the investigation, he was named by the Water-

gate grand jury as a co-conspirator in the cover-up, though no indictment was voted because of his office.

INTERFERING WITH INVESTIGATIONS. Aside from the attempted use of the C.I.A. against the F.B.I., the House committee staff found a number of occasions when Mr. Nixon tried to thwart or divert duly authorized investigations into Watergate.

Among the instances cited were his repeated refusal to honor subpoenas of evidence, his attempts to influence members of Congressional committees, his efforts to get special treatment for aides before the Watergate prosecutors, and his dismissal of the special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, when Mr. Cox insisted on having tapes of White House conversations.

Mr. Nixon's relations with Henry Petersen, the Justice Department official originally charged with prosecuting the Watergate burglars, also drew criticism. The President repeatedly quizzed the Assistant Attorney General about the progress of the investigation, and then passed the information on to subordinates who were suspects. "I've got Petersen on a short leash," he told John D. Ehrlichman, his chief domestic aide, at one point.

In a telephone conversation with Mr. Petersen on the evening of April 16, 1973, Mr. Nixon elicited the information that Frederick C. LaRue, a campaign aide who helped pass money to the burglars, was talking to the prosecutors. "Anything you tell me, as I think I told you earlier, will not be passed on," Mr. Nixon told Mr. Petersen. Yet, the next morning, the President instructed Mr. Haldeman to tell Herbert W. Kalmbach, another suspect in the money-passing, that Mr. LaRue was talking.

In his defense, the President insisted he had pressed for a full investigation as soon as he was made aware of incriminating facts. In testimony before the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Petersen said he saw nothing improper in Mr. Nixon's relations with him since the President is the nation's chief law-enforcement officer.

ALTERING OR DESTROYING EVIDENCE. Mr. Doar cited the apparently deliberate erasure of an 18½-minute portion of a tape recording conversation between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Haldeman on June 20, 1972 — three days after the break-in. Mr. Haldeman's notes indicated the conversation was about Watergate, and that the President instructed him to be "on the attack for diversion." The tape was in the possession of Mr. Nixon's personal secretary, Rose Mary Woods, when the erasure occurred.

The staff also cited many material discrepancies between transcripts of tapes prepared under Mr. Nixon's direction and transcripts of the same tapes made by the committee. In some cases, potentially compromising statements by the President were omitted entirely.

For example, on Feb. 28, 1973, Mr. Nixon expressed worry about evidence pointing to Mr. Kalmbach because "it'll be hard for him, he — 'cause it'll, it'll get out about Hunt." The statement did not appear in the White House transcript of the conversation. The reference is apparently to Mr. Kalmbach's help in sending money to E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of the burglars; Mr. Nixon had maintained steadfastly that he did not learn of payments to Mr. Hunt until March 21, 1973.

In a March 22, 1973, conversation, the White House transcripts had Mr. Nixon saying he needed flexibility "in order to get off the cover-up line." The committee transcript made the phrase "in order to get on with the cover-up plan."

The President and his defenders said they did not know how the 18½-minute gap in the key tape had occurred, but left open the implication that it could have been a mechanical fault in Miss Woods's tape recorder rather than a deliberate erasure. Miss Woods said she had accidentally erased a part of the tape when she answered the telephone while transcribing it, but could not account for the entire erasure.

Regarding the discrepancies between the White House and committee transcripts, Mr. St. Clair described them as honest differences in interpretation of tapes of poor quality that did not have material bearing on the matters stated.

HUSH MONEY. Beginning on June 29, 1972—twelve days after the break-in—and continuing for nearly a year, a total of nearly \$450,000 was paid by aides of Mr. Nixon to those accused in the burglary. The money came from contributions to his campaign, and much of it was routed through his personal attorney, Mr. Kalmbach.

On March 21, 1973, the President talked with Mr. Dean about payments to Mr. Hunt. He contended it was the first time he was informed of the payments, yet in the conversation he made no protest, showed no surprise and indicated familiarity with some details of the pay-off

scheme.

Mr. Dean said Mr. Hunt might consume a million dollars in the next two years. "What I meant is, you could, you get a million dollars," Mr. Nixon said. "And you could get it in cash. I, I know where it could be gotten." The same day Mr. Nixon told Mr. Haldeman that Mr. Hunt might "blow the whistle" and that "his price is pretty high, but at least, uh, we should, we should buy the time on that, uh, as I, as I pointed out to John." That night, \$75,000 in cash was delivered to Mr. Hunt's lawyer.

Under persistent questioning before the Watergate grand jury, Mr. Hunt stated unequivocally that when he was demanding money from the White House he was threatening to reveal "seamy things" he had done for the Administration if the money was not paid.

Mr. Nixon's defenders at one point said the President was "joking" in his discussion of \$1-million with Mr. Dean. At all points, the President said, the money paid to the burglars was for legal expenses and support of their families, and not to buy their silence.

Mr. Nixon denied repeatedly that the money for Mr. Hunt was "hush money." His lawyer quoted a passage from an unreleased tape in which Mr. Nixon said, "I don't mean to be blackmailed by Hunt—that goes too far."

EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY. On at least three occasions recorded in the transcripts, Mr. Nixon discussed with aides the possibility and political wisdom of giving executive clemency to Watergate defendants after their presumed conviction. The first discussion, with Mr. Ehrlichman on July 8, 1972, came two months before the burglars were indicted and six months before they were tried.

On March 21, 1973, talking with Mr. Dean about when clemency could be granted, Mr. Nixon said, "You can't do it till after the '74 elections, that's for sure. But even then . . . Your point is that even then you couldn't do it."

On April 14, 1973, Mr. Nixon spoke with Mr. Ehrlichman about how he could give signals to Mr. Magruder that leniency could be expected. The President suggested he mention "lovely wife and all the rest" and how painful it was to deliver the message.

"Also, I would first put that in so that he knows I have personal affection," said Mr. Nixon. "That's the way the so-called clemency's got to be handled. Do you see, John?"

Mr. Nixon's response to the charge was that, in any discussion of clemency, he was acting out of motives of compassion rather than trying to win favor with the defendants. He pointed out, for example, that Mr. Hunt's wife had been killed in an airplane crash shortly before his trial and that any consideration of clemency would be on that basis.

The President cited a point in a conversation about clemency for Mr. Hunt in which he said "It would be wrong." However, in the context of the conversation, the statement appears to refer to the political feasibility rather than the morality of granting clemency.

SUBORNING PERJURY. The staff cited a number of statements by the President in which he advised potential witnesses to lie or give incomplete answers, and others in which he coached witnesses to give answers that would match the testimony of those who had gone before.

On March 21, 1973, he gave this advice to Mr. Dean about talking with prosecutors:

"Just be damned sure you say I don't . . . remember, I can't recall, I can't give any honest, an answer to that, that I can recall. But that's it."

On April 14, 1973, Mr. Nixon directed Mr. Ehrlichman to coach Mr. Strachan on his forthcoming testimony so that he could cover the same points that Mr. Magruder made to the prosecutors. On April 17, Mr. Nixon discussed with Mr. Ehrlichman what he could say to investigators that would corroborate what Mr. Kalmbach had told them and impugn what Mr. Dean had said.

Mr. Nixon's defenders, discussing these passages, said it should be remembered that the President and his aides were discussing the range of options on how to act, and not recommending a specific course of conduct. Mr. Ziegler said that, in the transcripts, Mr. Nixon would often be found playing the "devil's advocate"—that is, eliciting statements by taking a position without really advocating it. His defenders also pointed out that on numerous other occasions Mr. Nixon had urged aides to tell the truth.

FAILURE TO ACT. Some of the major charges that Mr. Nixon failed to see that the laws were faithfully

executed were based on his failure to report wrongdoing to the authorities when he learned of it.

As early as July 6, 1972, L. Patrick Gray 3d, then head of the F.B.I., says he warned the President that his staff was giving him a "mortal wound" through interference in the Watergate matter. Mr. Gray said the President never questioned him about the statement.

On March 21, 1973, by Mr. Nixon's admission, Mr. Dean told him of the extent of the cover-up. His counsel also charged that Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Mitchell were implicated in the obstruction of justice. Mr. Nixon did not inform any authority of the charges, though he spoke at least three times in the next ten days with Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst about the Watergate case.

The President's response to the charge was that as soon as he learned of the cover-up he had immediately "personally ordered those conducting the investigation to get all the facts and to report them directly to me." (All major witnesses deny receiving such instructions.) Mr. Nixon said he "felt it was my responsibility to conduct my own investigation" and the White House asserted that the President himself was a "civil authority" empowered to receive reports of wrongdoing.

MISLEADING THE PUBLIC. The Judiciary Committee staff produced massive evidence, based on the tapes and Mr. Nixon's public statements, that the President had lied repeatedly in speeches and news conferences about the extent of his knowledge of the complicity of his aides.

Immediately after the break-in, Mr. Mitchell and Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary, issued statements that neither the re-election committee nor the White House was involved. On June 22, Mr. Nixon affirmed those statements and repeated them for the next 10 months, though, the staff said, he had no basis for believing they were true, and probably knew they were false.

Several times, Mr. Nixon cited "reports" or "investigations" by his aides that, he declared, cleared the White House. There is no evidence that such reports were ever prepared. On March 21, 1973, when Mr. Dean was talking about making such a report, Mr. Nixon said "Understand (laughs) I don't want to get all that goddamned specific." That day, Mr. Dean had told him that at least three of his aides had committed perjury in questioning by the prosecutors.

Mr. Nixon's contention in response to the charges was that his aides had misled him, or that he had told the truth as far as he was aware of it at the time. After the cover-up fell apart in April, 1973, the President's statements denied much that he had said before. Each major speech involved retraction of previous assertions.

Abuse of Power

In addition to the article of impeachment dealing with Watergate, and an article condemning the President for refusing committee subpoenas in connection with it, the Judiciary Committee voted for impeachment on four other specific matters:

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE. The committee staff collected evidence that Mr. Haldeman and other aides had put pressure on the I.R.S. to punish Mr. Nixon's opponents by auditing their tax returns and to reward friends by not auditing. There was testimony from both of Mr. Nixon's first two Commissioners of Internal Revenue that they had offered their resignations in the face of pressures from the White House to take improper

actions.

According to the evidence, a principal target for auditing was Lawrence F. O'Brien, the Democratic National Chairman in 1972. There was also a charge that Mr. Nixon's aides obtained tax information on Gov. George C. Wallace of Alabama and leaked it to the press. Regarding favors, it was alleged that the I.R.S. yielded to pressure not to audit the returns of the President's friend, C. G. Rebozo, in 1968 and 1969.

Mr. Nixon made no direct response to the specific charges but stated generally that he had not misused the government agency. The White House acknowledged it kept a list of "enemies" but asserted the list was to make sure that opponents received no favors, and not to subject them to persecution by arms of the Government.

WIRETAPS. Between May, 1969, and February, 1971, the President authorized F.B.I. wiretaps on four newsmen and 13 Government officials in an effort to stop leaks of confidential material to the press. The wiretaps were placed without a court order. Two of the subjects of the wiretaps went to work for Senator Edmund S. Muskie, a potential opponent of the President's in 1972, and three others were White House staff members. The committee staff found evidence that information from the wiretaps went to the President, that it did not lead to the discovery of any leaks, that some of the wiretaps were installed for political purposes, and that the White House tried later to have the F.B.I. destroy records of the taps.

Mr. Nixon has said the wiretaps were installed to prevent dissemination of national security information that would damage the nation if revealed. He said it was his right to take such action. Mr. St. Clair said that, at the time the action was taken, court approval was not required.

PLUMBERS. In 1971, Mr. Nixon authorized creation of a special investigation unit within the White House called the "Plumbers." The unit was assigned to plug leaks of classified information. Facilities of the Central Intelligence Agency, prohibited by law from domestic activities, were used for several of the unit's operations. In several cases, members of the unit acted to quell potentially embarrassing situations for Mr. Nixon. On Sept. 3, 1971, agents of the unit broke into the Beverly Hills, Calif., office of Dr. Lewis J. Fielding in an effort to get psychiatric information about Daniel Ellsberg.

Mr. Nixon said the unit was created because of threats to national security. He said he had not approved the burglary of Dr. Fielding, and did not learn of it until March 17, 1973. He did not relay the information to judicial authorities until April 25.

KLEINDIENST NOMINATION. In 1969, the Justice Department brought three antitrust suits against the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. On April 19, Mr. Nixon telephoned Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst and ordered him to drop an appeal in one of the suits with the words "The order is to leave the goddamned thing alone." In March, 1972, Mr. Kleindienst was undergoing Senate approval of his appointment as Attorney General, and he testified under oath that he had never received any White House directives about the I.T.T. case. Mr. Nixon took no action in regard to the perjury.

Mr. St. Clair, in his brief for Mr. Nixon, said there was no reason why the President should have known of Mr. Kleindienst's statement under oath, and that there was no legal duty to respond to the testimony.

BALTIMORE SUN
9 August 1974

No deal made on prosecution, Jaworski says

By STEPHEN E. NORDLINGER
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Leon Jaworski, the Watergate special prosecutor, said last night there has been "no agreement or understanding of any sort" between his office and President Nixon.

Mr. Jaworski, as the man in charge of the Watergate criminal prosecutions, presumably would play a major role in deciding whether to press criminal charges against Mr. Nixon for his involvement in the Watergate scandal.

Despite the uncertainties over this question, it appeared likely to legal experts yesterday that as a private citizen Mr. Nixon will be summoned to appear as a witness at the trial of his former aides in the Watergate coverup case scheduled to open next month.

Senator Edward W. Brooke (R., Mass.) said last night he will drop his move in Congress to get immunity for the President unless Mr. Nixon makes a "full confession" of his involvement in Watergate and related scandals.

"I believe that the President owes it to the American people to make full disclosure of his personal involvement in Watergate and related incidents," said Mr. Brooke, who earlier yesterday had introduced a resolution calling for immunity.

"There has been no agreement or understanding of any sort between the President or his representatives and the special prosecutor relating in any way to the President's resignation," Mr. Jaworski said in the statement telephoned to the press following the Nixon resignation speech.

"The special prosecutor's office was not asked for any such agreement or understanding and offered none. Although I was informed of the President's decision this afternoon, my office did not participate in any way in the President's decision to resign."

Mr. Jaworski's statement apparently was aimed at killing one popular bit of speculation—that Mr. Jaworski might agree not to prosecute the President in return for a presidential promise to resign.

The Brooke resolution stated: "Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to proceedings against President

Richard M. Nixon.

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) that it is the sense of Congress that if President Richard M. Nixon should resign, no officer or employee of the United States, including the attorney general and the special prosecutor, and no officer or employee of any state, territory or local government should bring, conduct or continue criminal or civil proceedings against him."

The likelihood that the resolution would be approved seemed doubtful ever before Senator Brooke announced his intention to withdraw it. Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the majority leader, said it raised a "grave constitutional question of the separation of powers," and Senator Robert C. Byrd (D., W. Va.), the assistant majority leader, said it would "set a bad precedent."

In any case, the resolution would lack binding power on either Mr. Jaworski or the Watergate grand jury and, as a matter of fact, on local and state prosecutors.

The House Republican leader, Representative John J. Rhodes (Ariz.), said that although there were moral reasons for such a resolution, "it wasn't worth the paper it was written on."

"I have never felt Congress had the constitutional authority to grant immunity to anybody for anything," Mr. Rhodes had said earlier at a news conference Tuesday.

Such a resolution could, however, exert influence on the Watergate grand jury and Mr. Jaworski against pursuing criminal action against Mr. Nixon. In discussing the resolution during a televised interview, Senator Brooke said, "I think that the American public has the right to know exactly what has gone on in Water-

gate, but the spectacle of an American president going to jail really distresses me."

The grand jury had wanted to indict President Nixon last May on charges similar to those brought against his former aides, including John N. Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman.

Mr. Jaworski reportedly dissuaded the grand jury from this action on ground that an incumbent president could not constitutionally be indicted.

However, with Mr. Nixon out of office, the grand jury would be free to indict him for obstruction of justice in the Watergate coverup, a charge to which he virtually admitted guilt in his statement Monday.

Penalties severe

According to knowledgeable criminal lawyers, if Mr. Nixon should be indicted, he would face criminal penalties that could reach a total of 30 to 60 years in prison and \$57,500 in fines.

The experts based their estimates on the specifications in the articles of impeachment approved by the House Judiciary Committee. The sections of the criminal code that were said to apply forbid attempts to influence or impede witnesses, obstruct criminal proceedings or cause misrepresentation of facts in criminal cases.

On Watergate matters, Mr. Jaworski was given the sole discretion in terms of plea-bargaining and prosecution. His jurisdiction cannot be limited without the approval of the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate and the chairman and ranking minority members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.

It also appears doubtful that William B. Saxbe, the Attorney General, would discharge him for pursuing a criminal case against President Nixon. The congressmen probably would not approve such an action.

Mr. Jaworski's charter, that developed after the first storm caused by the firing of his predecessor, Archibald Cox, last October, states that he cannot be dismissed "except for extraordinary improprieties."

Therefore, Mr. Jaworski and the Watergate grand jury appear free to indict Mr. Nixon if they wish.

Most observers here believe, however, that before acting he would consult with the leadership of Congress, which has the sole right to remove a president from office, as well as with the new President and Mr. Saxbe.

In this sense, a congressional

resolution might influence Mr. Jaworski. As Mr. Saxbe said earlier this week about a congressional move to immunize Mr. Nixon: "The only people who can interpret what the American people want is the Congress. I think they're aware of this and if it were handled in that manner, it would not be a legal question."

Power to pardon

Under his constitutional power "to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States," Mr. Ford could pardon Mr. Nixon for his alleged crimes. This decision would be made largely on humanitarian and political grounds, the anticipated public reaction.

Asked last November—in his confirmation hearings at the Senate Rules Committee on his nomination for vice president—whether he would pardon Mr. Nixon should he become president, Mr. Ford said:

"I don't think the public would stand for it."

Sentiments change, however, and there is no public outcry in Washington to deny Mr. Nixon immunity and a pardon, if necessary. Senator Brooke seems to have expressed the dominant mood here.

"It's pretty tough to picture a former President of the United States in jail," Representative Charles E. Wiggins (R., Calif.), Mr. Nixon's most eloquent defender on the House Judiciary Committee, told reporters at breakfast yesterday.

Senator Robert P. Griffin (R., Mich.), the assistant Republican leader of the Senate, said earlier this week that President Nixon's alleged offenses were not so serious that people wanted to see him in jail.

However, the feeling in the nation might not run entirely that way.

The California Poll, operated by Mervin D. Field in President Nixon's home state, showed this week that 51 per cent of those asked felt that Mr. Nixon should not be granted immunity from prosecution and 34 per cent said he should be granted immunity.

Even if Mr. Nixon is given full immunity from federal action, he could still face other legal problems as a private citizen. There would be no bar to subpoenaing him to testify in court, an expected move in the coming Watergate coverup case. He could also be indicted by state and local prosecutors and he could be sued in civil cases.

Mr. Nixon might also be disbarred because of his alleged misconduct.

A committee of the New

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7 August 1974

Nixon's previous statements

Before new disclosures, President assured U.S. that FBI was 'conducting a full field investigation'; pledged no cover-up

By a staff writer of
The Christian Science Monitor

Many of President Nixon's statements on the fullness of White House-ordered investigations into Watergate from 1972 onward now contrast sharply with his latest statement — that he ordered the FBI to limit its investigation into the Watergate break-in six days after the break-in occurred — June 23, 1972.

Excerpts from those statements follow:

Press conference — Aug. 29, 1972

"... The FBI is conducting a full field investigation. ... The other point I should make is that these investigations — the investigations by the GAO (General Accounting Office), the investigation by the FBI, by the Department of Justice — have, at my direction, had the total cooperation of the — not only the White House but also all agencies of government.

"... What really hurts is if you try to cover it up. ..."

TV address — April 30, 1973

"Last June 17 while I was in Florida ... I first learned from news reports of the Watergate break-in. ... I immediately ordered an investigation by appropriate government authorities. ...

"I again ordered that all persons in the government, or at the re-election committee, should cooperate fully with the FBI, the prosecutors, and the grand jury. ... There can be no whitewash at the White House.

Press statement — May 22, 1973

"The burglary and bugging of the

Democratic National Committee headquarters came as a complete surprise to me. ... My immediate reaction was that those guilty should be brought to justice and, with the five burglars themselves already in custody, I assumed that they would be.

"Within a few days, however, I was advised that there was a possibility of CIA involvement in some way.

"It did seem to me possible that, because of the involvement of former CIA personnel, and because of some of their apparent associations, the investigation could lead to the uncovering of covert CIA operations totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in. ... It was certainly not my intent, nor my wish, that the investigation of the Watergate break-in or of related acts be impeded in any way. ..."

Written statement — Aug. 15, 1973

"In the summer of 1972, I had given orders for the Justice Department and the FBI to conduct a thorough and aggressive investigation of the Watergate break-in ... my only concern about the scope of the investigation was that it might lead into CIA or other national security operations of a sensitive nature. Mr. Gray, the acting director of the FBI, told me by telephone on July 8 that he had met with General Walters, that General Walters had told him the CIA was not involved, and that CIA activities would not be compromised by the FBI investigation. As a result, any problems that Mr. Gray may have had in coordinating with the CIA

were moot. I concluded by instructing him to press forward vigorously with his own investigation. ...

"Attorney General Kleindienst ... informed us that it had been the most intensive investigation since the assassination of President Kennedy, and that it had been established that no one at the White House, and no higher-ups in the campaign committee, were involved. ...

"Not only was I unaware of any cover-up, but at that time [Sept. 15] and until March 21, I was unaware that there was anything to cover up ...

"My consistent position from the beginning has been to get out the facts about Watergate, not to cover them up. ..."

Nov. 20, 1973

At a private appearance before Republican governors in Memphis, President Nixon said that no "other bombs" of Watergate information were about to explode. On Nov. 21, the 18½-minute tape gap was disclosed to Judge Sirica and made public.

TV speech — April 29, 1974

(Release of tape transcripts of presidential conversations) "will at last, once and for all, show that what I knew and what I did with regard to the Watergate break-in and cover-up were just as I have described them to you from the very beginning. ...

"As far as what the President personally knew and did with regard to Watergate and the cover-up is concerned, these materials — together with those already made available — will tell it all."

York city bar association reportedly has been investigating Mr. Nixon in proceedings that could lead to disbarment. The state bar of California is also conducting a disbarment investigation.

The California Poll asked if Mr. Nixon should be allowed to continue to practice law after being removed from the presidency. Fifty per cent said he should not and 31 per cent said he should be allowed to practice.

There appeared to be little

support in Congress yesterday to continue the impeachment proceedings in light of the Nixon resignation, but Senator Frank E. Moss (D. Utah) said Mr. Nixon should be impeached if he resigns without acknowledging guilt.

"We all feel that whatever abuses of power were committed ought somehow to be laid out on the public record," said Senator Byrd, who indicated that the final filing of the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment report might serve that purpose.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 6, 1974

White House Transcripts of 3 Nixon-Haldeman Conversations on June 23, 1972

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 5—Following are transcripts released by the White House today of three conversations between President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman on June 23, 1972. The White House said the transcripts were as complete as the quality of the tape recordings would permit.

FIRST TRANSCRIPT

Meeting: The President and Haldeman, Oval Office, June 23, 1972 (10:04-11:39 A.M.)

(Unintelligible)

P (Unintelligible) . . . they've got a magnificent place.

H No, they don't. See, that was all hand-held camera without lighting—lousy place. It's good in content, it's terrible in film quality.

P (Unintelligible) Rose, she ought to be in here.

H No, well let her in if you want to, sure—

P That's right. Got so goddamned much (scratching noises)

H Goddamned.

P I understand, I just thought (unintelligible). If I do, I just buzz.

H Yeah, Ah—

P Good, that's a very good paper at least (unintelligible) The one thing they haven't got in there is the thing we mentioned with regard to the armed services.

H I covered that with Ehrlichman who says that can be done and he's moving. Not only armed services, but the whole Government.

P GSA? All government?

H All government procurement, yeah and, I talked to John about that and he thought that was a good idea. So, Henry gets back at 3:45.

P I told Haig today that I'd see Rogers at 4:30.

H Oh, good, O.K.

P Well, if he gets back at 3:45, he won't be here until 4:00 or 4:30.

H It'll be a little after 4:00 (unintelligible) 5:00.

Trip to Camp David

P Well, I have to, I'm supposed to go to Camp David. Rogers doesn't need a lot of time, does he?

H No sir.

P Just a picture?

H That's all. He called me about it yesterday afternoon and said I don't want to be in the meeting with Henry. I understand that but there may be a couple of points Henry wants me to be aware of.

P Sure.

P (Unintelligible) Call him and tell him we'll call him as soon as Henry gets here, between 4:30 and 5:00 (unintelligible) Good.

H O.K., that's fine.

H Now, on the investigation, you know the Democratic break-in thing, we're back in the problem area because the F.B.I. is not under control, because Gray doesn't exactly know how to control it and they have—their investigation is now leading into some productive areas—because they've been able to trace the money—not through the money itself—but through the bank

sources—the banker. And, and it goes in some directions we don't want it to go. Ah, also there have been some things—like an informant came in off the street to the F.B.I. in Miami who was a photographer or has a friend who is a photographer who developed some films through this Guy Barker and the films had pictures of Democratic National Committee letterhead documents and things. So it's things like that that are filtering in. Mitchell came up with yesterday, and John Dean analyzed very carefully last night and concludes; concurs now with Mitchell's recommendation that the only way to solve this, and we're set up beautifully to do it, ah, in that and that—the only network that paid any attention to it last night was NBC—they did a massive story story on the Cuban thing.

P That's right.

H That the way to handle this now is for us to have Walters call Pat Gray and just say, "stay to hell out of this—this is ah, business here we don't want you to go any further on it." That's not an unusual development, and ah, that would take care of it.

P What about Pat Gray—you mean Pat Gray doesn't want to?

H Pat does want to. He doesn't know how to, and he doesn't have, he doesn't have any basis for doing it. Given this, he will then have the basis. He'll call Mark Felt in, and the two of them—and Mark Felt wants to cooperate because he's ambitious—

P Yeah.

What Would Be Said

H He'll call him in and say, "we've got the signal from across the river to put the hold on this." And that will fit rather well because the FBI agents who are working the case, at this point, feel that's what it is.

P This is CIA? They've traced the money? Who'd they trace it to?

H Well they've traced it to a name, but they haven't gotten to the guy yet.

P Would it be somebody here?

H Ken Dahlberg.

P Who the hell is Ken Dahlberg?

H He gave \$25,000 in Minnesota and, ah, the check went directly to this guy Barker.

P It isn't from the committee though, from Stans?

H Yeah. It is. It's directly traceable and there's some more through some Texas people that went to the Mexican Bank which can also be traced to the Mexican Bank—They'll get their names today.

H—and (pause)

P Well, I mean, there's no way—I'm just thinking if they don't cooperate, what do they say? That they were approached by the Cubans. That's what Dahlberg has to say, the Texans too, that they—

H Well, if they will. But then we're relying on more and more people all the time. That's the problem and they'll stop if we could take this other route.

P All right.

H And you seem to think the thing to do is get them to stop?

P Right, fine.

H They say the only way to do that is from White House instructions. And it's got to be to Helms and to—ah, what's his name—? Walters.

P Walters.

H And the proposal would be that Ehrlichman and I call them in, and say, ah—

P All right, fine. How do you call him in—I mean you just—well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things.

H That's what Ehrlichman says.

P Of course, this Hunt, that will uncover a lot of things. You open that scab there's a hell of a lot of things and we just feel that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further. This involves these Cubans, Hunt and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves. Well what the hell, did Mitchell know about this?

E I think so. I don't think he knew the details, but I think he knew.

P He didn't know how it was going to be handled though—with Dahlberg and the Texans and so forth? Well who was the asshole that did? Is it Liddy? Is that the fellow? He must be a little nuts.

H He is.

P I mean he just isn't well screwed on is he? Is that the problem?

H No, but he was under pressure, apparently, to get more information, and as he got more pressure, he pushed the people harder to move harder—

P Pressure from Mitchell?

H Apparently.

P Oh, Mitchell. Mitchell was at the point (unintelligible).

H Yea.

P All right, fine, I understand it all. We won't second-guess Mitchell and the rest. Thank God it wasn't Colson.

Colson Interviewed

H The F.B.I. interviewed Colson yesterday. They determined that would be a good thing to do. To have him take an interrogation, which he did, and that—the F.B.I. guys working the case concluded that there were one or two possibilities—one, that this is a White House—they don't think that there is anything at the election committee—they think it was either a White House operation and they had some obscure reasons for it—nonpolitical, or it was a Cuban and the C.I.A. And after their interrogation of Colson yesterday, they concluded it was not the White House, but are now convinced it is a C.I.A. thing, so the C.I.A. turnover would—

P Well, not sure of their analysis, I'm not going to get that involved. I'm (unintelligible).

H No, sir, we don't want you to.

P You call them in.

H Good deal.

P Play it tough. That's the way they play it and that's the way we are going to play it.

H O.K.

P When I saw that news summary, I questioned whether it's a bunch of crap, I thought, er, well it's good to have them off us awhile, because when they start bugging us, which they have, our little boys will not know how to handle it. I hope they will though.

H You never know.

P Good

H Mosbacher has resigned.

P Oh yeah?

H As we expected he would.

P Yeah.

H He's going back to private life (unintelligible). Do you want to sign this

or should I send it to Rose?

P (scratching noise).

H Do you want to release it?

P O.K. Great. Good job, Bob.

H Kissinger?

P Huh? That's a joke.

H Is it?

P Whenever Mosbacher came for dinners, you see he'd have to be out escorting the person in and when they came through the receiving line, Henry was always with Mrs. Mosbacher and she'd turn and they would say this is Mr. Kissinger. He made a little joke.

H I see. Very good. O.K.

A Meeting With Mills

H (unintelligible) Congressional guidance to get into the Mills thing at all. It was reported that somebody—Church met with Mills.

P Big deal (unintelligible).

H Well, what happened there is—that's true—Church went uh?

P Is it pay as you go or not?

H Well, Church says it is, our people don't believe it is. Church told Mills that he had Long's support on adding Social Security and Wilbur equivocated on the question when Johnny Burns talked to him about whether he would support the Long/Church amendment, but Long and Church telling him that it is fully funded—and our people are afraid Mills is going to go along if they put the heat on him as a partisan Democrat to say that this would be damned helpful just before our convention to stick this to the White House. Ah, Johnny Burns, he talked to Wilbur about it afterwards and this has been changed, so don't be concerned about it—you should call Mansfield and you should tell Mansfield that Burns is going to fight this in conference and that he will demand that it go to Rules and he will demand a three-day lay-over, which means he will carry the conference over until July 7, which would be—and then before they even start the action, so it will mean they have to stay in—they can't—

P All right.

H (Unintelligible).

P Go ahead.

'A Dangerous Game'

H Clark made the point that he should handle this, not you, and is doing this through Scott by Byrd, who is acting (unintelligible) still in the hospital. And ah, Clark's effort is going to be to kill the Church/Long amendment. They got another tactic which is playing a dangerous game, but they are thinking about, which is, if they put social security on (unintelligible) that they will put revenue sharing and H. R. in it and really screw it up.

P I would. Not dangerous at all. Buck up.

H They're playing with it—they understand. Clark is going off with the mission to kill it.

P Revenue sharing won't kill it. But H. R. I would.

H So that's what he is off to.

P But, boy if the debt ceiling isn't passed start firing (expletive deleted) government workers. Really mean it—cut them off. They can't do this—they've got to give us that debt ceiling. Mills has said that he didn't (unintelligible) of the debt ceiling earlier. Well, it's o.k. It's o.k.

H. Well, Burns says that he is justifying it on the basis that they have told him that it's finance. Ehrlichman met with them the Republicans on Senate Finance yesterday and explained the whole thing to them. They hadn't understood the first six-months financing and they are with it now and all ready to go and hanging on that de-

fense. He feels, and they very much want, a meeting with you before the recess, Finance Republicans.

P. All right. Certainly.

"British Floated the Pound"

H So, we'll do that next week. Did you get the report that the British floated the pound?

P No, I don't think so.

H They did.

P That's devaluation?

H Yeah. Flanagan's got a report on it here.

P I don't care about it. Nothing we can do about it.

H You want a run-down?

P No, I don't.

H He argues it shows the wisdom of our refusal to consider convertibility until we get a new monetary system.

P Good. I think he's right. It's too complicated for me to get into. (unintelligible) I understand.

H Burns expects a 5-day percent devaluation against the dollar.

P Yeah. O.K. Fine.

H Burns is concerned about speculation about the lira.

P Well, I don't give a (expletive deleted) about the lira. (Unintelligible)

H That's the substance of that.

P How are the House guys (unintelligible) Boggs (unintelligible)

H All our people are, they think it's a great—a great ah—

P There ain't a vote in it. Only George Shultz and people like that that think it's great (unintelligible) There's no votes in it, Bob.

P Or do you think there is?

H No, (unintelligible) I think it's—it looks like a Nixon victory (shuffling) major piece of legislation (unintelligible)

P (unintelligible)

H Not til July. I mean, our guys analysis is that it will—not going to get screwed up. The Senate will tack a little bit of amendment on it, but not enough to matter and it can be easily resolved in Conference.

P Well, what the hell, why not accomplish one thing while we're here.

H Maybe we will.

P—Yep. Not bad.

H—In spite of ourselves.

P—O.K. What else have you got that's amusing today?

H—That's it.

P—How's your (unintelligible) (Voices fade) coverage?

'Good Newspaper Play'

H—Good newspaper play—lousy television—and they covered all the items, but didn't (unintelligible) you gotta (unintelligible) but maximum few minutes (unintelligible).

P—(unintelligible).

H—Sure. One thing, if you decide to do more in-office ones—Remember, I, I—when I came in I asked Alex, but apparently we don't have people in charge. I said I understood, that you had told me that the scheme was to let them come in and take a picture—an Ollie picture—but (expletive deleted), what good does an Ollie picture do?

H—Doesn't do any good.

P—Don't know what it was but apparently he didn't get the word.

H—Well, I think we ought to try that next time. If you want to see if it does us any good, and it might, let them.

P—Well, why wasn't it done this time?

H—I don't know.

P—It wasn't raised?

H I don't know. You said it—

P Because I know you said—and Ollie sat back there and (unintelligible) and I said (unintelligible) But, (expletive deleted) Ollie's pictures hang there and nobody sees them except us.

H Now what you've got to—it's really

not the stills that do us any good on that. We've got to let them come in with the lights.

P Well in the future, will you make a note, Alex, Ron or whoever it is—Steve. I have no objection to them coming in, and taking a picture with stills, I mean with the camera, I couldn't agree more. I don't give a (expletive deleted) about the newspapers.

H You're going to get newspaper coverage anyway.

P What (unintelligible) good objective play—

H Oh, yeah.

P In terms of the way it was—

H Or in the news.

P Needless to say, they sunk the busing thing, but there was very, very little on that (unintelligible) Detroit (unintelligible)

H Two networks covered it.

P We'll see what Detroit does. We hope to Christ the question

P (unintelligible) SOB. If necessary. Hit it again. Somebody (unintelligible) busing thing back up again.

H What's happened on the busing thing? We going to get one or not? Well, no we're out of time. No. After.

P I guess it is sort of impossible to get to the research people that when you say 100 words, you mean 100 words.

H Well, I'm surprised because this is Buchanan, and I didn't say time on this one, I said 100 words and Pat usually takes that seriously, but that one—I have a feeling maybe what happened is that he may have started short and he may have gotten into the editing—you know the people—the clearance process—who say you have to say such and such, although I know what's happened.

P I don't know—maybe it isn't worth going out and (unintelligible) Maybe it is.

Ehrlichman Mentioned

H Well, it's a close call. Ah, Ehrlichman thought you probably—

P What?

H Well, he said you probably didn't need it. He didn't think you should, not at all. He said he felt fine doing it.

H Well, it's a close call. Ehrlichman thought you probably—

P What?

H Well he said you probably didn't need it. He didn't think you should—not at all. He said he felt fine doing it.

P He did? The question, the point, is does he think everybody is going to understand the busing?

H That's right.

P And, ah, well (unintelligible) says no.

H Well, the fact is somewhere in between. I think, because I think that (unintelligible) is missing some.

P Well, if the fact is somewhere in between, we better do it.

H Yeah, I think Mitchell says, "Hell yes. Anything we can hit on at anytime we get the chance—and we've got a reason for doing it—do it."

P When you get in—when you get in (unintelligible) people, say, "Look the problem is that this will open the whole, the whole Bay of Pigs thing, and the President just feels that ah, without going into the details—don't, don't lie to them to the extent to say no involvement, but just say this is a comedy of errors, without getting into it, the President believes that it is going to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again. And, ah, because these people are plugging for (unintelligible) and that they should call the F.B.I. in and

(unintelligible) don't go any further into this case period!

P (Inaudible) our cause—

H Get more done for our cause by the opposition than by us.

P Well, can you get it done?

H I think so.

P (unintelligible) moves (unintelligible) election (unintelligible)

H They're all—that's the whole thing. The Washington Post said it in its lead editorial today. Another "McGovern's got to change his position." That that would be a good thing, that's constructive. Ah, the white wash for change.

P (unintelligible) urging him to do so—say that is perfectly all right?

'Maye He's Right'

H Cause then they are saying—on the other hand—that he were not so smart. We have to admire the progress he's made on the basis of the position he's taken and maybe he's right and we're wrong.

P (Inaudible) I just, ha ha

H Sitting in Miami (unintelligible) our hand a little bit. They eliminated their law prohibiting male (unintelligible) from wearing female clothes—now the boys can all put on their dresses—so the gay lib is going to turn out 6,000 (unintelligible).

P (unintelligible)

H I think

P They sure test the effect of the writing press. I think, I think it was still good to have it in the papers, but, but, let's—perfectly—from another standpoint, let's just say look, "Because (unintelligible) people trying and any other damned reason, I just don't want to go out there (unintelligible) what better way to spend my time than to take off two afternoons or whatever it was to prepare for an in-office press conference." Don't you agree?

H That's, that's—

P (unintelligible) I spend an hour—whatever it was—45 minutes or so with television executives (unintelligible) all in and out (unintelligible). "Look, we have no right to ask the President anything (unintelligible) biased." (unintelligible) says I'm going to raise hell with the networks. And look, you've just not got to let Klein ever set up a meeting again. He just doesn't have his head screwed on. You know what I mean. He just opens it up and sits there with eggs on his face. He's just not our guy at all is he?

H No.

P Absolutely, totally, unorganized.

H He's a very nice guy.

P People love him, but damn is he unorganized.

H—That's right, he's not.

P—But don't you agree that (unintelligible) worth doing and that it's kind of satisfying.

H—Sure. And as you point out there's soem fringe benefits with—going through the things is a good exercise for you—

P—That's right.

H—In the sense of getting caught up on certain items—

P—Right.

H—It's a good exercise for the troops in having to figure out what the problems are and what the answers are to them.

P—Three or four things. Ah—Pat raised the point last night that probably she and the girls ought to stay in a hotel on Miami Beach. First she says the moment they get the helicopter and get off and so forth, it destroys their hair and so forth. And of course, that is true—even though you turn them off and turn them on so on. The second point is—

P—Well, the point is, I want to check with Dean to be sure what the driving time is. If the driving time with traffic is going to be up to an hour—

H—Oh no.

P With the traffic—

H But they have an escort.

P How long would it take?

Girls on Television

H Half an hour. Less than half an hour. You can make it easy in a half hour without an escort, and they would—they should have an escort. They should arrive with—and they may not like it—it may bother them a little, but that's what people expect—and you know at the Conventions—every county—she has another point though which I think will please everybody concerned. She says, "Now, look. You go there—she says as far as she was concerned she would be delighted—the girls would be delighted to very reception—everything that they have there." They want to be busy. They want to do things and they want to be useful. Of course, as you know, our primary aim is to see that they are on television (unintelligible) coming into the ball (unintelligible) shooting the hall (unintelligible) plan on television. My point is, I think it would be really great if they did the delegations of the bit states. Just to stop in you know. Each girl and so forth can do—

H Sure.

P The second thing is—just go by and say hello, and they'll

P They'll do the handshakers (unintelligible) you know (unintelligible).

H Well, the big point is, there's, there's several major functions that they may want to tie that into.

P Yeah. Yeah.

H There's—a strong view on the part of some of our strategists that we should be damned careful not to over use them and cheapen them. That they should—there is a celebrity value you can lose.

H By rubbing on them too much—

P I couldn't agree more.

H And so we have to—their eagerness to participate should not go—

P California delegation (unintelligible) think I'm here. I mean we're going to have (unintelligible)

P You understand—they're willing. Have them do things—do the important things, and so forth, and so on.

H There's the question. Like Sunday night they have the (unintelligible) whether they should go to that—now at least the girls should go. I think I ought to go too!

P Yep.

Plan for Arrivals

H You know, whether Pat — one thought that was raised was that the girls and their husbands go down on Sunday and Pat wait and come down with you on Tuesday. I think Pat should go down and should be there cause they'll have the Salute—

P (Inaudible)

H She should arrive separately. I think she should arrive with the girls. Another thought was to have the girls arrive Sunday, Pat arrive Monday and you arrive Tuesday. I think you're overdoing your arrivals.

P No, no, no. She arrives with the girls and they—they should go. I agree.

H But, I don't think you have to be there until Tuesday.

P I don't want to go near the damned place until Tuesday. I don't want to be near it. I've got the arrival planned (unintelligible) my arrival of, ah—

H Now we're going to do, unless you have some objection, we should do your arrival at Miami International not at

Honestad.

P Yes, I agree

H Ah, we can crank up a hell of an arrival thing.

P Allright

P (unintelligible) is for you, ah, and perhaps Colson probably. (inaudible).

H I was thumbing through the, ah, last chapters of (unintelligible) last night, and I also read the (unintelligible) chapters (unintelligible). Warm up to it,

and it makes, ah, fascinating reading. Also reminds you of a hell of a lot of things that happened in the campaign press you know, election coverage, the (unintelligible) etc., etc.

H Yeah

P So on and so on. I want you to read it, adn I want Colson to read it, and anybody else.

H O.K.

P And anybody else in the campaign. Get copies of the book and give it to each of them. Say I want them to read it and have it in mind. Give it to whoever you can. O.K.?

H Sure will.

P Actually, the book reads awfully well—have to look at history. I want to talk to you more about that later in terms of what it tells us about how our campaign should be run. O.K.?

H O.K. In other words, (unintelligible) the media and so forth.

P Tao a great extent, is responsible to what happened to Humphrey back in '68. If that's true, it did not apply in 1960. The media was just as bad (unintelligible) two weeks. In 1960 we ran—H it was a dead heat.

'How Much Television'

P All the way through the campaign and it never changed, clearly. It may be—it may be that our—as you read this on how (unintelligible) our campaign was...how much television, you know. We didn't have (unintelligible) at all. It may be that our '60 campaign (unintelligible) was extremely much more effective and it may be too, that we misjudged the (unintelligible). You read it through and (unintelligible) see what I mean. I mean, it's it's—even realize that '68 was much better organized. It may be we did a better job in '60. It just may be. It may tell us something. Anyway would you check it over?

H Yep.

P (unintelligible) check another—thing—gets back? Convention?

H He was, I'm not sure if he still is.

P Could find out from him what chapters of the book he worked on. Ah, I don't want coverage of the heart attack thing. I did most of the dictating on the last two but I've been curious (unintelligible). But could you find out which chapters he worked on. Also find out where Moscow is—what's become of him—what's he's doing ten years. Say hello to him (unintelligible) might find it useful (unintelligible) future, despite the (unintelligible). You'll find this extremely interesting. Read (unintelligible).

H Read that a number of times (unintelligible) different context—

P Ah, I would say another thing—Bud Brown (unintelligible) did you read it? (Unintelligible) candidates. I don't know who all you discussed that with. Maybe it's not been handled at a high enough level. Who did you discuss that with? (Unintelligible)

H MacGregor and Mitchell. MacGregor and Mitchell, that's all.

Pictures With Democrats

P Yep. (Unintelligible) I don't mind the time—the problem that I have with it is that I do not want to have pictures with candidates that are running with

Democrats—or against Democrats—that may either be (unintelligible) or might be for us. On the other hand, all sophisticated Democratic candidates you understand—the damned candidates (unintelligible) they gotta get a picture with the President. The way to have the pictures with the candidates—this would be a very clever thing—is to call both Democrats—the good Southern Democrats and those few like (unintelligible), who did have a picture with me, see, and then call them up and say look (unintelligible) came on and they took a picture and maybe (unintelligible) President. Wants you to know that if you would like a picture, if you would like to come down to the office, you know, you can have a picture taken that you are welcome to use. How does that sound to you as a (unintelligible)? Let me say this. I'm not—I'm not—I think that getting to the candidates out there that are very busy and so forth may help us a bit. If the candidates run too far behind you, it drags you too much.

H Yeah. That's right.

P On the, on the other side, I don't think it's going to hurt you particularly if you always (unintelligible) there's some quality—

H O yeah, but they aren't going to (inaudible)

P (Unintelligible) quite candid with you—I think when I ran in '46, remember, I would have gotten on my hands and knees for a picture with Harold Stassen and (unintelligible) whole story. We (unintelligible) to do what we can (unintelligible) in the House and the Senate—as well as we can.

H (Unintelligible) have our loyalists feel that we're—

P That's right. (Unintelligible) and I'll be glad to do it next week, and I think on that basis we can handle the Democrats. Say, "Look they had a picture," and then call each one. I mean they'll have to check this list. Check each one (unintelligible) and say, look (unintelligible) if you'd like a picture with him—not on a basis of support—one?

H Yeah.

P (Unintelligible) not going to make any statement—not going to make any statement. (Unintelligible) have a picture, he'd be glad to have a picture (unintelligible).

H Picture of the—

P That's right. Be glad to if you like, but it's up to you and so forth.

H You did the Democrats in here. Would you do a, would you do the Republicans? Do a different picture (unintelligible) full shot.

P Yeah. Another point I was going to mention to you. Bob, is the situation with regard to the girls. I was talking to Pat last night. Tricia and I were talking, and she mentioned—Tricia said that apparently when she was in Allentown there were 20 or 30 thugs—labor thugs out looting.

H Hmmm.

P And when she went to Boston to present some art—her Chinese things to the art gallery there—two the (unintelligible) from the press were pretty vicious. What I mean is they came through the line and one refused to shake. One was not with the press. Refused to shake hands, so forth and so on. Tricia (unintelligible) very personal point, (unintelligible) good brain in that head. She said first she couldn't believe that the event that they do locally (unintelligible) understand. You know she does the Boys' Club, the Art Gallery (unintelligi-

ble). She says the important thing is to find this type of (unintelligible) to go into the damn town (unintelligible) do television, which of course, they do. (Unintelligible) she says why (intelligible) control the place. She says in other words, go in do the Republican group. Now, sure isn't (unintelligible) to say you did the Republican group, as it is the Allentown Bullies Club? But, that's the paper story. The point is, I think Parker has to get a little more thinking in depth, or is it Codus now who will do this?

H They are both working on it.

P What's your off-hand reaction on that, Bob. I do not want them, though, to go in and get the hell kicked (unintelligible).

H—There's no question, and we've really got to work at that.

P—Yep. (unintelligible).

H—Ya, but in think—I'm not sure—if you can't get the controlled non-political event, then I think it is better to do a political event (unintelligible).

P—For example—now the worse thing (unintelligible) is to go to anything that has to do with the Arts.

H—Ya, see that—it was (unintelligible) Julie giving that time in the Museum in Jacksonville.

P—The Arts you know—they're Jews, they're left wing—in other words, stay away.

P—Make a point.

H—Sure.

P—Middle America—put that word out—Middle America-type of people (unintelligible), auxiliary, (unintelligible). Why the hell doesn't Parker get that kind of think going? Most of his things are elite groups except, I mean, do the cancer thing—maybe nice for Tricia to go up—ride a bus for 2 hours—do some of that park in Oklahoma—but my view is, Bob, relate it to Middle America and not the elitist (unintelligible). Dou you agree?

P I'm not complaining. I think they are doing a hell of a job. The kids are willing—

H They really are, but she can improve.

P There again, Tricia had a very good thought on this, but let's do Middle America.

H Yep.

P (Unintelligible).

Secret Service Reception

P I don't know whether Alex told you or not, but I want a Secret Service reception some time next week. I just gotta know who these guys are. (Unintelligible). Don't you think so? I really feel they're there—that ah, I see new guys around—and Jesus Christ they look so young.

H Well, they change them—that's one (unintelligible) any reception now would be totally different (unintelligible).

P Get 100 then—so it's 200 and I shake their hands and thank them and you look (unintelligible) too—(unintelligible). They have a hell of a lot of fellas, let's face it, (unintelligible) friends (unintelligible), but I just think it's a nice—

H They all—you have such—that's why it's a god thing to do, cause they are friends—and they have such overriding respect for you and your family—that a

P I wouldn't want the whole group—something like (unintelligible). Third point—I would like a good telephone call list for California, but not a huge book, and the kind is—This would be a good time where (unintelligible) and just give thanks to people for their support. For example, Colson had me call

(unintelligible) the other day—(unintelligible) thing to do, but, here you could take the key guys that work—I wouldn't mind calling a very few contributors—maybe, but we're talking about magnitude of ten—very key ten.

H Ten—you mean ten people?

P Ya.

H Oh, I thought you meant \$10,000.

P No, ten. Ten. I was thinking of very key (unintelligible), people like—that worked their ass off collecting money, just to say that—people that—the people that are doing the work—very key political (unintelligible) just to pat them on the back. I mean that means a helluva lot—very key political VIPs, you know, by political VIPs—ah (unintelligible) just get the South get a better (unintelligible). Our problem is that there are only two men in this place that really give us names—that's Rose—the other is Colson, and we just aren't getting them. But I mean ah, and then editors—by editors and television people—like a (unintelligible) cal, but a few key editors who are just busting their ass for us where there's something to do. But give me a good telephone list, and Rose should give me a few personal things—like I do a lot of things, but I called (unintelligible) here today some (unintelligible) and things of that sort. But I I never mind doing it you know when I've got an hour to put my feet up and make a few calls—don't you agree?

H Yep.

P I think of the campaign—that's going to be a hell of a (unintelligible). I think sometimes when we're here in Washington, you know, supposedly doing the business of the government, that I can call people around the country—people that will come out for us—and so forth—like (unintelligible) for example, Democrats come out for us. They're (unintelligible) right across the board—Democrat or labor union. (unintelligible)

H Ya.

Care Is Urged

P Religious leaders (unintelligible) say something. You gotta be careful some ass over in (unintelligible) checked on (unintelligible) that's why you can't have Klein (unintelligible). He just doesn't really have his head screwed on Bob. I could see it in that meeting yesterday. He does not.

H That's right.

P He just doesn't know. He just sort of blubbers around. I don't know how he does TV so well.

H Well, he's a sensation on that—that goes to the (unintelligible) meaning of the thing, you know. What's his drawback, is really an asset.

P Ya. If you would do this. Pat, and tell Codus, (unintelligible), but I will go to Camp David (unintelligible) half hour. Key Biscayne—she might want to stay there if she can go in less than a half hour with an escort. Do you think you can? Frankly, Miami Beach (unintelligible) but we can arrange it either way? Leave it to her choice.

H It wouldn't take as long.

P Leave it to her choice—she'd—it's—

H She'd—it's so miserable. If she's at Miami Beach she'll be a prisoner in that hotel.

P Yeah. Tell her—tell her that's fine. But it's up to her.

H Fair enough!

P I'll be anxious in (unintelligible) sign that stuff (unintelligible). I suppose most of our staff (unintelligible) but that Six Crises is a damned good book, and the (unintelligible) story reads like a novel—the Hiss case—Caracas was fascinating. The campaign

of course for anybody in politics should be a must because it had a lot in there of how politicians are like (unintelligible) elections, and how you do things, (unintelligible) as of that time. I think part of the problem as an example, for example, I'm just thinking—research people something they really missed (unintelligible) Burns. Pat and I, she said (unintelligible) no, she had remembered. She remembered (unintelligible) and Jimmy Burns said well (unintelligible) hard for me to come, but I just want you to know (unintelligible) but because (unintelligible) want you to know you are still my friend (unintelligible). Wonderful item to put in.

H Is that in the book?

P It's in the book. Hell yes. It's in the book.

P (Unintelligible) Why don't you reread it?

Z [Ronald L. Ziegler, the press secretary] We're delaying our briefing until noon for the higher education (unintelligible) and so forth. But I thought, if you agree, that I would not press purposes, but just sit on the side for this economic thing.

P Sure. How many of them are there?

Z Well there's the entire cabinet of economic advisers. I mean Council of Economic Advisers, plus Shultz—fairly big group.

P Shultz

Z Well.

H (Unintelligible)

P See what I mean?

H Sure.

'Should Be Must Reading'

P It's the kind of thing that I get in toasts and that sort of thing, but, but you see. I don't think our guys do that kind of—that should be must reading—that book is crammed full—crammed full—see. It would be helpful for those to get it. O.K. Oh, can we take another second? I mean, on that thing on the All Time Baseball greats—I would like to do that and, if you could, if you could get it.

Unidentified Voice. There's already a story at random—

P I saw it.

UV Indicating that you were going to P If you would get that—if you would get three of four. I don't want the—I'm only speaking of the All Times Greats.

UV Right.

P And then, and then get me a couple of other people (unintelligible) very badly (unintelligible) and I'll go down through the—quietly (unintelligible)

UV So do you want names from me or just a list of others you have picked?

H No, just the names that have been picked (unintelligible) various people.

UV Right.

P (Unintelligible)

UV Right, I got it.

P O.K.

UV Yes Sir. (Unintelligible)

H You did, huh.

Z Yeah. Incidentally, in the news summary (unintelligible) preferred television. Did you see that? (unintelligible) I talked to

H We may (unintelligible) we may not.

Z No, the point I'm making—

P I know Ron, but let me say—but I think—apparently, the TODAY Show this morning (unintelligible) two minutes of television—

Z—I thought he got good play. Particularly in light of the fact that ah, helluva a lot of other (unintelligible) would take place in the nation.

P—Right.

H We have an overriding—

P—What, weren't, how about the guys that were there? They were pleased with the—

Z—(unintelligible) and then (unintelligible).

P—Huh?

P—Cause I didn't think they would—

Z—But they always are—

P—Helluva a lot of news and—

H—Well that snaps all our own machinery into motion too.

Z—(unintelligible) damn. Feel it?

P—(unintelligible) that's good, warm—

Z—Right. They came to me and then said (unintelligible).

P—(unintelligible) should have some more

Z—And, they liked the color. They made the point about—you know. How relaxed you were, and at the end, sitting down and talking about the baseball thing after the whole thing—after it was over. You know, you just chipped those things off with such ease and so forth. It was so good.

SECOND TRANSCRIPT

Meeting: The President and Haldeman, Oval Office, June 23, 1972 (1:04-1:13 P.M.)

P—O.K., just postpone (scratching noises) (unintelligible) just say (unintelligible) very bad to have this fellow Hunt, ah, he knows too damned much, if he was involved—you happen to know that? If it gets out that this is all involved, the Cuba thing it would be a fiasco. It would make the CIA look bad, it's going to make Hunt look bad, and it is likely to blow the whole Bay of Pigs thing which we think would be very unfortunate—both for CIA, and for the country, at this time, and for American foreign policy. Just tell him to lay off. Don't you?

H—Yep. That's the basis to do it on. Just leave it at that.

P—I don't know if he'll get any ideas for doing it because our concern political (unintelligible). Helms is not one to (unintelligible)—I would just say, lookit, because of the Hunt involvement, whole cover basically this

H—Yep. Good move.

P—Well, they've got some pretty good ideas on this Meany thing. Shultz did a good paper. I read it all (voices fade).

THIRD TRANSCRIPT

Meeting: The President and Haldeman, EOB Office, June 23, 1972. (2:20-2:45 P.M.)

H—No problem

P—(Unintelligible)

H—Well, it was kind of interest. Walters made the point and I didn't mention Hunt, I just said that the thing was leading into directions that were going to create potential problems because they were exploring leads that led back into areas that would be harmful to the CIA and harmful to the government (unintelligible) didn't have anything to do (unintelligible).

(Telephone)

P—Chuck? I wonder if you would give John Connally a call he's on his trip—I don't want him to read it in the paper before Monday about this quota thing and say—Look, we're going to do this, but that I checked I asked you about the situation (unintelligible) had an under-

standing it was only temporary and ah (unintelligible) O.K.? I just don't want him to read it in the papers. Good. Fine.

H—(Unintelligible) I think Helms did to (unintelligible) said, I've had no—

P God (unintelligible)

H Gray called and said, yesterday, and said that he thought—

P Who did? Gray?

H Gray called Helms and said I think we've run right into the middle of a CIA covert operation.

P Gray said that?

H Yeah. And (unintelligible) said nothing we've done at this point and ah (unintelligible) says well it sure looks to me like it is (unintelligible) and ah, that was the end of that conversation (unintelligible) the problem is it tracks back to the Bay of Pigs and it tracks back to some other the leads run out to people who had no involvement in this, except by contacts and connection, but it gets to areas that are liable to be raised? The whole problem (unintelligible) hunt. So at that point he kind of got the picture. He said, he said we'll be very happy to be helpful (unintelligible) handle anything you want. I would like to know the reason for being helpful, and I made it clear to him he hasn't going to get explicit (unintelligible) generality, and he said fine. And Walters (unintelligible). Walters is going to make a call to Gray. That's the way we put it and that's the way it was left.

P How does that work though, how, they've got to (unintelligible) somebody from the Miami bank.

Bureau's Inquiry

H (Unintelligible). The point John makes—the bureau is going on this because they don't know what they are uncovering (unintelligible) continue to pursue it. They don't need to because they already have their case as far as the charges against these men (unintelligible) and ah, as they pursue it (unintelligible) exactly, but we didn't in any way say we (unintelligible). One thing Helms did arise. He said, Gray—he asked Gray why they thought they had run into a C.I.A. thing and Gray said because of the characters involved and the amount of money involved, a lot of dough. (unintelligible) and ah, (unintelligible).

P (unintelligible)

H Well, I think they will.

P If it runs (unintelligible) what the hell who knows (unintelligible) contributed C.I.A.

H Ya, it's money CIA gets money (unintelligible) I mean their money moves in a lot of different ways, too.

P Ya. How are (unintelligible)—a lot of good

H (unintelligible)

P Well you remember what the SOB did on my book? When I brought out the fact, you know

H Ya.

P That he knew all about Dulles? (expletive deleted) Dulles knew. Dulles told me. I know, I mean (unintelligible) had the telephone call. Remember had a call put in—Dulles just blandly said and knew why.

H Ya

P Now, what the hell! Who told him to do it? The President? (unintelligible)

H Dulles was no more Kennedy's man than (unintelligible) was your man (unintelligible)

P (Unintelligible) covert operation—do anything else (unintelligible)

H The Democratic nominee, we're going to have to brief him.

The remainder of the transcripts was not available for this edition. The full text will appear in later editions.

WASHINGTON POST
7 August 1974

CIA Gets Watergate Vindication

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

The newest installment of White House transcripts strongly vindicates the Central Intelligence Agency in its long standing denials of any direct involvement in the Watergate break-in.

The transcripts of the tape recordings reveal — in the President's own utterances — that the CIA was injected into the Watergate case by Mr. Nixon and his top aides. Their efforts delayed for nearly two weeks the FBI investigation of the first major evidentiary link between the Watergate burglars and the 1972 Nixon campaign organization.

But the strategy ultimately failed when former CIA Director Richard M. Helms persistently refused to give a written declaration to former acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III that the bureau's investigation threatened to expose covert CIA activities in Mexico.

The plan concocted in the White House by the President and his chief of staff, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, was to direct the CIA to tell the FBI to "stay the hell out of" (Haldeman's words) the investigation of Nixon funds which were laundered through a Mexico City bank account and ended up in the pockets of the Watergate burglars.

The new evidence wholly undermines the President's repeated claims that he was motivated by national security considerations in implicating the CIA. Mr. Nixon said on May 22, 1973, that his initial suspicions of CIA involvement were incorrect. But he did not concede, until the release of the latest bombshells of evidence, that the concern was to cover up Watergate-White House connections.

True to its institutional ways, the CIA had no comment yesterday on the latest developments. But there is little doubt that the tape disclosures provided a certain joy in Langley in the aftermath of the hammering the CIA has taken throughout the unfolding Watergate scandal.

There was one fleeting and cryptic presidential comment in the new transcripts relating to Helms on which no informed officials could shed light. It was the President's remark that "well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot."

Previous testimony in the CIA-Watergate affair has revealed that the White House acted through the CIA's deputy director, Gen. Vernon Walters, a former military aide to Mr. Nixon in his vice presidential days, to carry the message to the FBI.

Walters initially complied with the White House directive that he tell Gray the FBI investigation in Mexico endangered covert CIA operations. But he reversed himself in the face of the insistence of his boss, Helms, that there was no basis for such a stand by the agency. Helms, who had a reputation as an adroit maneuverer in Washington's bureaucratic minefields, was pursuing a strategy of "distancing" the agency from the scandal.

Despite the confirmatory revelations of the new tapes, the CIA does not emerge from the episode with its skirts in spotless condition.

Item. The agency did, in 1971, agree to provide—at high-level White House direction—spy paraphernalia to White House "plumbers" E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy which was used in the Daniel Ellsberg break-in. The CIA's defense was that it did not know what the equipment would be used for.

Items. In testimony to the the initial assistance to Hunt in August, 1971, when it became suspicious of his activities, it once again resumed dealings with him in connection with the White House-requested psychiatric profile of Pentagon Papers defendant Ellsberg.

Item. After turning off Senate Foreign Relations Committee early in 1973 Helms testified that the CIA had no dealings with Hunt or any of the other Watergate break-in figures subsequent to their retirement from the agency. It was Helms' successor, James G. Schlesinger, who broke the story of the 1971 assistance to Hunt to investigating congressional committees.

Item. Helms also denied in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the CIA was involved in an interagency White House domestic intelligence program launched in 1970. Subsequent publication of the so-called "Huston Plan" (drafted by former White House aide Tom Charles Huston) confirmed that Helms personally participated in the White House program. The CIA is prohibited by its congressional charter from becoming in-

NEW YORK TIMES
7 August 1974

FULBRIGHT PANEL CLEARS KISSINGER ON WIRETAP ROLE

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 6—The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously today to clear Secretary of State Kissinger of allegations that he had misled the committee about his role in the wiretapping of 17 officials and newsmen from 1969 to 1971.

In a report approved this morning, the committee "concludes that there are no contradictions between what Dr. Kissinger told the committee last year and the totality of the new information available."

The favorable report, first made known by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, the committee chairman, to newsmen, removed the possibility of Mr. Kissinger's resignation because of doubts raised in the press about his credibility.

Kissinger 'Gratified'

The State Department, late this afternoon, said that Mr. Kissinger had been "gratified" by the report and "no longer sees any reason for resignation."

"Therefore, he does not intend to resign," Robert Anderson, department spokesman, said. On June 11, in a news conference in Salzburg, Austria, Mr. Kissinger had threatened to quit unless his reputation was cleared of allegations that he had lied to the committee last fall.

Mr. Kissinger had noted news reports at the time based on Federal Bureau of Investigation documents that raised doubts as to whether he had been completely candid in discussing his wiretapping role before the committee last September when he was up for confirmation.

Asserting that he could not continue to conduct foreign

involved in internal security enforcement matters.

But on the crucial question of CIA involvement in Watergate, the White House instigated effort to suspend the FBI's investigation of the re-election committee cash, Helms stood firm against what must then have seemed awesome presidential pressures.

The new tapes gave some measure of how powerful those pressures must have been.

policy if his honesty was questioned, Mr. Kissinger asked the committee to make a new inquiry into his role in the wiretapping that involved 13 Government officials, several of them former and present Kissinger aides, and four newsmen.

"The committee reaffirms its position of last year that his role in the wiretapping 'did not constitute grounds to bar his confirmation as Secretary of State,'" the report said. It added:

"If the committee knew then what it knows now it would have nonetheless reported the nomination favorably to the Senate."

Committee members were unanimous in their statements to newsmen about their support for Mr. Kissinger.

Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota, said "the committee made a very exhaustive study."

"We found nothing in those documents or hearings of any significance to cause us to change our minds," he said. "The decision made at Dr. Kissinger's nomination hearings still stands."

Mr. Humphrey added that he hoped Mr. Kissinger would remain as Secretary, even if President Nixon was forced to leave office.

"He is needed," Mr. Humphrey said. "His role is good. He's a tremendous national asset."

The committee held six closed-door hearings in the current inquiry, with Mr. Kissinger testifying as well as Attorney General William B. Saxbe, Clarence M. Kelley, F.B.I. director, and Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., the White House chief of staff, who at the time of the taps was Mr. Kissinger's deputy on the National Security Council staff.

The report made clear that the committee's purpose "was not to investigate the wiretap operation per se."

It said that the inquiry did not make definitive findings on each allegation about Mr. Kissinger's role, "but we believe it should lay to rest the major questions raised about Secretary Kissinger's role."

The committee said that it was not ruling on the legality of the wiretap program, initiated, according to President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, to stem leaks of national security information to the press.

Noting that "discrepancies" remained between the F.B.I. documents and the testimony of participants, the report said, "Probably it will never be possible to determine exactly what took place."

It said that since it was impossible to resolve "every question about the wiretap program and Secretary Kissinger's role in it," the committee set "a more modest and realistic objective."

It said that it had tried to

answer two questions:

"1. Is there a basis in ascertainable fact to conclude that Dr. Kissinger misrepresented his role in the wiretapping during his testimony last year?"

"2. Would the committee, with all of the information it now has concerning the wiretapping program, reach the same conclusion it did last September that 'Dr. Kissinger's role in the wiretapping of 17 Government officials and newsmen did not constitute grounds to bar his confirmation as Secretary of State.'"

Answer Is 'Yes'

The report said that "after considering all of the testimony and relevant materials, the committee has concluded that the answer to the second is 'Yes.'"

In its inquiry, the committee failed to find "any significant

inconsistencies" between Mr. Kissinger's testimony last fall and the new evidence—primarily the F.B.I. material.

It noted that one "inconsistency" was the fact that the President's decision to order wiretaps was made on April 25, 1969, and not May 9, 1969, as Mr. Kissinger had first testified. But it concluded that "it matters little" when the decision was taken.

"None of the discrepancies that has emerged pierce the heart of the issue here: Is there solid reason to doubt that Dr. Kissinger was truthful last year in describing his role?" the report said.

The major question raised in the press about Mr. Kissinger's role was that in the F.B.I. documents, including memorandums written by the

bureau's late director, J. Edgar Hoover, Mr. Kissinger was described as "initiating" same of the wiretaps.

Kissinger's Contention

Mr. Kissinger, in his prior testimony, and in public statements had insisted that he had only participated in the program by supplying names of those who had access to information that had been leaked to the press, or whose files had derogatory information, or whose names arose in the course of the investigation.

The committee said that "to be sure there are inconsistencies between the F.B.I. documents and the testimony."

As an example, it said that there was a letter from William C. Sullivan, a former top F.B.I. official, to Mr. Hoover, dated May 20, 1969, asserting that Mr. Kissinger came to Mr. Sul-

livan's office that morning and "read all the logs."

Mr. Kissinger told the committee that he "cannot recall such a visit," the report said, and Mr. Sullivan "assured the committee that he neither saw nor talked to Mr. Kissinger during the entire time the wiretap program was in operation."

The report noted that Mr. Nixon in a letter to the committee on July 12 reaffirmed his own responsibility for the wiretap program. It said that Mr. Kissinger had told the committee that "I did not initiate the program, I did not recommend the program, and I had nothing to do with its establishment."

"I then participated in the program, once it was established, according to criteria that had been laid down in the President's office," he said.

NEW YORK TIMES
7 August 1974

Text of Report on Kissinger's Role in Wiretaps

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 6—Following is the text of the observations and conclusions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on its most recent inquiry into Secretary of State Kissinger's role in the White House wiretap program:

The purpose of the committee's inquiry was not to investigate the wiretap operation per se. Nor does the committee consider it necessary to make definitive findings of fact on each of the allegations that have been made concerning Dr. Kissinger's role in the wiretapping. In fact, this new record may raise additional questions about certain aspects of the wiretap program. But, we believe it should lay to rest the major questions raised about Secretary Kissinger's role.

The committee had no illusions about the difficulty of establishing precisely what took place in the wiretap program. There are some discrepancies between the F.B.I. documents and the testimony of participants in the program. Probably it will never be possible to determine exactly what took place. More than five years have passed since the wiretaps were initiated and time has taken its toll in life, memory, health, and records.

Some questions can be answered only by President Nixon.

Others could be answered only by the late J. Edgar Hoover.

Some inconsistencies between the testimony and the F.B.I. documents can be resolved only by Mr. William C. Sullivan, who is physically unable to testify.

Other aspects will remain a mystery due to apparent gaps in the F.B.I. documents.

Recollections of participants have become hazy and uncertain with the lapse of time.

Realizing the impossibility of laying to rest every question about the wiretap program and Secretary Kissinger's role in it, the committee set a more modest and realistic objective. The committee approached this inquiry with two questions in mind:

[1]

Is there a basis in ascertainable fact to conclude that Dr. Kissinger misrepresented his role in the wiretapping during his testimony last year?

[2]

Would the committee, with all of the information it now has concerning the wiretapping program, reach the same conclusion it did last September that "Dr. Kissinger's role in the wiretapping of 17 Government officials and newsmen did not constitute grounds to bar his confirmation as Secretary of State?"

After considering all of the testimony and relevant materials, the committee has concluded that the answer to the first is "no," and the answer to the second is "yes."

In making this inquiry the committee has not addressed itself to the legality of the wiretaps involved. It is neither passing judgment on the constitutionality of warrantless wiretaps for foreign policy/national security purposes nor on whether these individual wiretaps were properly justified if, in fact, warrantless wiretaps for such purposes were legal at the time. These are matters for the courts to decide.

But it should be noted that Dr. Kissinger's participation in the wiretapping came after assurances by the Attorney General that such wiretaps were lawful and by Mr. Hoover that similar wiretaps were carried out under previous administrations. It is highly unlikely that anyone with Dr. Kissinger's background, largely within the academic world, would question assurances of legality

and precedents from the nation's chief law enforcement officers. In carrying out his orders from the President, Dr. Kissinger was acting on the assumption, backed by Attorney General Mitchell and F.B.I. director Hoover, that the wiretaps were perfectly legal.

The committee has not found any significant inconsistencies between Dr. Kissinger's testimony of last year as to his role in wiretapping and the new evidence now available. It matters little whether the President's decision to use wiretaps in an effort to trace the source of leaks was made in April 25, 1969, as now appears to be the case, or May 9, 1969, as Dr. Kissinger had thought when he testified last year. None of the discrepancies that has emerged pierce the heart of the issue here: Is there solid reason to doubt that Dr. Kissinger was truthful last year in describing his role?

To be sure, there are inconsistencies between the F.B.I. documents and the testimony. For example, in the documents, there is a letter from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Hoover dated May 20, 1969, which states that Dr. Kissinger came to Mr. Sullivan's office that morning and "... read all the logs." Dr. Kissinger cannot recall such a visit, and Mr. Sullivan assured the committee that he neither saw nor talked to Dr. Kissinger during the entire time the wiretap program was in operation.

Much of the recent controversy over Dr. Kissinger's role seems to be a question of semantics, particularly over the meaning of the words "initiate" and "request" in relation to his participation in the wiretapping. Words in F.B.I. documents or on Presidential tape cannot be considered as definitive statements either of what transpired or of Dr. Kissinger's part in the over-all program. They should be con-

sidered only in relation to the framework of the overall policy ordered by the President and the total evidence now available.

Did Dr. Kissinger initiate the wiretap program by urging it on the President? Or, did he merely participate in the wiretapping, carrying out a program ordered by the President, as he testified last year?

Assertion by Nixon

In a letter to the committee dated July 12, 1974, in response to a committee request for additional information, the President wrote:

"I ordered the use of the most effective investigative procedures possible, including wiretaps, to deal with certain critically important national security problems. Where supporting evidence was available, I personally directed the surveillance, including wiretapping, of certain specific individuals.

I am familiar with the testimony given by Secretary Kissinger before your committee to the effect that he performed the function, at my request, of furnishing information about individuals within investigative categories that I established so that an appropriate and effective investigation could be conducted in each case. This testimony is entirely correct; and I wish to affirm categorically that Secretary Kissinger and others involved in various aspects of this investigation were operating under my specific authority and were carrying out my express order."

the committee, "I did not initiate the program, I did not recommend the program, and I had nothing to do with its establishment. I then participated, according to criteria that had been laid down in the President's office." The President stated that he initiated the program. Dr. Kissinger's role, as he described it last year and again this year, was that of

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN

14 JUL 1974

Cloaks and Daggers

assisting in implementing a program ordered and directed by the President. The committee has received no new information which contradicts that description of his role.

Semantic problems arise again in the question of whether or not Dr. Kissinger "initiated" individual wiretaps. Secretary Kissinger testified last year that he supplied names to the F.B.I. of those fitting the criteria agreed upon in the meeting with the President but that "in supplying the names we did not specifically request a tap, although we knew, of course, that this could be, was a probable outcome." In testimony this year he expalined that: "Insofar as the submission of a name triggered a series of events which resulted in a wiretap, it could be said that the submission 'initiated' the tap.

Contradictions Noted

There are unexplained contradictions between the testimony and the documents relative to the wording of individual wiretap requests. Documents concerning "requests" for wiretaps were generally prepared without the benefit of personal contact between the drafter and the "requester," whose real identity is sometimes doubtful. Upon questioning, Mr. Bernard Wells, the F.B.I. agent who handled the preparation of most of the papers relative to the program stated that the wording on the individual request forms could not be taken literally.

The committee was unable to settle to its satisfaction some questions about the initiation and termination of certain wiretaps. But it did establish to its satisfaction that Secretary Kissinger's role in the program was essentially as he described it in testimony last year.

In summary, the committee is of the opinion that it has appropriately inquired into Dr. Kissinger's role in the wiretapping, pursuant to his request following the recent controversy, and the committee now concludes that there are no contradictions between what Dr. Kissinger told the committee last year and the totality of the new information available. The committee reaffirms its position of last year that his role in the wiretapping . . . "Did not constitute grounds to bar his confirmation as Secretary of State." If the committee knew then what it knows now it would have nomination favorably to the Senate.

THE CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. By Victor Marchetti and Joan D. Marks. Alfred A. Knopf, \$8.95.

Reviewed by
THOMAS B. ROSS

This is a book that is important as much for the fact that it has gotten into print as for what it has to say. Marchetti is a former high-ranking CIA official and the first to write a critical unauthorized book about our multibillion-dollar spy organization. Marks is a former State Department official and senatorial assistant with extensive experience in intelligence matters.

The CIA — and to a lesser degree the State Department — tried to censor this book, arguing that the authors, particularly Marchetti, had in effect waived their First Amendment rights by signing various secrecy agreements during their government employ. The courts at first upheld the government's claim, and the CIA ordered the deletion of 339 passages in the book.

During the process of appeal, the CIA first agreed to restore all but 168 passages, then was ordered to put back all but 28. The ruling bears high significance. The CIA had argued the right to suppress anything it designated as classified information. But for the first time since secrecy became an obsession in the Cold War, the courts ruled that the government had to prove that the material truly endangered national security, not merely that it bore a classification stamp.

Prior to this ruling, there was a caste system in force in the government of our egalitarian democracy. Officials up to the topmost level were prohibited from publishing anything they had learned in their work. But Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officers, and most especially Presidents, were permitted to take their classified documents into retirement, declassify them on their own and weave the information into best sellers. It has been a comfortable

and lucrative enterprise: the leaders of our government have been able to protect themselves while in office by making secrets of that portion of the people's business that might be politically embarrassing. Then, upon leaving office, they have been able to sell the information back to the people, often for millions of dollars.

Until Marchetti and Marks came along, no one from the rank and file had dared to challenge the racket. Even now it is not sure that they have truly succeeded. The government has appealed the case to the Supreme Court, and so the book still bears 168 excisions, indicated by blank spaces. They are marked (deleted) but the only explosives involved are those of irate CIA officials contemplating the possibility that the spaces will be filled in after the Supreme Court hands down its ruling.

In this first edition the 171 passages originally deleted, then restored by the CIA, are printed in boldface type. They give the reader a good idea of what the CIA was worried about — revelations of its involvement in efforts to shore up or overthrow governments in Chile, Brazil, Indonesia, the Congo and Brazil. Disclosure that a "CIA raiding party" was operating in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 at the time two U.S. destroyers allegedly came under attack by the North Vietnamese, giving President Johnson the rationale for seeking and receiving the congressional blank check to escalate the war.

Much of what Marchetti and Marks write about has been previously revealed in books by authors with no government connection. But as the CIA has complained — the facts gain a special authenticity when confirmed by former officials who have dealt with the information first hand.

Of late, high-ranking CIA officials have begun to emerge from the near-total isolation that has characterized the agency since its inception after World War II.

Their message to the press and the people is that the CIA has changed its ways in keeping with the changing times. In an era of détente, the CIA is said to be concentrating on intelligence gathering and no longer meddling in the affairs of other governments.

But Marchetti and Marks, in a passage that was originally censored, estimate that the CIA is still devoting two-thirds of its money and manpower to covert operations. The authors argue that the spending is almost totally wasteful — they credit the CIA with having recruited only one man at a high level in the Soviet Union and maintain that he was actually turned over by British intelligence.

The bulk of intelligence, they say, is now collected by mechanical means — spy-in-the-sky satellites and the like — and the human agent is obsolescent. With the boldness of the initiated, Marchetti and Marks recommend the complete abolition of the CIA's "department of dirty tricks" and a return to the agency's original function as an intelligence organization.

"The other countries of the world," they conclude, "have a fundamental right not to have any outside power interfere in their internal affairs . . . the mechanism used to intervene overseas ignore and undermine American constitutional processes and pose a threat to the democratic system at home. The United States is surely strong enough as a nation to be able to climb out of the gutter and conduct its foreign policy in accordance with the ideals that the country was founded upon.

Thomas B. Ross, Washington Bureau chief for the Chicago Sun-Times, is co-author of "The Invisible Government," an inside story of CIA operations; and "The Espionage Establishment," an account of the intelligence structures of the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and Great Britain.

Prepared Statement on H.R. 15845

by

William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence

22 July 1974

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to testify today on H.R. 15845 introduced by you and Mr. Bray. The amendments proposed in this bill would be the first changes in the charter of the Central Intelligence Agency, found in the National Security Act of 1947. In conformity with our American constitutional structure, the existence of the Central Intelligence Agency stems from an Act of Congress. This is a unique contrast to the tradition and practice of most intelligence services, but it is a necessary reflection of our free society. The result, I believe, makes us a stronger nation, whose citizens live in a freedom envied by most of the world.

The amendments would add the word "foreign" before the word "intelligence" whenever it refers to the activities authorized to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency. I fully support this change. While I believe the word "intelligence" alone in the original Act was generally understood to refer only to foreign intelligence, I concur that this limitation of the Agency's role to foreign intelligence should be made crystal clear to its own employees and to the public. I hope this amendment will reassure any of our fellow citizens as to the Agency's true and only purpose.

Section (3) of the bill reenforces the charge in the original Act that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." The amendment states that pursuant to this responsibility, the Director shall develop appropriate plans, policies and regulations but such responsibility shall not be construed to authorize the Agency to engage in any police, subpoena, law enforcement or internal security activities, and that any information indicating a violation of the Director's plans, policies and regulations, should be reported to the Attorney General for appropriate action.

This amendment conforms to my own understanding of the meaning of the original statutory language. As I said in my confirmation hearing, I believe that the original Act gives the Director a charge but does not give him commensurate authority. Under existing law, the Director is responsible for developing such internal administrative controls as are possible and appropriate to protect against unauthorized disclosure, but if such a disclosure is identified, his only recourse beyond internal disciplinary action, including termination of an employee, would be to report the matter to appropriate authorities for examination of possible legal action. As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, the Government did take legal action with respect to one of our ex-employees who declined to abide by the agreement he made when he joined CIA to protect the confidential information to which he would be exposed.

Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with this clarification of the precise nature of the charge on the Director to protect intelligence sources and methods against unauthorized disclosure. As you know, I am of the personal opinion that additional legislation is required on this subject to improve our ability to protect intelligence sources and methods against unauthorized disclosure. The contract theory on which the previously mentioned litigation is based is indeed a very slender reed upon which to rely in all cases. My views on this subject became known publicly as a result of that case and the specifics of my recommendations on this subject are still under active consideration within the Executive Branch, so that an appropriate Executive Branch recommendation can be made to the Congress.

The bill would also require that the Agency report to the Congress "in accordance with such procedures as the Congress may establish" on those "other functions and duties related to [foreign] intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The National Security Act authorized the National Security Council to direct the Agency to conduct a number of foreign intelligence activities which by their nature must remain secret. The Act made clear, however, that these functions and duties could only stem from a specific direction by the National Security Council rather than being determined by the Agency itself. The amendments do not change this situation but add the requirement of reporting to Congress.

Mr. Chairman, at present the Agency reports to the Congress about its activities in a number of ways. On certain matters the Agency reports publicly, such as in this hearing and in my own confirmation hearings. The Agency further identifies for public release a number of matters affecting it or resulting from its efforts. A recent example was the publication of testimony on the economies of the Soviet Union and China provided to the Joint Economic Committee and published on July 19th with only a few deletions which related to intelligence sources and methods.

The second area in which the Agency reports to Congress is in its assessments of foreign situations. The Agency briefs appropriate committees of the Congress in executive session, using the most sensitive material available, thus providing the Congress the fruits of the intelligence investment made by the United States. I believe this type of reporting is particularly important, as I hope to make our intelligence of maximum service to the nation as a whole, and this can only take place if it can assist those in the Congress who share in the American decision-making process under our Constitution. The Appropriations Committees, the Armed Services Committees, the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and others have been the recipients of this kind of material. Again, to the extent possible, information provided and discussed in these executive sessions is later screened for publication. In many cases the sensitivity of the sources and methods involved does not permit such publication, but the classified transcript of the briefing can be made available to the members of Congress.

The third area in which the Agency reports to Congress concerns its operations. Pursuant to long-established procedures of the Congress, reports on these matters, including the most sensitive details, are provided only to the Intelligence Subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of each House. Mr. Chairman, there are literally no secrets withheld from these Subcommittees. In fact, I believe I have more than a duty to respond to them; I must undertake the positive obligation to volunteer to these Subcommittees all matters of possible interest to the Congress. As you know, these reports cover our annual budget, the details of our activities, and problems which may have arisen in some regard or other.

The procedures established by the Congress for this reporting have worked well. Large numbers of highly sensitive matters have been revealed to these Subcommittees over the years, and their classification has been respected. I am also aware of the sense of responsibility of the members of the Congress as a whole with respect to matters which must remain highly classified because of their sensitivity. Thus, I am confident that congressional procedures in the future will be as effective as those of the past and I welcome the codification of this relationship in the proposed amendment which requires the Agency to report to the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, the bill also reenforces the proscription in the original Act against police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions. I wish I could say that this clarification was not necessary but as you know, Mr. Chairman, I have frankly admitted that the Agency did make some mistakes in recent years in this area. Your own report of the investigations of this Subcommittee dealt with those incidents. The Congress has, in Public Law 93-83 of August 6, 1973, made clear that the CIA may not provide help to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in assisting local police and law enforcement agencies of the states and municipalities. The language of the bill would go further in this regard and prohibit the Agency from engaging directly or indirectly in the above type of activities within the United States either on its own or in cooperation or conjunction with any other department, agency, organization or individual. This would restrict our collaboration with the FBI to the field of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. It may also limit the degree of assistance the Agency could provide to the Secret Service, under the Secret Service Act, which authorizes it to call upon the assistance of any other agency of the Government to assist it in its mission (Public Law 90-331). While this amendment might restrict certain of our activities of the past which were not in any way reprehensible, I believe that its enactment at this time would be an appropriate way of clarifying the purpose of the Agency as related only to foreign intelligence.

I do note that the bill contains a proviso in this area which I believe is both appropriate and essential to the proper functioning of the Agency. This makes it clear that nothing in the Act shall be construed to prohibit the Agency from conducting certain necessary and appropriate activities in the United States directly related to its foreign intelligence responsibilities. I welcome this proviso not only for its content but also for its clarification of the propriety of some of the long-standing activities of the Agency which are essential to its foreign intelligence mission. These include:

- a. Recruiting, screening, training and investigating employees, applicants and others granted access to sensitive Agency information;
- b. Contracting for supplies;
- c. Interviewing U.S. citizens who voluntarily share with their Government their knowledge of foreign subjects;
- d. Collecting foreign intelligence from foreigners in the United States;
- e. Establishing and maintaining support structures essential to CIA's foreign intelligence operations; and
- f. Processing, evaluating and disseminating foreign intelligence information to appropriate recipients within the United States.

These matters were publicly reported by me in my confirmation hearing last summer, and I believe that there is general understanding of their necessity and propriety. The proviso in the amendment, however, would make this explicit.

The bill also adds a new subsection to the Act to prohibit transactions between the Agency and former employees except for purely official matters. I fully subscribe to the purpose of this provision, to assure that former employees not take advantage of their prior associations to utilize the Agency's assistance or resources or to have an undue influence on the Agency's activities. This is particularly directed at the possible use of the Agency's assets for "nonofficial" assistance outside the Agency's charter. I would like to

say that such a provision is not necessary, but again I must admit that errors have been made. While I do not believe there were any instances of major import, I accept the desirability of making the limitations on the Agency's unique authorities quite clear.

The normal legal proscriptions against improper influence on Federal employees apply, of course, to the Agency. In addition, a regulation has been developed within the Agency, which is brought to the attention of each employee each year, that any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative charter will inform the Director immediately. I might point out that in those cases which presented questions concerning the Agency overstepping its bounds, the propriety and dedication to American traditions of our own employees caused them to object to possible Agency activities outside its charter. In my confirmation hearing I stated that I am quite prepared to leave my post if I should receive an order which appeared to be illegal and if my objections were not respected.

Thus, we in the Agency are fully in accord with the purpose of this amendment. At the same time, I confess concern over some possible interpretations of the language of this subsection. I assume that "purely official matters" would include our normal relationships with our retirees or others who left the Agency. I would assume it would also enable us to maintain normal official relationships with individuals who left the Agency to go on to other Governmental activities so long as the "official matters" fall within the scope of CIA's legitimate charter and there is no undue influence involved. I do wonder, however, whether certain activities might be included under this provision as official which neither the Congress nor the Agency would want to countenance, and on the other hand whether the phrase might interfere with a contact with an ex-employee volunteering important information to the Agency.

Since the Agency has certain unique authorities under the National Security Act and the CIA Act of 1949 and since much of its work does involve highly classified activity, I would think it appropriate that the Congress add to the Agency's legislative charter some special recognition of the high degree of responsibility imposed on the Agency and its employees as a result of the grant of these unique authorities. This could require the Director to develop and promulgate a code of conduct for CIA employees at a higher standard than that expected of Federal employees generally. Thereby, the intelligence profession would become one of those with special standards such as the medical or legal professions. The Director's unique authority to terminate employees in his discretion when necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, would provide a sanction for the application of such high standards. Regular congressional review would provide an assurance that such a code of conduct was adequate and that it was being promulgated, applied, and adhered to.

Mr. Chairman, it has been a pleasure to have had this opportunity to comment on H.R. 15845. With the few reservations I have noted above, I fully support the bill. Most of all, I fully support the purpose of the legislation in clarifying the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency only to conduct foreign intelligence activities. At the same time, I am pleased that the modifications proposed to the CIA charter would not adversely affect its authority or capability to carry out the challenging task of collecting, processing and disseminating foreign intelligence in the world today. I believe these amendments would mark an important milestone in eliminating any apparent conflict between our ideal of an open American society and the minimum requirements of secrecy in the intelligence apparatus necessary to protect this free nation.

24 July 1974

THE BOOK REPORT

Probing the CIA's 'Cult of Secrecy'

BY ROBERT KIRSCH
Times Book Critic

A quotation from Malcolm Muggeridge provides the headnote for the final chapter of "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" (Knopf: \$8.95) by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. It is worth quoting in full:

"In the eyes of posterity it will inevitably seem that, in safeguarding our freedom, we destroyed it; that the vast clandestine apparatus we built up to probe our enemies' resources and intentions only served in the end to confuse our own purposes; that the practice of deceiving others for the good of the state led infallibly to our deceiving ourselves; and that the vast army of intelligence personnel built up to execute these purposes were soon caught up in the web of their own sick fantasies, with disastrous consequences to them and us."

President Words

Muggeridge wrote these words in 1966. How prescient they are remains to be seen, but there is hint enough nowadays to suggest their ominous relevance.

"The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" has already been much in the news. Marchetti, a veteran of CIA service, resigned in 1969 after 14 years with the agency. He began the writing of this book in collaboration with John D.

Marks in 1972. Shortly thereafter he was served with a court order obtained by the government enjoining him from disclosing in any manner (1) any information relating to intelligence activities, (2) any information concerning intelligence sources and methods, or (3) any intelligence information." In an introduction to the book, Melvin L. Wulf, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, which assisted in Marchetti's defense, describes the litigation.

In the end, the doctrine against prior restraint in publication was overturned in the case because as a CIA employee Marchetti had, the courts held, signed several secrecy agreements with the agency, and this made the case "a contract action" rather than a First Amendment issue.

In the course of legal action, and under protest, the authors delivered the manuscript to the CIA. The agency designated 339 deletions ranging from one word to whole pages. By this year, when another action brought by the authors went to trial, the deletions had been reduced to 168. The trial judge found that only 27 of these deletions were classified. The CIA appealed and so did the authors.

For the authors this historic censorship is evidence of the basic point they seek to make: that

the CIA has gone beyond its original purpose "as a coordinating agency responsible for gathering, evaluating and preparing foreign intelligence" to become "an operational arm, independent and unaccountable, the secret instrument of the Presidency and a handful of powerful men whose purpose is interference in the domestic affairs of other nations."

This last phrase is posed in the form of a rhetorical question, but there is no doubt that the authors intend an affirmative answer. That, indeed, is the burden of the remaining text of the book.

The strongest point made by the book is in its attack on the clandestine mentality, the "cult of secrecy" which the authors say has pursued policies to make the service immune from public scrutiny. This mythologizing of the clandestine shields the failures of the CIA, fosters a reliance on covert activities, minimizes accountability and injects into foreign policy and, to some degree, domestic policy operations which have the possibility of subverting the democratic process.

"Vital Function"

Marchetti and Marks do not deny "that the gathering of intelligence is a necessary function of modern government... makes a significant contribution to national security,

ty, and... is vital to the conduct of foreign affairs."

They continue: "The proven benefits of intelligence are not in question. Rather, it is the illegal and unethical clandestine operations carried out under the guise of intelligence that are questionable — both on moral grounds and in terms of practical benefit to the nation."

They call for legislation limiting the CIA's role to its original functions of coordinating and evaluating intelligence and urge that the minimal clandestine functions be assumed by appropriate government departments, with counter espionage functions taken over by the FBI.

Ironically, in one passage that remains intact after the CIA reading, they report on "the most important of the CIA's private literary projects... the massive secret history of the agency that has been in preparation since 1967."

This "encyclopedic summary of the CIA's past," which might answer some of their claims, they say, will never be published except for the benefit of those few who "have a clear need to know." That is the dilemma of secrecy — for we, the public, also have a need to know. The deletions of matter in these pages are a constant reminder of that deprivation.

LONDON TIMES

9 July 1974

Vatican denies
'CIA cash link'
with the Pope

From Our Correspondent
Rome, July 8

The Vatican newspaper *L'Osservatore Romano* today denied a magazine report that the Pope received money from the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when he was Archbishop of Milan.

An interview with a former CIA agent in *Panorama* last May said the Pope had received CIA funds for use in orphanages but may not have known where the money came from.

Today *L'Osservatore Romano* said in a brief statement: "His Holiness Pope Paul VI has never received financial contributions from the CIA or any other unknown source."

WASHINGTON POST

2 August 1974

Colby Against
Declassifying
Speedup

Associated Press

CIA chief William E. Colby yesterday said congressional efforts to speed the declassification of government documents would endanger the country's intelligence operations.

"I would find it very difficult... to urge a foreign intel-

ligence service or a strategically placed individual in a foreign government or a foreign country to cooperate with this agency and to provide information in confidence if the law of this country required that such information be made available to the public two years later," Colby told a House Government Operations subcommittee.

The subcommittee is considering amendments to the Freedom of Information Act that would require all documents labeled secret and confidential to be declassified within two years.

JAPAN TIMES
6 July 1974

Ex-CIA Man Criticizes Agency in Book

WASHINGTON (AP) — A new book about the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) says a series of American presidents encouraged and assisted the agency to shift from its original mission of gathering intelligence to one primarily devoted to covert operations.

While conceding the agency a number of successes, the book says the agency has become "a secret instrument of

the presidency and a handful of powerful men, wholly independent of public accountability."

The CIA's chief purpose is interference in the domestic affairs of other nations (and perhaps our own) by means of penetration agents, propaganda, covert paramilitary interventions and an array of other dirty tricks," the book says.

The authors of "The CIA

and the Cult of Intelligence" are Victor Marchetti, a CIA man for 14 years who rose to be executive assistant to the deputy director, and John D. Marks, a former State Department official.

The book, just published, has been a subject of litigation for years. The CIA obtained an injunction barring Marchetti from publishing any secrets he learned while he was in CIA employ.

When the manuscript was submitted last fall, the CIA ordered 339 deletions, ranging from single words to entire pages, but it later yielded on all but 168. A federal judge ruled that only 27 of them were justified. Pending appeals, however, the book has been published with blank spaces representing the 168 passages.

The CIA has not commented on specific portions of the book, but says it does not endorse it nor agree with its conclusions.

The authors note that President Harry Truman, during whose administration the CIA was established, said in 1963 he was disturbed that it had

been diverted from its original assignment and become "an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the Government."

"In no instance has a president of the United States ever made a serious attempt to review or revamp the covert practices of the CIA," Marchetti and Marks write. "And this is not surprising: presidents like the CIA. It does their dirty work — work that might not otherwise be doable. When the agency fails or blunders, all the president need do is to deny, scold or threaten."

In a passage that the agency first ordered deleted, the authors say the CIA employs 16,500 persons — not counting tens of thousands of agents mostly overseas who work under contract — and has an annual budget of \$750 million, plus hundreds of millions more from the Pentagon.

Even so, Marchetti and Marks say, that is less than 15 per cent of the total of 150,000 persons and annual funds of over \$6,000 million spent for intelligence by the Government.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 August 1974

Mexico to Probe Charges Officials Are C.I.A. Agents

MEXICO CITY, Aug. 1 (Reuters) — President Luis Echeverria Alvarez today ordered the Attorney General's department to investigate whether there are agents of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in the Government, a spokesman said.

The investigation follows a

statement last month in Britain by Philip Agee, an American who claimed to have worked for the C.I.A. in Mexico and other Latin-American countries, that there were at least 50 people paid by the agency in the Mexican Government.

Since then there has been a rash of charges among political parties here that the other groups are harboring C.I.A. agents.

their just extent? Marchetti and Marks are of course entitled to their opinions. But then so are the "faceless, desk-bound bureaucrats" they sneer at—and even Presidents. To take another tack: the manner of both authors' departure from their jobs is not spelled out, but it is well known that Mr. Marchetti is violating the sworn oath of secrecy required of any CIA employee. (Presumably a similar requirement obtained for Mr. Marks.) If a man so grandiloquently abandons an honorable contract, what does this say about his honor? More specifically, what does it say about his accuracy in reporting?

Make no mistake: There is

much here for concerned citizens to ponder. These authors are too knowledgeable to be put down as just another pair of Peck's Bad Boys. (Mr. Marchetti confesses that he was probably the country's "leading expert" on certain aspects of Soviet affairs.) But neither are they so wise as to qualify just yet for Wunderkind status. In sum, it seems fair to affirm that a citizen would do well to weigh many another piece of evidence on this topic rather than rely on the unconfirmed allegations leveled by these rather grimy Galahads.

CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS
Mr. Davis served with the CIA's Office of Specific Operations a long time ago.

The chatter of disgruntled spies

The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. 398 pages. \$8.95. Knopf.

To the great joy of its publisher and authors this thick volume, in the brassy tradition of the old-style expose, has reaped a rippling harvest of advance publicity. This is because, according to its dust jacket, the book is "the first in American history to be subjected to prior government censorship," on the ground that it reveals government secrets normally held within the confines of "classified" information. Nevertheless the authors—Marchetti is a resignee from the Central Intelligence Agency, Marks from the Department of State—persisted clamorously; and the upshot of the legal skirmishing is a tome pockmarked with restored deletions, indicated by bold-face type, and with deletions per se in the form of blank areas approximating the length of the excision. If nothing else, the work is a bibliographical curiosity. Is it anything else?

Seamlessly written

To take its good points, the volume is, considering the dual authorship, seamlessly written. It has a good index. There are two charts, on the CIA's internal structure and on the components of the "intelligence community" in Washington. On the minus side the book has no bibliography, no illustrations and

no annotation. The few sources cited in the text tend to steer toward such twinkling examples of objective journalism as Ross and Wise's "The Invisible Government" (1964) or *Ramparts* magazine.

What of the alleged revelations that have caused such a clacking of media typewriters? These constitute a running diatribe against the "cult," or obsessive veneration, of intelligence gathering; detailed descriptions of the various branches of the CIA, viewed as the focus of that activity; and a concluding section that seeks to analyze "the clandestine mentality" and show why it ought to be eradicated. Throughout certain theses recur. The covert (secret or hidden) branch of CIA controls the agency, to the detriment of its less exceptionable information-assembling branches. Anywhere in the world such secret services exist primarily for the fun and games to be derived at public expense. The CIA "intervenes" in the affairs of other nations, and this is criminal; it maintains some of its background machinery in this country, and that is almost as beastly. Despite its machinations the agency has not placed a spy in the Kremlin since Oleg Penkovsky, and the British handed him to us to begin with.

The problem thumpingly presented by the appearance of this polemic is the nature of a government's right to protect its valid secrets. Should it have any secrets? If so who is to determine

GENERALNEW YORK TIMES
26 July 1974

Assessing the Strategic-Arms Negotiations in Moscow

By Paul Nitze

WASHINGTON — For those who have seriously hoped for long-term, balanced and effective limits on offensive strategic nuclear arms, the Moscow summit talks may turn out to have been a decisive, negative turning point.

There are three considerations: what was agreed, what was not achieved, and what President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger have said about the strategic-arms part of the talks.

The agreements covered three matters: a treaty prohibiting underground weapons tests exceeding 150 kilotons; amendments to the antiballistic-missile treaty under which both sides would be limited to one rather than two ABM sites; and an agreement that the delegations of the two sides will meet promptly to begin negotiation of an interim agreement on limiting offensive nuclear arms extending through 1985. The first two would appear to accomplish little of strategic importance and the third would appear to acknowledge a serious setback to previous hopes.

What was not achieved was a permanent agreement to replace the first interim agreement on offensive arms, an objective that the two sides at the last summit meeting, in Washington in 1973, had set themselves to accomplish this year. Nor was it possible to secure agreement on an equitable partial measure limiting deployment of the new family of Soviet offensive strategic-weapons systems.

The President in his television appearance on his return from Moscow said that new patterns were emerging between the United States and the Soviet Union "that hold out to the world the brightest hopes in a generation for a just and lasting peace that all can enjoy." The accomplishments at Moscow would appear to warrant a more modest appraisal.

The proposed treaty to prohibit underground tests—it requires Senate ratification—undoubtedly has positive political aspects. There was, however, inadequate time in Moscow to work out agreed criteria to distinguish between nuclear-weapons tests and peaceful nuclear explosions, and agreed measures to assure adequate means of verifying such a distinction. This task remains to be accomplished.

Furthermore, the strategic value of an agreement not to test after March 15, 1976, weapons of a yield greater than 150 kilotons—the equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT—is doubtful. The Russians have tested, or will have tested by the starting date of the ban, warheads they need for their new family of offensive weapons.

What would be cut off would be subsequent weapons tests above that threshold. A principal purpose of such tests would appear to be further im-

Paul Nitze recently resigned from the United States strategic-arms delegation in Geneva.

provements in the ratio of the explosive power of a warhead to its weight.

The strategic significance of such improved ratios for a force having the large throw-weight potential of the Soviet missile force is not readily apparent, while such improved ratios could be significant for a force with smaller throw-weight. (Throw-weight is the weight a missile can carry to a target.)

As for the proposed amendments to the ABM treaty, there are again certain positive aspects: One ABM site on each side would appear to be better than two. However, the defense either of a nation's capital or of an intercontinental ballistic missile silo field limited to 100 ABM interceptors is not of major strategic significance. The risk in the ABM treaty is rather the difficulty of distinguishing between an ABM interceptor and a modern surface-to-air-missile (SAM) interceptor. From that standpoint, the radar complexes around Moscow have a greater strategic potential than do those at Grand Forks, N. D.

What gives greater grounds for concern, however, is the summit decision that the delegations of both sides will now direct their efforts not toward negotiating a permanent agreement limiting offensive nuclear systems to replace the interim agreement but toward negotiating a limited agreement covering the period to 1985.

This decision would appear to undercut the positions taken by the United States delegation at Geneva under Presidential instruction and to favor the Soviet positions.

In essence, the United States sought in Geneva a permanent agreement based on the concept of equality, or essential equivalence, in basic verifiable limitations on those offensive weapon systems whose principal role is strategic, with a provision not to circumvent the agreement through the deployment of other nuclear systems not specifically limited. To avoid the necessity of the United States building up to Soviet levels to achieve essential equivalence, the United States delegation proposed phased reductions to lower levels.

I believe the Soviet strategy is to deal with each segment of the problem piecemeal, nailing down one piece after another in a manner favorable

to Soviet interests and using all effective measures—diplomatic, propagandistic and through enhanced military capabilities—to bring pressure on the United States to settle for such piecemeal agreements.

Among the issues the Soviet side considers already settled are the inequalities in numbers of launchers and silo dimensions provided by the interim agreement and their right to put multiple warheads on a substantial proportion of their more numerous and larger missiles.

Their current interest in a threshold nuclear-test ban (the treaty involving underground tests), agreement to forego a second ABM site, and a limited agreement to cover the period to 1985 is consistent with such a piecemeal strategy and with inhibiting a United States response to the imminent deployment of the Soviet Union's new and much more effective family of offensive strategic systems.

In the absence of any agreement by the Soviet side to substantially alter its past positions—and there have been no indications of such a change—I see small prospect of the continuing Geneva talks on limiting strategic arms making progress toward a balanced and substantially helpful outcome.

In his news conference in Moscow, Mr. Kissinger implied that the responsibility for lack of greater progress rested equally on both sides, which "have to convince their military Establishments of the benefits of restraint."

During the thirty years since I first became associated with the interface between foreign policy and defense policy, I recall no instance when a Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to respond to a valid Presidential order.

Any implication that the specialized advice of those legally charged with giving it cannot be overridden by Presidential or Congressional decision based on their broader range of responsibilities, that it should be molded to fit the views of higher authority or should be withheld from those entitled to it, I would find novel and contrary to our theory of government.

Furthermore, it is my judgment that the United States defense Establishment, because of its particular national security responsibility, has been more deeply concerned that there be balanced and effective arms-control measures than other parts of the Government.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 July 1974

Plutonium for Peace, Maybe

By Paul L. Leventhal

WASHINGTON—Peaceful plutonium can be the death of us all—not will be necessarily—but can be. The present course of the United States and France to step up the exporting of nuclear-power technology to nations willing to pay the cost is a form of insanity that may overtake the world before its awesome dimensions are realized.

Consider this: The nuclear power plants that the President wants to sell to Egypt are each capable of producing 150 kilograms (352 pounds) of plutonium as a by-product every year. After reprocessing, this plutonium will amount to more than 700 pounds of weapons-grade material suitable for the fashioning of dozens of bombs of the size of the one dropped on Nagasaki.

Consider this also: The Atomic Energy Commission plans to license over the next quarter-century 1,000 nuclear-power plants in the United States, which will produce 60 per cent of our electricity and also 660,000 pounds of plutonium a year by the year 2000.

Worldwide projections for that date are for 2,000 reactors, including our own, generating 40 per cent of electrical needs and also more than two million pounds of plutonium a year. These projections are based on the development of the so-called "breeder" reactor, which will generate more plutonium than it consumes.

All this, of course, is to be done under adequate—the industry does not like the term "strict"—safeguards.

A recent study by a team of outside consultants for the Atomic Energy Commission, which was released in May by Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff after he obtained it from the A.E.C., reported that current regulations are "entirely inadequate" to protect weapons-grade nuclear materials in the private sector from theft and subsequent fashioning into terrorist bombs. Most commercial reactors today do not use weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. If safeguards are so poor—and dangerous—now, what will the situation be like after 1980, when the A.E.C. predicts that commercial power reactors will be producing and using more plutonium than will the Government weapons program?

And also consider this: The A.E.C. conducted a secret study to determine whether two physicists with doctorates, fresh out of graduate school, could design an atomic bomb from current, public literature, assuming they could obtain the necessary plutonium or highly enriched uranium.

It has since been disclosed that the young physicists succeeded in designing a fission device that A.E.C. experts determined would explode with a force within 10 per cent of the yield predicted by the would-be bomb-makers.

And, finally, consider this: Plutonium is the most toxic substance known to man. One thirty-millionth of an ounce—less than a pollen grain—if inhaled or swallowed will cause cancer. Thus, even if a crudely fashioned bomb fails to explode, partial detonation will convert it into a terribly poisonous dispersion device. Also, the radioactive half-life of plutonium is 23,640 years, which means it retains its toxicity for at least 100,000 years.

These facts lead to three basic conclusions.

First, the nuclear-power industry generates the world's most explosive and poisonous element.

Second, this element can be fashioned by skilled, determined individuals into atomic bombs or deadly dispersion devices.

Third, present efforts to safeguard this element from outside theft or internal diversion have been found to be entirely inadequate in the world's most sophisticated nuclear nation, the United States.

What, then, are we in for if we and our peaceful nuclear competitors like France continue to view the exporting of this technology as a solution to our balance-of-payments problems?

At best, we are in for a period of uncertainty. It is an uncertainty built on the sure knowledge that even energy-rich nations like Iran and Saudi Arabia are only too ready to pay the price for the stuff that international dreams are made of: ultimate power. In that sense, plutonium-producing power plants are international dream machines. Plutonium has become the world's most valuable and coveted substance. India has recently demonstrated what one country can do with

plutonium from foreign-built reactors on its own soil—for "peaceful purposes," of course.

Even if the industry proves to operate as safely as the A.E.C. and other advocates say it will, there is still the problem of safeguarding nuclear materials from theft and nuclear facilities from sabotage.

At present, international safeguards as administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency cover only internal accounting systems (comparable to a bank audit), not physical security (comparable to a bank guard). However, while a bank audit involves accountability down to the penny, a nuclear audit is considered tight if it can account for 99 per cent of weapons-grade materials.

Materials unaccounted for already amount to thousands of pounds of plutonium and highly enriched uranium that the A.E.C. assumes—and can only assume—have been lost in the industrial process, not stolen.

Nevertheless, the A.E.C. does not require tests of the commercial-safeguards system—so-called adversary testing—to determine whether sneak-thefts of small amounts of weapons-grade nuclear materials are possible.

The nuclear power debate has been subjected to much sound and fury, mostly over the safety issue. This has benefited the industry because it has diverted attention from the most basic issue of all: safeguards.

The bottom line of the nuclear-power industry is the exporting and the common use of plutonium. Can the world whose commerce will soon have to accommodate more than two million pounds of plutonium a year survive? Even if legitimate governments agree to safeguard the industry from threats, thefts and sabotage, what of nationalizations, revolutions and terrorist attacks?

The trend toward nuclear power may be inevitable. But we, and the rest of the world, ought to know now what we are letting ourselves in for.

Paul L. Leventhal is special counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Reorganization, Research and International Organizations, which reported to the Senate the original version of a pending bill to reorganize the Atomic Energy Commission.

Eastern Europe

NEW YORK TIMES
7 August 1974

Dealing With Moscow: East-West Experts View Value and Risks

Last month, following the summit meeting between President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, Secretary of State Kissinger said that he expected a national debate on the meaning of security in the nuclear age and on the value and risks of closer ties with the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow, that debate in effect begins when Mr. Kissinger testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In advance of that discussion, The New York Times invited four public figures with interests in East-West relations to its Washington Bureau last Friday to consider some of the issues.

The discussion preceded President Nixon's latest Watergate disclosures Monday, but the participants already had assumed that the impeachment inquiry might result in Mr. Nixon's departure from office. They also discussed what implications United States policy.

The participants were Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of the Trilateral Commission, a nongovernmental group focusing on common problems of the United States, Japan and Europe, and professor of government at Columbia University; McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation and former adviser on national security to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; Senator J. W. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, a frequent critic of the Administration.

Clifton Daniel, Washington Bureau chief of The Time, moderated, assisted by David Binder and Bernard Gwertzman of the bureau.

MR. DANIEL: It seems to me that when we begin talking about security in the nuclear age, to us Secretary Kissinger's phraseology, we eventually come down to one question, and that question is can we trust the Russians?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I never like to put it as trusting people. It is a matter of recognizing and adjusting the interests of the two countries. Where their interests are in variance with ours, I don't think you can trust them or other governments. The only possibility of making progress is to discover, if possible, areas of mutual interest on which they can agree.

To take a simple example, we have had treaties with them in the Antarctic, for example, which it was in our mutual interest to make and they respected them.

Lack of Mutual Interest

Now if we take the other example, where we attempt to make them abide by our ideas of morality, or ideology and so on, there is no mutual interest there and you can't trust them to do something in reformation of their own society that they don't want to do.

SENATOR JACKSON: I think it boils down to the simple fact that if you are to have an agreement with the Soviets, it must be one that is not based on faith as such. I think agreements to be meaningful must be mutually self-enforcing. If one presupposes that we can enter into an agreement with the Soviets in which we are going to rely on their word or their interpretation, I think this is an illusion. I

suppose they might say the same thing of us. I believe it is important that the agreements that we do have with the Soviets are mutually beneficial so that they can be implemented and carried out to the satisfaction of both countries.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: If you ask whether we can trust the Russians, it sort of begs the question. Trust them about what? I think we can trust the Russians to promote their national interests as they best see fit, as I think we try to do also.

What bothers me about the problem of American-Soviet relations is that I see in the Soviet attitude the curious combination of ideological residue and recently awakened great-power nationalism, the combination of which may make the Soviet Union an insufficiently constructive partner in dealing with the new global problems that are becoming central.

Problems are Global

Indeed, in some respects, I consider the debate about détente a bit anachronistic because it focuses on a power relationship which is important and critical but which, in many ways, deals with the very traditional aspects of international politics. We are very rapidly being thrust into a world in which, for the first time, global problems are becoming central.

What makes me uneasy about the Soviet attitude is that the Soviet Union, in many ways, much less than the United States, does not have a global perspective. It has a rather narrow vision of its interests. There is

much less of a willingness to respond to the new global problems that impose themselves on us.

The longer-range threat is not Soviet domination, because I don't think the Soviets are strong enough to impose it on anyone—but world chaos to which the Soviets would be able to make a very major contribution.

MR. DANIEL: Since you mentioned détente—it was bound to come up very early in the discussion because the détente revolves a great deal around the word—you have said, that there is no alternative to détente. What do you mean by "détente?"

MR. BRZEZINSKI: When I said there was no alternative to détente, I mean as a matter of deliberate policy there is no alternative but for both sides to try to stabilize the relationship, to try to upset the competitive aspects of their relations with more cooperative aspects. But within that context, there are different kinds of détements that we can have.

Compartmentalized Concept

My criticism of the Nixon-Kissinger détente is that it is a highly compartmentalized, highly limited, very conservative concept of détente that happens to suit the Soviet leadership as well. It is not a détente which is compatible with these global problems that are surfacing and which require a much broader social, political, even cultural accommodation among the advanced countries. In that sense, it is an anachronistic and, in some respects, even a very dangerous détente.

MR. BUNDY: The idea, purpose, in American foreign policy goes back long before the present Administration. The first efforts in that direction, I think, can be associated with the later years of the Eisenhower Administration. They were an element, a strong element in the policy of both President Kennedy and President Johnson.

There were some results, as Senator Fulbright has suggested. I am inclined to believe, however, that détente is not a state of peace among friends, and cannot be, that there is this persistent ambiguity between our common interests and our adversary relationship, and that we have to expect that to continue. So when you ask the question, "Can we trust the Russians?" I agree that we can trust them to pursue their own interests.

In my judgment, the overriding common interest is survival in the nuclear age. One of the great things that we have achieved over the last 15 years is some increase in common understanding of that reality. The disappointments we have had along the way are not trivial; the disappointment with Moscow this spring and summer is serious.

I would think, nonetheless, that we have no alternative but to continue to try to have the most effective communication with this complex, secretive, self-serving, ideologically primitive state and, in that sense, I would agree with Mr. Brzezinski that we need more and not less effort at effective communication and, if possible, agreement with

the Soviet Union.

MR. DANIEL: Why do you think it was the Nixon Administration that was able to achieve this degree of détente, rather than the earlier administrations, two of which you served?

MR. BUNDY: These things build on each other. You can't have a SALT I except in the context of your earlier efforts over nuclear test bans and nuclear nonproliferation. I don't blame the Nixon Administration particularly for talking as if détente began in 1969. Most administrations have a habit of talking as if foreign policy began on the inauguration.

A National Objective

It is the fact that any large-scale policy of this and not all of the arrangements that have been made, I would have to say, seem to me to have been well calculated or carefully connected in spite of the Administration's belief in linkage.

I would not believe, to wind up quickly here, that détente is irreversible. I think it has been a national objective, not a single Administration's objective, and that it should continue to be so.

MR. BINDER: What makes it not irreversible?

MR. BUNDY: Czechoslovakia is a kind of example. Vietnam sometimes was an example of an action which could impede or make difficult communications. We could have that kind of breakdown or understanding in the Middle East. We could have it, I regret to say, on the next stage of the arms balance, because there are very serious differences evidently now between the concepts of Moscow and those of Washington as to what makes an acceptable agreed position for strategic weapons in the next five to ten years.

MR. DANIEL: Could you offer some reasons why détente is unstable or reversible?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: The first is the potential for leadership change in both systems. We may be getting a very significant leadership change in this country and it is conceivable that the new leadership in some respect is going to be more cautious in foreign affairs, more conservative.

We know that the Soviet leadership is aged, quite aged. It is one of the oldest leaderships in the world. We do know in the past at least that leadership changes in the Soviet Union produce periods of instability and rather dramatic shifts in foreign policy as well.

The second reason is more basic and worth considering in the general context of what is meant by national security. I think we are on the eve of a very major crisis

of international systems as a whole.

We may have national bankruptcies of a number of America's allies. The whole international situation is becoming unstuck. In that context, I think it is only reasonable to expect the Soviet Government to reassess its own stake in a détente relationship which is predicated to some extent on stability.

SENATOR JACKSON: I do not think it is a question of whether we should or should not have a détente. Everyone wants peace. The question is what kind of détente. You can have a good détente; you can have a bad détente. It seems to me that it boils down to the basic question of how should we conduct American foreign policy.

I think first that we should engage in hard bargaining with the Soviets, just as the Soviets do on every transaction. If you only put forward the proposals that you know in advance are acceptable to the Soviets, you end up negotiating on Soviet terms.

Second, each agreement that we enter into should reflect reciprocity, a two-way street.

The grain deal is the classic example of a one-way street. The Administration announced it as being part of détente. The official position now is that it was never a part of détente. That change came after the investigation of the grain deal was completed.

I would point out, too, that in this area of reciprocity there is a lot to be done in improving the accessibility of the American press in Moscow to their citizens as the Russian press moves freely in this town. Somehow we are reluctant to insist on reciprocal terms.

I think the whole world had a chance to see how reciprocity is handled when the Soviets cut off the interviews in the middle of the summit conference, over the three great networks.

Another key point here is the need for early progress in the critical area of mutual arms reduction.

To the man in the street, I suspect, and it has been my own experience in talking with audiences that if he would see some movement toward a mutual reduction in arms leading to disarmament, this more than anything else would give credibility to a better relationship with the Soviet Union.

The same applies in the area of progress in human rights. That is why I introduced my amendment on the right and opportunity to emigrate that is being debated too in this context.

There is also the need to promote genuine trade not economic subsidies disguised as trade.

Let me just illustrate how far the Administration has

wandered in the handling of trade, in the handling of exports. We are sending a lot of phosphates to the Soviet Union. The bulk of the phosphates come from Florida. We are sending so much now that we are being required to open up an important environmental area, one of the national forests in Florida, to mine phosphates because we are going to be short of phosphates for our own needs.

I do believe that we should have the kind of trade with the Soviet Union that is a two-way street. Now the facts are that the Soviets have very little to offer us in the way of goods and services, unless we are willing to spend billions of dollars in capital investment in the Soviet Union.

I would be willing to make some special concessions in commerce and trade, recognizing that our trade with the Soviet Union will not inure directly to our commercial benefit if we can work out satisfactory arrangements in other fields with them.

I think another element in a genuine détente that is of critical importance is the restraint on the part of both countries — it has not been exercised by the Russians of late — in the delivery of sophisticated weapons to areas of tension. The Middle East is a classic example of this.

Better relations with the Soviets requires less emphasis by the Soviets on the ideological struggle.

MR. DANIEL: Do any of you feel that détente with the Soviet Union depends on the personal relationship between President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev to the extent that Mr. Nixon indicates? Secondly, is détente a partisan matter in your view, as between Republicans and Democrats?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I don't think it is partisan. I don't think the personal relations can have a great effect. You asked a moment ago why Mr. Nixon could do this. I think one of the reasons is the fact that he has such a reputation for being anti-Communist.

If the Democrats did the same, they would be accused by the Republicans of being subversive.

I think much of it has to do with our ancient feeling about the Russians being atheistic Communists and bad people.

MR. BUNDY: I would just say that I don't think President Johnson felt inhibited on the Soviet side. I do think Senator Fulbright's remark about [Nixon's] special advantage is important in the context of China.

SENATOR JACKSON: I might make one observation. I think Communist states tend to speak in terms of top personalities of other governments. I have found this generally to be true,

that. However, that the departure of a top representative of any of the states will in itself cause a change in relations.

I think this points up the need to institutionalize our relationships more effectively between the United States and the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: It seems to me that the central question about détente is whether our policies are reinforcing the worst tendencies in the Soviet system or are they encouraging the best. It seems to me that a meaningful détente, one which offers real prospects for the future, is obviously the one which engages the Soviet Union in more extensive, more collaborative effort in regard to all of the central issues that are now becoming important.

It is this kind of détente which I believe this Administration has not been successful in mounting.

The fact of the matter is that the economic relationship today amounts to nothing less than a fairly sizable Americanized science-technology transfer to the Soviet Union. This I think is the kind of détente which does not encourage the best and which is some respects reinforces the worst because it delays internal reform in the Soviet Union. It makes it impossible for the Soviet system to maintain a highly centralized economic system on the basis of a highly centralized political system. It impedes the kind of pressures from within the economy which in time will spill over into the political realm. Indeed it even encourages a certain measure of domestic repression when external costs are not too high.

MR. BUNDY: Are you suggesting that not to have economic relations would lead to an increased diversity in the Soviet economic system?

MR. BRZEZINSKI: What I am suggesting is that the economic relationship ought to be calibrated very closely to the development of other relationships and should not outpace it on the basis of one-sided arrangements.

SENATOR JACKSON: I will break in here by saying that this is where hard bargaining comes in. The Soviets have a serious need for our science, our technology, our business-management technicians and a vast amount of our agriculture and agricultural know-how. All I am suggesting is that in light of this situation we should in our bargaining relate this to a reordering of priorities in both countries.

I don't see why we should subsidize their military-industrial complex. I would be willing to make some economic and some technological concessions if I could see a movement away from the Soviet arms build-up to an

arms reduction.

MR. DANIEL: Senator Fulbright, a short while ago, Senator Jackson outlined what might be described as a negotiating posture toward the Soviet Union. Do you agree with that attitude and posture?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: No. Just two incidents I want to remark on. When he says that the grain deal was part of détente, I never conceived that it was part of détente. It was part of the elections of 1972 to create an image of tremendous effectiveness on the part of President Nixon to get rid of a surplus.

What was wrong with it was selling it at such a cheap price. We had had a policy for 2 years of helping our farmers by getting rid of our surpluses to the extent of giving it away under P. L. [public law] 980. What was wrong with that is the price. If we had gotten \$2.50 a bushel, it would have been a good grain deal. Giving it to them at \$1.65 was stupidity, but it was our stupidity. We didn't have to give it at \$1.65.

Now, if you come down to attitude, I think the attitude is basic to it in the matter of arms. The overriding, single most important one is the control of strategic arms. I can't see where we have been very forthcoming. The Secretary of State says we have three times as many nuclear warheads as the Russians today.

We have the forward bases, we have the aircraft carriers, all with nuclear weapons. We our nuclear weapons on the borders of Russia, all the way from Turkey, Germany, and all around their periphery except, I guess, on the Arctic Circle.

I think they have taken the position that we meant it when we said "parity" and they have not achieved parity. I don't think they are going to be satisfied in agreeing to a permanent inferiority which they believe they have.

Now, you get into all kinds of minute descriptions of "throw weight" and so on in this argument, but I just sum it up by saying the Secretary believes that we have—I think he said we have 36 warheads for each 218 cities in the Soviet Union. We could, if they were perfect in their delivery system, that many on each city.

We have, all along, been ahead of them, back to the missile gap of the Kennedy era, when President Kennedy alleged there was a missile gap. There was a missile gap but it was in reverse. We had about 1,000 weapons and they had about 80, whereas he made the country believe that we had 80 and they had 1,000. It just was not so. But the public believes that we are behind.

We have had Admiral Moorer and Admiral Zumwalt going about recently—of course, this always happens; this is an annual ritual just before appropriations time—saying we are suddenly inferior, our fleets are in-

ferior, everything is inferior, we are in terrible shape militarily, and therefore we need more money.

I think when it comes to the nitty-gritty of doing something, we are never quite willing to do it. We began MIRV, we have advanced the Trident, which is twice as large as their biggest submarine. We are going into the B-1, which they have nothing comparable to.

SENATOR JACKSON: May I just make a brief comment to my colleagues. I think we should all agree that reduction of arms to a new and lower level of equality should be our main objective. What is being said is that there is too much armament on both sides. My answer is very simple. Let us start reducing on both sides.

MR. DANIEL: Although you make that suggestion, it seems that the military on both sides are opposed to this. Both Washington and Moscow, think they must approach détente from a strong military position. How are we going to deal with that problem?

SENATOR JACKSON: This is not correct on the American side. I have seen the official papers. The Secretary of Defense supports—and I am advised the Joint Chiefs join in that—a mutual reduction of strategic arms based upon the amendment adopted by the Senate and the House two years ago for equality.

Certainly we will always have the problem within the military services of one service wanting to keep bombers or missiles and another service wanting to keep ships. You will always have that.

But the official position of the Department of Defense is for a mutual reduction in strategic arms.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I suggest there is a great difference between the official position and what they do. That is all I suggest.

SENATOR JACKSON: That is their negotiating position. I stand on that statement.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: I think of the major factors of strategic instability in the American-Soviet relationship is the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding Soviet planning, development, and deployment.

However, one judges the scale of the American effort and however critical one may be of its scale, the fact is that our rival knows pretty much what we intend to do in the strategic realm.

We have absolutely no knowledge of long-term Soviet strategic planning. We have no idea whether it is geared to permanent relationship of parity, whether it is geared to something which might be called political-military superiority.

Our knowledge becomes reasonably extensive, though not foolproof, only on the level of deployment.

I should think that one major contribution which could be made to strategic stability would be for the Soviets, in the context of something which now approximates parity, to begin to indicate more explicitly and overtly what their strategic planning is, what their long-term development proposals and plans are.

Senator Fulbright might feel that we exaggerate the Soviet threat, and we might well be doing so. We certainly have done so in the past. He is absolutely right when he said that we exaggerated it in the early sixties. The reason we exaggerated the Soviet threat in the early sixties is not because every man in the United States was running around howling about the missile gap. The fact is that the Soviets went out of their way in 1960 to claim that they had missile superiority, to operate as if they had it, and even to engage in a little bit of deliberate deception to pretend they had it. It was a miscalculation for which they paid in Cuba.

MR. BUNDY: I agree with Senator Jackson that, if we can get balanced reduction, substantive reduction, in numbers of warheads, "throw weight," any measure you want, that would be excellent. I think that is a long way away.

None of the agreements that we have made at any time with the Soviet Union in this area has involved their giving up something they already had that they still really wanted. I think it will be quite a while before the Soviet military will agree to the dismantling of a "Grade A" force. The most we can expect them to do on the basis of past experience is not to deploy things that they have come to believe are not really valuable, like the ABM, or to agree to an eventual implied scrapping of obsolete or obsolete forces.

This is really our own position, too. I know of no readiness really in our military to give up the prospect of developing and deploying forces which they regard as of first-class strategic importance.

It is one reason for being patient about the progress of Salt II and one reason for being skeptical about the speed which the Administration has tried to put behind this phase of the bargaining. I really think it just takes longer. This is a harder thing than any defensive or ineffective systems.

I also think that it is going to be a long time—I suspect Professor Brzezinski will agree—before the Soviets engage in the kind of relatively open discussion of their defense planning or defense development and research that we have been accustomed to in some measure here.

So it does seem to me that we need to be very patient about strategic-arms limitation and we need to look to

the question of the way in which our own behavior, which is within our control, and does and does not contribute toward increased understanding and eventual limitation.

And here I would have to say I am seriously disturbed by the intermixing of targeting doctrine with SALT negotiations which has been a consequence of the Pentagon position and Secretary Schlesinger's otherwise extremely intelligent and helpful contributions to the discussion.

I think he is right that American strategic targeting needs to have something other than a doomsday plot to it. I think that has, in fact, been a problem for 15 years anyway. I think it is also right that we should be very careful about assuming that there could never be a use of nuclear power to try to affect political results.

But I think it is very dangerous to connect those questions to the potential development of a wholly new strategic system which could be perceived as a counterforce system, which, in that connection, in spite of the Secretary's disclaimers, does exist.

That perception, I believe, has been seized upon in Moscow and has seriously impeded the discussions of SALT II, and it is this kind of question, it seems to me, that needs clarification. I believe that is not the cost of strategic weapons that is so serious. The danger of nuclear war, if it ever came, is so massive that insurance policies should not be measured by the kind of cost that is now associated with our strategic-weapons system, a cost which is lower than it was a decade ago.

MORE

But I think the character and make-up of those courses, the doctrine which justifies them and the things we do and do not seem to be planning to do on our own are potentially very destabilizing, and I do not myself believe that there is any urgent need for major change at any early time in the current strategic posture of the United States.

MR. DANIEL: When you speak of patience and time, what sort of time frame do you have in mind?

MR. BUNDY: I should be inclined to agree with Jerry Smith, who was the principal negotiator under the President and Kissinger in SALT I, and his last suggestion is that it may take at least as long to do SALT II as it did SALT I. That would go to another two or three years and perhaps longer because this is much harder.

MR. DANIEL: Has international stability and security been enhanced by what we have agreed upon?

MR. BUNDY: I think the agreement on ABM was a very stabilizing agreement. I think, as Senator Fulbright

said, it did give treaty recognition to the proposition that there is no such thing as protection between superpowers in the event of major nuclear war.

SENATOR JACKSON: I think the significance of the ABM agreement lies in the fact that they have recognized equality, and that is: each side is to have one site. I think that is the direction we should be moving.

I would just like to make a point in response to Mr. Bundy's comment about the new targeting doctrine. First, let us remember that this is only a research-and-development effort. It is an option that we can examine later on. This move, I think, was made in a restrained and responsible way.

What we have said is that no American President should be allowed to have only the inhumane option of killing all human beings in the Soviet Union. The doctrine of assured destruction may have had some validity when we had overwhelming superiority but I don't think it has validity in the context in which we now face the Soviet Union.

Finally, I think the point needs to be made that the Administration has not pushed arms reduction. I want to emphasize that very strongly. The President has not gone to the country and to the world and said our objective is to reduce arms to new and lower levels of equivalence.

I disagree with the Administration in their whole negotiating approach.

If you only put forward proposals that you know in advance the Soviets are going to accept, you wind up negotiating on their terms. I disagree on this basic issue. I think it is a central issue in the whole negotiation process.

MR. DANIEL: Are you suggesting that the President is doing this sort of thing in order to enhance his own image as a peacemaker, as

a success in international relations?

SENATOR JACKSON: I long ago have given up determining the intent of the White House in many different areas.

MR. BRZEZINSKI: One of the purposes of these arrangements is to not only reach specific agreement but also to set in motion a prolonged process of mutual edification. I think one of the great importances and even accomplishments of SALT was that it did result in better mutual understanding of the relative strategic political positions of both sides.

In this connection I would like to make a very modest proposal. We have now had more than a decade at different stages of American-Soviet talks. Perhaps the time must come for both sides by joint agreement to begin to release to the public the protocols of at least some of the talks.

The fact of the matter is that they have been conducted

A Glossary

ZUMWALT, Adm. Elmo R. —Recently retired Chief of Naval Operations.

MOORER, Adm. Thomas H. —Recently retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

GRECHKO, Marshal Andrei A., Soviet Defense Minister and alternate member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist party.

THROW-WEIGHT, a term for the weight, usually in kilotons or megatons, of warheads capable of being carried to targets by missiles.

FORWARD BASES, military usage for submarines armed with nuclear missiles and intermediate range ballistic missiles located close to opponent frontiers, as in West Germany.

B-1, a new nuclear-bomb-carrying plane to be the main Air Force bomber, replacing the aging B-52 series.

ABM, anti-ballistic missile, that is, missiles designed to knock down other missiles.

ed in great secrecy. I think this secrecy is first of all in the long run incompatible with the nature of our society. We are entitled to know more about the nature of some of these discussions.

In the longer run, I think public knowledge would contribute also to greater Soviet understanding of the issues involved. I am aware of the fact that you cannot conduct sensitive ongoing negotiations if you expect them to be published quickly. Hence I would not recommend that anything that transpired recently be made part of the public record.

MR. DANIEL: What about the possibility of that?

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I don't think there is much possibility on it on both sides.

MR. BUNDY: I must say I would be strongly in favor of it.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I would too.

SENATOR JACKSON: A condition precedent to that, however, gentlemen, is the need to get the Administration voluntarily to make public the understandings entered into in connection with SALT I which were kept secret from the chief of SALT negotiations for our Government from July 24, 1972, until June 20, 1973, kept secret from Secretary of State Rogers and the Secretary of Defense. I refer to two important documents that the Congress knew nothing about.

I hope that the one that was agreed to in Moscow that modified the July 24, 1972, agreement will voluntarily be made public. This business of entering into agreements with the Soviets and keeping them secret astounds me. I can't for the life of me understand what useful purpose the Administration hopes to further by that kind of procedure.

I would agree, I think all of us can agree, that a bilateral agreement to release the discussions in the areas that Professor Brezezinski has referred to would be useful. I think it is some way down the road yet.

MR. BUNDY: I really do think that this Administration is not unique in this—that administrations tend to underestimate the value of the precise expositions of what they themselves are thinking.

When the Secretary of State called for a debate, it seemed to me one of his first addressees should have been the Secretary of State. I think it is very fortunate that he is going to be the lead-off witness in Senator Fulbright's hearings because it is inescapable that the temper of argument is set by what the Executive Branch says, and at the moment based on what the Executive Branch has said and said most clearly by the Secretary of Defense, I would still have to sustain the position that that could be read as very threatening in Moscow.

SENATOR JACKSON: I would add, that we don't really know the role of the military in the decision-making process in the Soviet Union. Marshal Grechko is now a member of the Politburo.

We do know what the role of the military is in our own decision-making process. The President and the Secretary of State really make the final decisions. I think you can find that for the most part in connection with Salt I and Salt II decisions the military has played a relatively less important role than the civilians, contrary to a lot of statements that are being made.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: That is contrary to my statement. I don't agree with it at all. I think the military and its allies have much influence here. In our case, even if the President does not like it, the military can go to Congress and override the President. They do it on their appropriations time and time again, year after year.

It has been going on and there is no power that can restrict the military in our political system.

The Russians don't have the organization behind them that you have here. You have Mr. Meany and 13 million of his people, all the labor organizations. There is very little counterforce against the power of the military. Look at the votes in the Senate on any effort to reduce in a substantial way anything the military wants. everybody knows what happens year after year. We have never won a single showdown with the military.

MR. BUNDY: It does appear to me that it really is true that the Soviet military arms are very strong and if you make available all objective measures, percentages of gross national product, those soldiers seem to do

better than our soldiers.

At the same time I would have to say that I think it is simplistic to say that the President and Secretary of State are in charge and what they say goes. I think there has been a very pronounced weakening over the last several years, both inside the Executive Branch and in the country as a whole, of the capability to countermilitary arguments in knowledgeable and sophisticated terms.

Many of us think—although I am open to correction on this—that as a consequence of the bargaining in the Senate, the arms control agency was stripped of many of its most capable staff officers. Since Henry Kissinger moved from the White House to the Department of State, there is evidence that the White House capability and influence at staff level in these matters has declined. It is very difficult, although it is not impossible, for members of the

Legislative Branch and their staffs and for informed and interested members of the public to participate effectively in the kind of debate that is being asked for, if the debate does not exist already in some measure inside the Executive Branch of the Government.

SENATOR JACKSON: I would disagree with that. Contrary to some public statements, I think there has been a real debate between Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Schlesinger. There has been a coming together, allegedly in more recent weeks, on some of these points. I think it is fair to say there have been some strong differences of opinion.

I can say very candidly I think the failure of the recent Moscow summit stems from the fact that neither Dr. Kissinger nor the President of the United States could accept what was being proposed by the Russians at the summit. Those are the facts. It has nothing to do with the U.S. military or any evil spirit that I know of.

MR. DANIELS: This new American committee on U.S.-Soviet relations that was formed recently put out a list of seven positive accomplishments in international relations that they thought détente had so far achieved, including, incidentally, help dealing with the problems of peace in the Middle East.

How do you feel about the contributions to date of détente?

SENATOR JACKSON: It is incredible to cite the Middle East as an example of helpful progress.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: The Secretary did.

SENATOR JACKSON: Let me give a bill of particulars. Was it helpful for the Soviets to bring the two countries to the brink almost again, the first time since Cuba? Was it helpful during the course of that Yom Kippur war for the Soviets to urge the Arab countries to

join in the fight against Israel? Was it helpful to encourage maintaining the oil embargo? Was it helpful to the economies of the Western world when the Russians day after day urged the Arab countries to increase the price of oil?

I would say that what Dr. Kissinger was able to do in Egypt to separate Egypt from the more militant Arab states was one of the singular accomplishments of this Administration, that and opening travel to China.

Finally, I would say that what is going on right now in Syria on the part of the Soviet Union does not portend well for the months ahead. The Soviets have moved more arms, mostly sophisticated arms, arms that are not even available in the Warsaw Pact countries, into Syria.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I don't know why it seems to be that we view these questions in directly the opposite way. I have heard the Secretary several times. I don't see any evidence that the Russians urged an increase in the price of oil. If you want to pick on one man, it is the Shah of Iran.

To attribute everything that goes wrong, or wrong from our point of view, to the Russians I think is unrealistic and not true. Not that they don't enjoy it and take advantage of it. But I think the Middle East grew out of a conflict which had its origins long ago and that was not Russian-inspired. Obviously when something which discomforts us happens, they enjoy it.

I think to treat it as we did at the time gave much more significance to the alert than was justified. I don't think there was any great threat. To put it bluntly, the Secretary has said that without their acquiescence and cooperation, nothing could have been achieved. It would have been very easy to prevent an agreement with Syria or to make it impossible to have any agreement at all.

The Russians—I don't pretend they are out to help us. I regret that they are not more cooperative. The Secretary stated—and I have no reason not to agree with him—that they are so interested in bringing about détente they have been very restrained during this whole period in several areas where they could have been extremely difficult. Now they are becoming impatient, particularly as to hold-up of the trade bill.

Above all, they do have the capacity to reduce the tensions politically. That comes right back to Professor Brezezinski's central idea: If we don't move in this direction, we are really threatened with international chaos—certainly, if not worldwide chaos, a worldwide depression.

Ugly strains of nationalism that lie below the Soviet surface

If nationalism were not the strongest acid attacking the Soviet regime's iron, speculation about its fresh strength would smack of White émigrés' café plans for returning upon the Bolshevik clique's fall.

But in fact, national feeling—among Ukrainians, Estonians, Cossacks, Tadjiks and many other minorities—bubbles and boils in the Soviet "family of nations". Just as the rouble's price in Moscow black-market currency transactions fluctuates in tight step with the quotations of Zurich banks, the aspirations and resentments of the Soviet empire's non-Russian peoples have swelled in rough proportion to those of Third World Nations.

The Curtain, that is to say, is porous to these calculations and emotions. Scorching winds of native patriotism blown up since the Second World War rage through it. But perhaps such metaphors are misleading, for on that side, love of country—not of the union of socialist republics forcibly formed in 1924 and enlarged by subsequent aggression, but of ancient homelands—needs no outside encouragement. All the conditions that have made old fashioned nationalism, among the most powerful of modern forces, operate in high gear there. The much more severe penalties for expressing such instincts only increases the commitment, bitterness and potential for explosion.

But, as in other aspects of Soviet life, repression not only stimulates noble ideals and heroic deeds in its finest victims, it also provokes what can only be called the worst elements to think and mutter their unlovely thoughts.

From New Printing House Square, minority nationalism is the most promising agent for the empire's disintegration.

But in the Soviet Union itself, nationalism is often startlingly different: evil jokes, drunken obscenities of one race

cursing another, raised rancor and fists. A Georgian entrepreneur reviling an Armenian engineer, a Latvian lorry driver scorning the Ukrainian khakhli, huddled Uzbeks pronouncing their superiority over lesser Central Asian tribes—and Tartars theirs over the Uzbeks. A reservoir of bigotry and misdirected grievances.

This is why Mr. Bernard Levin's description of nationalist sentiment as "heartening" and "salutary", let alone his gratification that the problem may soon become more important than America's racial one, is perniciously misleading, for all his admirable intention.

Months before the publication of Andrei Amalrik's *Will The Soviet Union Survive*, the most politically perceptive Muscovite I knew also spoke of the real danger of war with China. Defeat or difficulties might be the spark to ignite the magazines of non-Russian nationalism, he said—but in his prediction, this would lead to nothing beneficial, but to a grisly new time of troubles.

Thirty major peoples will be at each others' throats, "and all will beat the Jews, meaning anyone not 'one of us'". Two-hundred-and-fifty million people lashing out after release from their totalitarian swaddling will produce a "huge, ugly, vicious riot—a nightmare.... The prospect is horrible, terrible, unimaginable".

This is mere supposition of course, but it raises questions that deserve consideration before tossing flowers at disruptive forces—even disruptive of Soviet rule. However odious the tyranny, potentially uglier strains of obscurantism and hatred lurk below its surface. However uncomfortable the notion, some of the progressive and civilizing influences in Soviet life, as well as many of the savage, abominable ones, come from the centre. Not all the restraints are sinister.

And this leaves out Great

Russian nationalism. Almost by definition, patriotic sentiment among the minorities incorporates deep resentment, sometimes loathing, of the Moscow colonizers. If free expression of this were encouraged, one pictures not only whipped-up hooligans mistreating Russian residents in cities from Riga to Tbilisi, but also a violent backlash in Mother Russia against the "foreigners".

Many decent Russians feel that they bear disproportionate sacrifices for the sake of backward Soviet peoples. Many less decent ones simply hate foreigners and Jews, in the spirit of Black Hundred prejudice and pogroms.

No way out of a dictatorship is easy when its citizens can be as easily confused, swayed by demagoguery and goaded to violence as the Soviet peoples. But even to suggest a remedy of nationalism, here so mingled with virulent chauvinism and jingoism, without warning of its possible side effects is an act of some irresponsibility.

As the British press's most eloquent prosecutor of Soviet crimes, Mr. Levin bears a special responsibility in any case. He who never tires of reminding the West of its duty in helping bring down the dictatorship might spare some thought to his own obligation to picture Russia after the fall. Otherwise, his sense of outrage at Kremlin evil, however justified in itself, is too much like the radicals' call for capitalism's downfall, which pretends that some shining substitute system will sprout by itself from the ruins.

So many well-intended mistakes in our prescriptions for Russia, so many exhortations to correct injustices with what turn out to be greater ones! One would think Western commentators had developed some caution. But propagandists keep shouting.

George Feifer

WASHINGTON POST
2 August 1974

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

NEW YORK TIMES
20 July 1974

U.S. Curbs Export of Police Equipment

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 19 The—Nixon Administration bowed to Congressional pressure and issued regulations today to discourage American companies from selling sophisticated law enforcement equipment at a Moscow trade fair next month.

The effect of the new rules, industry and Government sources said makes it extremely unlikely that any American company would exhibit or try to sell its products to Soviet authorities.

Commerce Secretary Frederick B. Dent announced that specific licenses would be required for the sale to the Soviet Union and other Communist countries of "any instruments and equipment particularly useful in crime control and detection."

Mr. Dent said that the new controls were being imposed as the result of consultation with the State Department, which suggested to the Commerce Department earlier in the week that steps be taken to close a loophole by which most law enforcement equipment could be sold without licenses.

In a statement, Mr. Dent said that the new rules were

being imposed under the provisions of the Export Administration Act, which allows such moves for "foreign policy" consideration.

He said the Government was concerned "with potential uses to which such equipment could be put, and had a continuing interest in the welfare of persons who seek to exercise their fundamental rights." Mr. Dent said that the decision had the approval of Secretary of State Kissinger.

The controversy arose two weeks ago when representative Charles A. Vanik, Democrat of Ohio, disclosed on the House floor that a number of American firms were planning to show and sell their wares at a Moscow fair in August, dedicated to modern means of law enforcement.

He and several other members of Congress, including Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, argued that equipment such as voice-identification devices and lie detectors would logically end up being purchased by the Soviet secret police for use against Jewish and other dissidents.

Although Mr. Vanik's office said on Wednesday that between 15 and 30 firms had shown interest in exhibiting at the fair, a check by The New

York Times produced no more than six, most of which said today that they had already decided, because of the adverse Congressional reaction, not to exhibit.

Mr. Dent, in speaking to newsmen before testifying in closed session before Senator Jackson's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, said that the new rules do not prohibit exhibiting at the Moscow fair, but do require licenses before sales can be made. He said such sales would be scrutinized very stringently before permission would be granted.

Mrs. Johanna Welt, vice president of Welt International of Chicago, which had been commissioned by two American companies to represent them at Moscow, said by phone today that she did not think any company would now exhibit because it would probably be impossible to secure licenses in time for the fair. She said no company would go to the fair without expecting to make sales.

Technology Sale Criticized

WASHINGTON, July 19 (AP) — An American manufacturer urged today that the United States refrain from selling technology to the Soviet Union and other Communist nations.

'Captive Nations' And Detente

"Captive Nations Week" came and went without much fuss last week. The particular kind of ethnic anti-Communism which the "captive nations" concept represents—the "captives" being the nations and nationality groups incorporated within the Soviet Union plus the East European States dominated by Moscow—has been pretty much eclipsed by detente.

Mr. Nixon has indicated firmly that it is not possible to try to improve relations with the Soviet government while at the same time trying openly to cultivate the nationalistic and even secessionist impulses of Moscow's constituent parts and allies.

Typically, the United States' annual ritual appeals for the "self determination" of the Baltic States, incorporated by Moscow as World War II began, ended as soon as President Nixon became a regular summiteer. At the last summit, Mr. Nixon agreed to establish a U.S. consulate in Kiev—a step regarded by the Kremlin and by Ukrainian Nationalists alike as a symbolic denial of Ukrainian nationhood. The two American radio stations broadcasting specifically to the "captive nations," Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, constantly wonder if they will survive the next summit.

Mr. Nixon's own "Captive Nation Proclamation" has become the faintest shadow of the original growling, anti-Russian, anti-communist resolution passed by Congress in 1959.

Yet the underlying issues do not easily go away. The "nations" themselves—some more, some less—remain undigested parts of the Soviet polity and the Soviet block. No sober analysis of the Soviet scene can ignore the tugs and pulls of, say, the Ukrainians and the Poles. Certainly the Kremlin takes these into the closest account in developing its own basic policies, from where it invests its money to where it stations its troops.

On the face of it, there is no apparent reason—except politics—why, say, Palestinians deserve a state of their own, as Moscow asserts, while a number of Soviet nationality groups, larger and with equal national credentials, are denied even the lesser goal of a genuine nationality group existence.

The connection of "human rights" to detente has been widely accepted in recent years, mostly in respect to Jews, intellectuals and dissenters inside the Soviet Union. And they pose no territorial challenge to the Kremlin. Their causes are certainly legitimate. But it is plain that at least part of the

reason why their plight has become politicized is that each of these groups (they overlap) has a recognizable constituency within the United States.

In abstract terms, the cultural or national aspirations of the "captive nations" are hardly less legitimate. Yet their American spokesmen do not have the same political leverage.

The realities of American politics, then, have an effect on which people or peoples controlled by Moscow win active American concern. The realities of geopolitics also have an effect. Successive American Presidents have cultivated local nationalism in, first, Yugoslavia and, then Romania—Communist states which for their own reasons have chosen to assert a measure of independence from the Kremlin. The White House has done this for the purpose of strengthening the American hand in dealing with the Russians.

Like Yugoslavia, however Romania, which sits off in the southwest corner of the Soviet Union, has by virtue of geography a degree of political maneuverability which is simply unavailable to a country like Czechoslovakia which directly connects the Soviet Union with Germany. This in turn affects the degree of encouragement which any responsible American President can

proffer.

The fact remains that the United States has no comprehensive strategy to free "captive nations." On the contrary, detente and the discipline necessarily imposed by the nuclear responsibility of a great power rule out much more than tentative efforts to remove certain symptoms of their plight. This is painful; some small part of the pain could perhaps be relieved if the rest of us looked with more sympathy at the very human emotions which touch many Americans whose kinsmen lived hard lives under Communist rule, but it is unavoidable.

Here it is useful to recall the time when the U.S. did have such a comprehensive strategy. According to a credible, though officially denied account in "Operation Splinter Factor," a new book by British journalist Stewart Steven, Allen Dulles set out to liberate East Europe by destroying liberal nationalistic Communists in those countries, thus provoking a Stalinist repression that would ignite a successful popular revolt. This fantastic operation called "Splinter Factor," may indeed have contributed to Stalinist repression. It certainly did not free East Europe. A more cynical and disastrous policy is hard to imagine. Its lessons linger.

Western Europe

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
25 July 1974

Cyprus rivals 'paid by CIA'

From HELLA PICK

Washington, July 24

Both Nikos Sampson and Archbishop Makarios had been receiving CIA funds, "as part of the agency's standard policy of supporting both sides in a dispute," according to the Washington columnist Jack Anderson.

Quoting CIA sources he said that Makarios was "simply blackmailing the CIA. If the agency wanted to keep its

extensive facilities in Cyprus, Makarios allegedly told them, they had to pay for the privilege."

According to Anderson, Sampson had been receiving CIA money for many years. It was channelled to him through Savas Konstantopoulos, publisher of the Athens Free World. Konstantopoulos, say Anderson sources, had long been on the CIA payroll.

Anderson also claims that President Nixon and Dr Kissinger were the last to maintain free-world support for the Greek military junta. He believes that even the CIA had given them up, and was "secretly pulling out its facilities from Athens" and transferring them to Tehran.

The Administration today hastened to put itself on the side of the angels, and welcomed the return of Greece to civilian rule. Dr Kissinger said this morning that "we expect to have close and friendly relations with the new Greek Government, which is composed of old friends of ours."

The United States has long been severely criticised for supporting the Greek junta, but Dr Kissinger said that he did not believe this would cause difficulties with the new Greek Prime Minister, Mr Karamanlis.

The Administration's foremost concern in its relations with Greece has always been to safeguard its military bases there, as part of NATO's vital southern flank. In spite of warnings from NATO, the Secretary of Defence, Mr James Schlesinger, told the Senate as recently as June 25 that "as far as the military side of the alliance is concerned, Greece remained an effective member."

However, there have been indications during the last few days that even the Pentagon, and certainly the State Department, realised at the time of the coup against Cyprus that they must recognise the weakness of the Greek military junta.

From that moment its fate was sealed, probably even in the Administration's eyes, and

it still remains to be seen precisely what rôle US officials played in bringing civilian leaders back to power in Greece.

However, Jack Anderson claims that NATO had given up the Greek military junta well before the Administration did, and that it had sent repeated warnings of the junta's unreliability to Washington. He quotes from one confidential paper which argues that "the European allies were eager to hasten the transfer of power from unsophisticated and parochial military men ... to a political Government enjoying the confidence of the people."

According to Anderson, the advice from NATO headquarters was that "there are growing doubts about the extent to which the Greek armed forces as a whole, disunited as they are, and dissipated by police and supervisory functions, are capable of playing their part in NATO defence strategy."

NEW YORK TIMES
2 August 1974

U.S. Said to Order C.I.A. To Curtail Role in Greece

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 1—The Central Intelligence Agency has reportedly been instructed by top officials of the Nixon Administration not to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece nor to play favorites among Greek politicians.

These orders, according to well-placed officials, reflect the current thinking of Secretary of State Kissinger and of the Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby—that Americans should keep out of the politics of other countries as much as possible. The C.I.A. is said to have been deeply involved in Greek politics for 25 years.

Until the last few weeks of the Athens military junta, according to high American officials and to Greek sources, American operatives remained quite close to the men in power in Greece.

A United States specialist on Greece said that the C.I.A. continued to maintain about 60 full-time operatives in Greece and that some had been there 15 years or longer.

The agency, the specialist said, had close contact not only with George Papadopoulos, the Greek colonel who led the 1967

coup, but also with his successor, Brig. Gen. Demetrios Ioannides.

Mr. Papadopoulos, who was deposed last November, was among many Greek political and military figures who received personal subsidies over many years from the intelligence agency, two United States officials said. Another source said Mr. Papadopoulos had received money from the agency since 1952.

The C.I.A. stopped its subsidies for Greek political figures about two years ago, a high American official said.

The operative closest to General Ioannides was said to have been Peter Koromilas, a Greek-American who also went by the name of Korom. An American official said Mr. Koromilas had been sent to Athens to confer with General Ioannides shortly before the July 15 coup in Cyprus, which was headed by Greek officers.

'Papadopoulos is My Boy'

James M. Potts, the agency's station chief in Athens from 1968 to 1972, was described as having been on close terms throughout his stay there with Mr. Papadopoulos.

Mr. Potts was listed as a political officer in the American Embassy. He served earlier in

Athens from 1960 to 1964 as deputy station chief of the intelligence agency.

A State Department official said that when Mr. Potts left Athens in August, 1972, his farewell party was attended by virtually every member of the military junta. The American Ambassador, Henry J. Tasca, seeing who was present, turned and walked out, the source said, after which he sent a cablegram to Washington protesting Mr. Potts's action.

Mr. Tasca had adopted a chilly attitude toward the Athens junta and was appalled that the C.I.A. station chief would give a party that contradicted the position the American Ambassador had taken.

State Department officials, who have served in Greece, commented in background interviews on what they described as a negative role played in the past by the Central Intelligence Agency in Greek affairs.

One of them mentioned John M. Maury, the agency's station chief in Athens from 1962 to 1968.

"Maury worked on behalf of the palace in 1965," the official said.

"He helped King Constantine buy Center Union Deputies so that the George Papandreou Government was toppled."

Mr. Maury, 61, left the agency somewhat more than a year ago and is now Assistant Secretary of Defense for Congressional Relations.

Although generally leaning to Greek conservative politicians, the agency flirted briefly with the variant in Greek politics offered by George Papandreou and his Harvard-educated son, Andreas, in the early nine-

teen-sixties, a former Greek official said.

"In the beginning, say about 1962 or '63, the C.I.A. used Andreas as an agent, as a resource and supported him," the Greek said. "His buddy was Campbell," he added, referring to Laughlin A. Campbell, the C.I.A. station chief from 1959 to 1962.

Agent Reassigned After Protest

In his 1970 book, "Democracy at Gunpoint," Andreas Papandreou describes a scene in 1961 in which he had an altercation with Mr. Campbell.

Now retired and living in Washington, Mr. Campbell declined to talk with a reporter about his Greek service.

A knowledgeable Greek said that Stavis Milton, an operative who objected to the "cozy" relationship between the agency and the junta leaders over the last seven years, was moved out of Greece and sent to Iran, and later to the Far East.

Mr. Milton was described as one of numerous Greek-Americans recruited by the agency in the early days of its operations in Greece. Another was said to be Thomas H. Karamessines, a 57-year-old New Yorker who served in Athens from 1947 to 1948, during the Greek struggle against Communist insurgents, then again as station chief from 1951 to 1953.

Mr. Karamessines rose to be head of the agency's clandestine services before his retirement, recently.

The Central Intelligence Agency also used enterprises of Thomas A. Pappas, the 75-year-old Greek-American industrialist, as a cover for its operations in Greece, according to

the Greek source.

A spokesman at the headquarters of the agency, in Langley, Va., said he had no general comment on the allegations. He did say, however, that C.I.A. agents follow orders approved at the highest level in Washington.

WASHINGTON POST
25 July 1974

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

... And Sisco's Shuttle Diplomacy

Full-scale war between Turkey and Greece was averted and the 7-year-old military dictatorship in Athens toppled when Washington belatedly abandoned permissiveness and laid down the law to the Greek junta.

There is little doubt Greece would have responded to Turkey's invasion of Cyprus with its own invasion of Turkey were it not for Undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco's backstage pressure in Athens. In most undiplomatic language, Sisco told the Greek generals that the U.S. would abandon them to inevitable destruction if they attacked Turkey. Jolted by this unexpected threat, the military dictatorship backed down and thereby guaranteed its own fall on Tuesday.

But there is no room for American self-congratulation here. The generals held tyrannical power so long because of Washington's coddling. The Cyprus crisis which has shaken the NATO alliance should have been averted by the United States. What's more, this menacing question remains: will bitterness by ordinary Greeks toward Washington for wet-nursing the dictatorship eventually propel their nation out of the Western alliance?

U.S. follies toward Athens date back to the Johnson administration, which embraced the Greek military coup of April 1967. U.S. diplomats in Athens felt the obscure colonels masterminding the coup would have collapsed at a single word from Washington, but that word never came. This policy was perpetuated by the Nixon administration, freezing tyranny in Greece.

Despite a growing coolness toward Athens recently, the U.S. has rigidly refused to pressure the military dictatorship. The current junta, dominated by Brig. Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides, seemed puzzled that Washington demanded so little for friendship and military aid.

Noting American permissiveness coinciding with increased opposition from the Greek people, Ioannides decided on the ancient expedient of faltering regimes: a foreign adventure. Athens' plot to take over Cyprus should have been foreseen and prevented by Washington. Instead, as the junta expected, there was no U.S. interference.

Moreover, working-level State Department officials who wanted to condemn Athens for the Cyprus plot after it occurred were overruled by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, heeding Pentagon fears of losing Greece as NATO's anchor. Had Kissinger instead aligned himself with the British against the coup, congressional critics

believe, the Turks might have been dissuaded from invading Cyprus—a contention bitterly disputed by administration policymakers.

By the time Sisco left Washington at 11 p.m. July 17 for his try at shuttle diplomacy, the administration was resigned to a Greek-Turkish war which would shatter the West's strategic position against Moscow and threaten the NATO alliance. Thankfully, at that belated hour, Sisco talked tough to the Greeks.

When Sisco arrived in Athens Friday morning, July 19, the generals informed him they would respond to Turkish invasion of Cyprus by invading Turkey. Sisco's hardboiled reply: except for the U.S., you have no friends in NATO—or the world. You can expect nothing from the Communist world. In the Third World, you are pariahs. And if you attack Turkey, you will lose the U.S. and be totally isolated.

Flying to Ankara that night, Sisco told the Turks that the U.S. would work with Turkey and Great Britain to undo Greek meddling in Cyprus. But the Turks seemed determined to teach Athens a lesson. At 5:45 a.m. Saturday, Sisco was informed of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus to begin 15 minutes later. He left Ankara for Athens at 6:30 a.m.

In Athens, the Greeks reiterated their intention to counterattack against Turkey. Again, Sisco recited his tough line. Stunned that Washington finally meant business, the generals backed down. When Sisco left for Washington last Monday night after negotiating the shaky cease-fire, it was clear the Ioannides regime could not survive.

Luckily, it was replaced not by nationalistic young colonels vowing a redemptive war against Turkey but by a civilian government headed by old conservative Constantine Karamanlis. But the United States has not escaped the consequences of its follies. The harvest from anti-American seed sown in Greece since 1967 by Washington's pro-junta policies has yet to be revealed.

We reported from Athens in June 1969 that the U.S. embrace of the junta—because of military requirements in the Eastern Mediterranean—posed "immense danger to long-range stability" in the region. That prediction was fully realized by the Cyprus crisis. Whether Sisco's belated badgering of the Greeks can forestall the prediction's full consequences will require undeserved but eagerly welcomed good fortune.

© 1974, Field Enterprises, Inc.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 August 1974

ARTICLE ON C.I.A. IN GREECE ATTACKED

Andreas Papandreou, a former Greek Cabinet Minister and an exiled leader of the Greek political left, released a statement yesterday charging The New York Times with an attempt to "damage [his] political reputation" in an article published in yesterday's editions.

The article by David Binder of The Times Washington Bureau reported a move by top officials of the Nixon Administration instructing the Central Intelligence Agency not to interfere in Greek internal affairs. The article quoted a former Greek official as saying that the agency in 1962 or 1963 had supported Mr. Papandreou and used him "as an agent."

"The American establishment, using newspaper correspondent David Binder and The New York Times, is attempting to damage the political reputation of Andreas Papandreou, leader of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement and leading political figure in Greece, arguing among other things that he has had support from the C.I.A.," the statement from his political office said.

"We charge David Binder and The New York Times with being parties to attempted political sabotage in the internal affairs of our country, Greece," the statement said.

Far East

WASHINGTON POST
4 August 1974

Jack Anderson

Vietnam War: The Role of the CIA

Ten years ago, the Gulf of Tonkin incident led to massive U.S. involvement in an unwanted war in Vietnam. Did the Central Intelligence Agency play a hidden role in that incident?

We have now pieced together part of the story, together with other CIA exploits in Vietnam, from intelligence memos and old Vietnam hands, including an ex-CIA officer, John Kelly, who has agreed to break his long silence. It is a fascinating story, sometimes hilarious, sometimes deadly grim.

At the time of Tonkin, the CIA was already deeply involved in a vast undercover operation known mysteriously as Op-34-A. Memos show that the CIA, working secretly with the Saigon government and U.S. armed forces, kidnaped North Vietnamese fishermen to recruit them as spies, landed rubber-boat crews on the North Vietnamese coast to blow up bridges, parachuted agents into the Communist back-country and engaged in other clandestine activities.

Although U.S. forces weren't supposed to participate in open combat, a favorite Op-34-A sport was to send dark-painted U.S. patrol boats to bombard Communist-held islands off the Vietnam coast. This sometimes led to shootouts between U.S. and North Vietnamese gunboats. The incidents, according to one Pentagon memo, were regarded as acceptable risks.

The public wasn't told about these naval engagements until the late President Lyndon Johnson chose to make an issue of the August 2, 1964, attack on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. There is some indication that the destroyers may have been preparing to draw North Vietnamese gunboats away from an Op-34-A operation when the celebrated incident occurred.

After the United States was drawn openly into the war, the CIA brass settled into a handsome dwelling next to the Italian embassy in Saigon. Instead of CIA, one of its units adopted the initials SOG—short for "Special Operations Group."

In long interviews with my associate Les Whitten, the irreverent John Kelly, now an investigative reporter for CBS News in New York City, remembers the SOG as a sort of "Catch 22" outfit forever goofing up but occasionally achieving a triumph.

The SOG, of course, was obsessed with secrecy. It operated fleets of black-painted planes, jeeps, trucks and PT boats. Even the SOG's gates were sometimes painted black. It didn't take the Vietnamese, South and North alike, long to identify black as the CIA-SOG color. The black gates, therefore, may as well have been emblazoned with the CIA seal.

On one occasion, the CIA's secret identification was found scribbled on a latrine wall in a Saigon bar. Among the obscene inscriptions, a horrified CIA officer saw the equation, "CAS equals SOG equals CIA." CAS means "Controlled American Source," a euphemism for a CIA agent. In great alarm, the CIA officer dispatched two majors and a team of enlisted men to comb the men's rooms of Saigon in search of similar security violations hidden amid the graffiti.

The CIA brass went to such lengths to maintain secrecy that they held their most important conferences in a huge transparent box, constructed of

inch-thick clear plastic walls resting on plastic beams, with a transparent plastic door, at the U.S. embassy.

One day, a CIA officer, peeping at the Italian embassy across the way, discovered the Italians peeping back. He spotted a telescope lens aimed at secret maps on the CIA walls. With all the drama of a TV slapstick spy episode, his superior ordered the windows boarded up. This had scarcely been completed before another agent, missing the sunlight, tore down the boards.

Meanwhile, a terse security directive was issued by Washington after CIA agents in Nigeria were almost killed during a rebellion because their automobile was a "Rebel," a 1967 American Motors model. The CIA urgently ordered agents around the world to remove the "Rebel" insignia from their cars, Kelly was told.

When Kelly first arrived in Saigon under super-secret orders, he was greeted at Tansonghut airport by a Eurasian, with a uniquely brawny build and a mouthful of flashing gold teeth. He turned out to be the official CIA greeter, who would have been hard to miss by the Vietcong agents lurking around the airport.

At SOG headquarters, Kelly found the CIA brass in a tizzy. One of his superiors had just been identified by French and West German intelligence as the naked American on vacation at the famous L'Île du Levant nudist camp off the coast of France. The CIA officer's girl friend had divulged his identity the moment he left the nudist camp for Saigon.

One of the CIA's great objectives was to get the North Vietnamese to listen to a CIA radio transmitter, which was disguised as a militant Vietnamese nationalist underground station. To increase its Hooper rating, the CIA dropped tens of thousands of plastic transistor radios in styrofoam boxes on North Vietnam. The radios were locked upon a single frequency, so those who retrieved the radios could listen only to the CIA station.

To reach the Vietcong, whose jungle hiding places were difficult to locate for parachute droppings, the CIA strategists planned to bait the styrofoam radio boxes with food and float them down the Mekong River network. The hungry guerillas, it was suggested, would fish the food-laden radios out of the river. The plan was finally abandoned, however, because the CIA could find no foolproof flow charts for the Mekong. At last report, there were still two warehouses full of the little black radios.

The CIA, however, had its occasional successes. It was able to determine, for example, that 33,000 Saigon officials, from clerks to cabinet officers, were active Vietcong agents or Vietcong sympathizers. More dramatically, the SOG units equipped South Vietnamese troops with Vietcong-style black pajamas. The disguised troops were able to crash into a North Vietnamese encampment, firing machine guns and tossing grenades.

But the notorious Phoenix program, an assassination scheme run by present CIA director William Colby, was less effective. A report to the U.S. embassy revealed that the program was only one per cent effective.

© 1974. United Feature Syndicate

NEW YORK TIMES
6 August 1974

SENATE AIDES HIT EMBASSY IN SAIGON

'Selective' Reports Adhere
to South Vietnam's Line
Too Closely, Study Says

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 6—A staff report issued today by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee criticizes the United States Embassy in Saigon for reports that were described as adhering too closely to the official line of the Saigon Government.

"Over the years, the American Embassy in Saigon has acquired a reputation, among both official and unofficial observers, for close identification with the policies of the South Vietnamese Government and for selective reporting," the study said. "These same tendencies are apparent today."

The 47-page report was prepared by Richard M. Moose and Charles F. Meissner, staff members, after a mission to Indochina from May 12 to June 4.

WASHINGTON POST
7 August 1974

State Denies Distortions From Saigon

Associated Press

The State Department reaffirmed its confidence yesterday in the reporting of U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin and the embassy in South Vietnam to the department.

A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report released this week said the embassy was distorting its dispatches in favor of the Saigon government.

Robert Anderson, department spokesman, said that some of the reporting from consuls in South Vietnam to Saigon was not included in information that the embassy sent in to Washington.

He added, "If significant reports are left out, it is because of an effort to avoid duplicating information."

Anderson said the "totality of the reporting" from Saigon has had no significant omissions. This would include the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency reports as well as those of the State Department.

The report on Vietnam said that unless the big powers apply strong pressure, the South Vietnamese Government and the Communists will fail to reach a political settlement.

"The present military confrontation seems likely to continue," the report said, "with the South Vietnamese unable to expel the North Vietnamese from their country, and the Communists unable to acquire 'the decisive edge required to defeat the south militarily.'"

On specific points, the report doubted whether the Administration's economic aid request of \$750-million for this fiscal year would accomplish what Ambassador Graham A. Martin has predicted—a "takeoff" by the South Vietnamese economy, and an eventual American extrication from Saigon.

"It is difficult to reach any other conclusion than that the fiscal year 1975 program is, in reality, a continuation of the past aid strategy of supporting the Vietnamese economy with massive flows of outside resources in order to fill fiscal and trade deficits," it said.

Mr. Martin, who has been in Washington urging support of the aid request, said again in an interview the other day that a large appropriation was needed to spur the South Vietnamese economy and thus accelerate an end to American involvement.

Mr. Martin has rejected—as

he did when he testified before the Foreign Relations Committee two weeks ago—the allegations that the Embassy had distorted its reporting to Washington on the situation in South Vietnam.

He said he had given the strongest orders that reports should be objective and fair, but he added that sometimes messages to the State Department did not convey what was already included in Pentagon or Central Intelligence Agency cables.

The report said that in comparing reports submitted to Saigon by foreign service officers in the field with reports ultimately sent by the Saigon Embassy to Washington "one consistent pattern emerges." It said the Embassy had a tendency "to play down or to ignore obvious cease-fire violations by the South Vietnamese armed forces."

"The Embassy, both in briefings provided to us and in its reporting to Washington, closely followed the public line of the South Vietnamese Government in justifying the South Vietnamese measures which precipitated the temporary breakdown in May 1974 of the talks in Paris and Saigon" between the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, the staff members reported.

The report cited the case of the fall of Tong Le Chan as an example. That small outpost on the Cambodian border had been under siege for more than a year. On April 12, the Saigon

Government announced that a "massive" North Vietnamese attack using tanks had overrun the entire garrison.

Within a few days, today's report noted, it was widely known in Saigon—and reported in the American press—that the government had withdrawn voluntarily without losing a

man. The Communists also said no battle had been fought.

According to the report, the Embassy in Saigon was reporting to Washington as late as April 24 on the "bombardment and fall" of Tong Le Chan.

The report said that many diplomats in Saigon believed that the Tong Le Chan incident and others were "part of a deliberate effort by the Saigon Government, assisted by the United States Embassy, to impress the United States Congress of the necessity to authorize additional military assistance for South Vietnam."

The report said that in the months between October, 1972, and January, 1973, when the Paris accord on Vietnam was signed, the United States supplied Saigon with equipment worth \$753.3-million. This was the first time this figure was made known.

It said most of the equipment has not been well utilized, and one "knowledgeable official" was quoted as saying it was "sitting around rusting."

NEW YORK TIMES
4 August 1974

U.S. Envoy in Cambodia Said to Give Arms Advice

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 3—John G. Dean, the United States Ambassador in Cambodia, regularly gives military advice to President Lon Nol and other Cambodian officials despite Congressional injunctions, according to a report issued today by the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee.

The report, which covered all of Indochina, noted that five separate acts of Congress prohibit the United States "from acting in a military advisory capacity in Cambodia."

But the study, prepared by two committee consultants, said that Mr. Dean, "by his own admission does not hesitate to give strategic military advice to Lon Nol or tactical advice to subordinate military commanders."

"It is his interpretation of existing laws that Congress did not mean to preclude 'advising' at the level at which he per-

forms," the report said. It was prepared by John J. Brady and John H. Sullivan, who visited the area from April 15 to May 10.

The report said that, contrary to some press reports that American military personnel were actively advising Cambodian military units, "the staff survey team could find no evidence that Americans are acting as combat unit advisers."

Members of the defense attaché's office regularly go into the field to gather information, the report continued, and while there their actions "or even their questions may have some impact on the actions of Cambodian field commanders."

"There is no indication, however, that this practice has been systematized or is being used by defense attaché office personnel with the intent of violating the law," it added.

"It is clear, however, that

hesitated to give the Cambodians advice on military matters ranging from command structure and training to management and logistics," it said.

Broad Help by Americans

In detail, the report said:

"In order to insure proper end use of equipment, the United States has found it necessary to help the Cambodians to develop ports to receive the equipment, repair roads and bridges on which to move it, train personnel to operate it, build housing for trainees, establish supply systems for efficient distribution and reorder, create facilities for maintenance and repair, and educate them to run the logistics and other systems." "This has resulted in constant, wide-ranging communication between Americans and Cambodians, with the Americans telling Cambodians what to do."

The study said that American officials hoped that the Communist forces in Cambodia would acknowledge a stalemate in and agree to a Laotian-style coalition Government through negotiations. But the insurgents' successes in the dry season just ended, may encourage them to continue the fight.

Moreover, a possibility that the Lon Nol Government would be replaced at the United Nations General Assembly session this fall by a Communist delegation would probably also rule out negotiations, the study said.

Laos War Still Real for Meo Tribal Leader

**CIA Aid Gone, Mountain
General in Lonely Fight
for Threatened Homeland**

BY GEORGE McARTHUR
Times Staff Writer

LONG CHENG, Laos—The most effective general produced by the government side in three decades of war in Laos, Lt. Gen. Vang Pao, sits today in his once-secret mountain fortress, his maps still showing North Vietnamese troops looking down his throat, and shrugs "La guerre, c'est fini (the war is over)."

Then, gesturing toward his big wall map, the Meo tribal leader who began his personal war as a French army second lieutenant in the early '50s, adds:

"But we will never have peace as long as the North Vietnamese are here."

These are difficult times for the 46-year-old soldier, lifted from relative obscurity by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 15 years ago. The reason then was simple: Unlike his Laotian counterparts Vang Pao was energetic. The tribal mountain people, unlike the lowland Laotians, were willing to fight and unafraid of the Vietnamese. With CIA money, Vang Pao led the army that carried the brunt of the fighting.

Now, a coalition government including the Communists is installed in the capital of Vientiane and a de facto partitioning of Laos has been accepted—with most of the Meo homeland given up to control of North Vietnam and the local Pathet Lao movement. As was the case with the war itself, the Meo and other tribal people have had little voice in the so-called peace.

Still, even Vang Pao now thinks mainly of reconstruction.

"We lost too much," he said. "Our homes, our women, our cattle—almost everything."

But demobilizing some of his soldiers and sending them back to non-existent homes is proving difficult. With CIA support gone, it is also difficult to keep the remaining men up to past standards. And the attitude of the Americans is disturbing—though Vang Pao remains unaffectedly pro-American, a portrait of Richard Nixon on his wall and his eldest son off to West Point as a cadet.

It is a sign of the times that the

Americans are planting grass at Long Cheng, Vang Pao's mountain base which was virtually destroyed three times during the war. The base was once so full of CIA secrets its very existence was denied and extra labor in those days was used to dig holes and build bunkers.

Nestled below a cloud-topped granite peak called Skyline Ridge, its short airstrip shuttling off bomb-laden warplanes, often under shell fire, the base held much of the world's attention in 1972. With terrible bloodshed and vast American air support it survived by a hair—at one time North Vietnamese soldiers reached the ground floor of Vang Pao's stone home but were shot down by tribal soldiers on the second floor.

In those days, Long Cheng was the virtual symbol of the war in Laos.

The price was almost total destruction. But there are those who say that battle was a necessary prelude to the peace talks that followed.

Now rebuilt, Long Cheng has muted the trappings of war. Around the airstrip is a hodge podge tribal community in wood and sheet metal homes. Streetside stalls sell bananas, coconuts and lowland luxuries, including canned American soft drinks. There is a movie house and a brightly painted temple. In the immediate area there are 12,000 civilians, mostly the families of Vang Pao's prolific soldiers.

On the airstrip are a dozen single-engined T-28s, the ancient propeller-driven trainers which were converted into bombers for the hastily trained Meo pilots. Their bomb racks are empty and nowadays they seldom make even training flights. The raffish Air America pilots and CIA men of the past are gone (though who can say what a CIA man looks like). Only four Americans stay in Long Cheng regularly, working in new concrete block buildings labeled United States Agency for International Development.

Where newsmen were once arrested on sight, they now get an affable greeting. Vang Pao himself is likely to put a silver ring on your finger and with the cheery politeness of mountain people, insist on your return.

Yet the sprouting radio aerials, the bombs stacked by the runway, the swagger of tribal soldiers on the streets attest that Long Cheng retains some muscle and mystery. Even getting there is an adven-

ture. From Vientiane it is six hours of bumping and grinding on a perilous dirt road cut through jungles and mountains. The approach by air, through peaks often shrouded by clouds, resembles the end of a roller-coaster ride. The surrounding jungle is sparsely dotted with the stilt-houses of the tribal people and sometimes elephants are seen working fields and pulling out trees though they are rare today.

In this fortress valley, midway between Vientiane and the Plain of Jars which the Communist forces have occupied for four years, Vang Pao holds sway as something of a warlord—though hardly in the old tradition.

Only a handful of guards stand around the two-story stone building which is his headquarters and home (only part of his family is with him. He has had 28 children by his six wives). He strolls about casually, wearing a baseball cap and a non-regulation bush jacket adorned with red shoulder tabs and his three-star insignia. In the casual manner probably picked up from the Americans, many of his men simply call him Vee-Pee.

He is a husky man with a ready laugh. While he complains that he is getting old he also volunteers that his latest child is just three months. Asked about his good health, he grins:

"I don't smoke. But I drink a little bit."

In title, Vang Pao is simply commander of Military Region II. But in fact he is the leader of 200,000 people who make up the Meo tribes.

There is little that Vang Pao can now do to regain the Meo homeland around the fabled Plain of Jars.

Negotiators in Vientiane are now attempting to draw some kind of line between Vang Pao's forces and the Communists on facing hilltops. Meanwhile, he accuses them of attempting to nibble off the dwindling land holdings he has left though he admits that actual shooting incidents have been few since the country's third coalition government was formed April 5.

He dismisses any idea that the North Vietnamese will ever pull out the Plain of Jars and turn over the

administration to Pathet Lao forces—who would be acceptable to the tribal people.

Pointing to the map again, Vang Pao pointed to a valley about 60 miles to the north. From there, he said, a North Vietnamese brigadier general, with radios and supplies tucked in bunkers and caves, commands "the Plain of Jars operational front." It is one of three North Vietnamese military commands in Laos, all reporting directly back to Hanoi—and bypassing the Pathet Lao political headquarters at Sam Neua ruled over by Red Prince Souphanouvong who commutes to his cabinet post in Vientiane aboard an ancient Russian biplane.

WASHINGTON STAR
6 August 1974

Report Charges Aimless Policy In S. Vietnam

By Oswald Johnson
Star-News Staff Writer

Despite calculated official optimism, South Vietnam 18 months after the cease-fire is economically, politically and militarily in peril and could continue to be a burden to the United States for years to come.

This gloomy assessment emerges from a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report which charges the Nixon administration with a policy of aimless drift and specifically faults the U.S. embassy in Saigon for deliberately misrepresenting the gravity of the situation.

In addition, the report reveals for the first time the staggering cost in military equipment transferred from U.S. stockpiles to South Vietnam between October 1972, (when peace was "at hand"), and January 1973, when the cease-fire was agreed. That arms bill was \$753.3 million—a figure which never appeared in any budget and was never approved by any congressional action.

EXCEPT FOR the details, the report, by committee staff aides Richard M. Moose and Charles F. Meissner, could have been written 10 years ago, when the United States was first sliding into the Vietnam quagmire. In a particularly poignant echo of the past, it describes the U.S.

While Vang Pao admits the North Vietnamese show no present sign of attacking, he notes the presence of four veteran regiments in the plain probably numbering 10,000 men.

These are combat troops. The number of support troops and Pathet Lao forces could double that—possibly more.

Vang Pao claims the North Vietnamese now have two good highways going into the Plain of Jars. One cuts almost due east to the panhandle of North Vietnam and is sometimes not passable in the rainy season. The other is an all-weather route leading northeast from the plain to the North Vietnamese border.

Defectors and agents in the Plain of Jars report, Vang Pao said, that about 50 trucks a day go between the plain and North Vietnam. They bring in food and ammunition and take out timber, hides, scrap metal and an assortment of things that amazes Vang Pao.

"They are taking out all kinds of things, broken bottles and animal bones for example. I don't know what they do with it."

Just to keep Vang Pao edgy, the North Vietnamese keep a handful of tanks just north of Long Cheng and also have the base within range of a battery of Soviet-built 130mm guns.

Where he once commanded perhaps 25,000

men, including some 4,000 now departed Thai mercenaries, Vang Pao is now down to 6,700 men. He will lose even more by the end of the year when the overall Lao army will drop to 50,000 men from its peak of 78,000.

There is grumbling among the men who are being sent home—some having become virtually professional soldiers with up to 15 years service—and more grumbling over pay and severance allowances. The pay of the tribal soldiers—once about \$60 monthly—was cut in half when they were incorporated into the Royal Army and lost their CIA subsidies.

above the 200-man limit imposed by Congress.

To do so, it said, Dean has been flying personnel into Cambodia in the morning and out again at night so that no more than 200 are actually present when counts are taken.

In addition, it said, Dean "by his own admission... does not hesitate to give... military advice" to the Cambodian government, but maintains that Congress did not intend to preclude advising "at the level at which he performs."

In a lengthy exposition of South Vietnam's faltering post-war economy, the Senate report argues that the country's top-heavy military establishment and excessive reliance on a U.S.-fostered artificial economy of expensive imports will make South Vietnam incapable of self-sufficiency for at least another 10 years.

IN THE FACE of this, the report notes, the Agency for International Development establishment in Saigon is aiming for an economic "takeoff" in five years at the latest. AID officials base that projection in part on a reduction in South Vietnamese military expenditures which, the report notes, Martin and other embassy officials oppose.

Martin is currently in Washington to sell the administration's aid plans to a reluctant and preoccupied Congress. He has been arguing for a two-year program of massive doses of economic aid (750 to \$800 million a year) in addition to the \$1.45 billion in military aid the administration has requested. (The report also notes that U.S. aid and Chinese aid to North

Vietnam in 1973 is estimated by U.S. intelligence experts to be no more than \$713 million—of which \$425 million was estimated as economic aid and only \$290 million military aid. This was exactly the reverse of the prevailing 2-to-1 military-to-economic ratio of U.S. aid to South Vietnam.)

THE STATED theory of Martin's proposed massive aid jolt is that it would push the South Vietnamese economy over the takeoff point in two years, after which it would rapidly become self-sufficient. But Martin's own subordinates in AID see five years necessary before this could happen and other economists cited in the report expect this process to take 10 to 15 years. Accordingly, Martin's rationale is rejected as totally unfounded.

In a carefully understated conclusion to the report, Moose and Meissner made this assessment of the policy Martin is responsible for administering:

"What we saw and heard... suggested to us that our present policy toward Vietnam is directed toward the maintenance of the status quo at a time when Washington's attention is directed elsewhere."

The Report said that "the present military confrontation seems likely to continue," with the South Vietnamese unable to expel the North Vietnamese, and the Communists unable to acquire "the decisive edge required to defeat the South militarily."

A critic of administration policy with access to committee materials pointed out that the two-year period would expire in 1976.

NEW YORK TIMES
22 July 1974

Spreading Trials in Korea Devastate Political Activity

Students, Press and Clergy Are Silent as President Park Uses the Courts to Eradicate Rising Opposition

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, July 20 — The wife of a man sentenced to be executed in one of Korea's spreading political trials stared at her hands and said, almost imperceptibly, "If I tell you he was innocent, they will send me to jail too."

It is a measure of the devastating effect of the trials, ordered by President Park Chung Hee to exterminate growing opposition to his Government, that even the families of the accused dare not talk about them.

Students have stopped discussing politics, the clergy are giving circumspect sermons, the press prints only the official version of the trials, and businessmen mutter that stability is good for the economy.

The impact of the trials, which began last winter after a series of small demonstrations against Mr. Park's autocratic 13-year rule, was suddenly intensified in the last week with a new wave of arrests, indictments and convictions.

In the last eight days, 55 persons have been convicted before secret courts-martial. Fourteen were sentenced to death, including South Korea's best known young poet, Kim Chi Ha, and six students.

Today, however, the death sentences of the poet and four other men convicted of an anti-Government plot were commuted to life terms after Defense Minister Suh Jong Chul reviewed their sentences.

A respected 77-year-old former President of the country, Yun Po Sun, was taken before another military tribunal this week, and a prominent Catholic bishop, the Most Rev. Daniel Chi, was ordered to stand trial next week, under emergency decrees proclaimed by President Park. Both men face a death sentence.

Moreover, it appears that the

trials will continue to spread. An American-educated lawyer who had defended several students and the poet, Mr. Kim, was arrested this week by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency after he bitterly objected in court to the death sentences given his clients.

Also, 150 Koreans, including clergymen, professors and students, are being held in jail awaiting trial, well-informed diplomats say.

Among the few Koreans still willing to talk, although in furtive whispers, there is a feeling that the austere, aloof Mr. Park has gone too far. "He is mad, mad, there is no other explanation," said one opposition politician.

But some other officials with access to the President — and there are very few these days — insist that he is still under control. "Cold, calculating and self-confident," one diplomat said.

According to associates, Mr. Park, who first came to power in the military coup of 1961 as a general, is the product of three related and rigorous traditions. One is Korea's borrowed heritage of Confucianism, with its stress on paternal government by stern leaders. Another is the bleak, often violent world of the Korean peasant, and the third stems from Mr. Park's highly disciplined training in the imperial Japanese Army, where subordinates were expected to follow orders.

"Park is only doing what his instinct and training have taught him to do: use force and terror to enforce his leadership," said one Westerner with long experience here. "It would be easier if we just recognized this is a dictatorship."

Among Korean officials Mr. Park's crackdown is explained as "an unfortunate necessity"

caused by the constant threat of North Korea, as Chung Il Kwon, the Speaker of the National Assembly, said in an interview.

Mr. Chung, who was commander of the Korean Army at the outbreak of the Korean war, a former Premier and close friend of President Park, said, "Our American friends must understand our special situation and traditions. North Korea may invade any day, so we cannot afford the luxury of democracy as you can."

"Anyone who creates unrest is really helping the Communists," Mr. Chung added. The interview was conducted in Mr. Chung's new hilltop house, in a wood-paneled room decorated with a tiger's head, a carved elephant tusk and a lacquered table from Vietnam. The last two were gifts from President Nguyen Van Thieu and former President Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam.

Since the current crackdown began last January with the first of Mr. Park's emergency decrees, the Seoul Government has repeatedly stressed the imminence of an invasion from the north.

Officials here point to several signs: two small new airfields the Communists have built close to the demilitarized zone, a new naval base on the west coast not far north of Seoul, and several attacks this year by the north on southern fishing boats and patrol ships.

Yesterday the Government said North Korean antiaircraft gunners had fired on a Korean Airlines civilian jetliner as it approached Gimpo International Airport at Seoul, though no bullet holes were found.

However, the American intelligence community here takes issue with the Government's analysis of the Communists' hostile actions and intentions at almost every point. There is a prevalent belief that Mr. Park has been using the threat more for his own domestic purposes.

Mr. Park's control over the Government and the population has no doubt been helped by the continued growth of the Korean economy. Despite dislocations caused by the oil crisis last winter — South Korea must import all its oil —

economists here forecast a 12 per cent growth rate this year, down from last year's phenomenal 17 per cent but still excellent.

Inflation has become a serious concern, with wholesale prices up 30 per cent from last year and consumer prices 16 per cent by official estimate. But to offset the effects of inflation, the Government recently approved a 30 per cent raise for civil servants.

Both the 600,000-man army and the large Korean intelligence agency, Mr. Park's main power bases, remain loyal to him, as far as can be determined, knowledgeable diplomats say. The President has made a practice of regularly transferring the top army commanders to prevent any officer from accumulating power.

Thus Mr. Park's opponents, who have been arrested and tried in recent weeks remain largely an isolated minority, like the liberals in China who were squeezed between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists and the elusive third force in Vietnam caught between President Thieu and the Vietcong.

The dissidents are almost all urban, middle class and well educated, and many are members of South Korea's 12 per cent Christian minority. They have no real ties to the peasantry that still forms the backbone of the population, and they have only strictly controlled links to the growing working class.

But the 1960 coup that toppled President Syngman Rhee was begun by students in Seoul, and there is still a feeling that someday the students can do it again.

And despite the current wave of repression, there are still some surprising acts of courage. Bishop Chi, the Catholic leader under indictment, came back from a European trip even though he knew what would happen to him.

"We cannot allow ourselves to become just the same as North Korea," said Mr. Yun, the former President now on trial. "I admit I gave money to the students to demonstrate," Mr. Yun related in an interview. "I would do it again if it would help."

THE ECONOMIST JULY 20, 1974

Korea

Look-alikes

Opposition is treason. This simple equation, which has served dictators from time immemorial, was formally proclaimed the law of the land in South Korea three months ago when the death penalty was introduced for pretty well any expression of dissent. Last week the first lot of prisoners was convicted under this emergency decree: 14 people, including the country's leading satirical poet and several student leaders, were

condemned to death, 15 were given life terms and 26, among them two Japanese, were sentenced to 15–20 years in jail. This week a former president of the country went on trial along with a professor of history, the dean of a theological college and the minister of a Seoul church. Another 200 students, teachers and churchmen are said to be under arrest and awaiting their turn in the military courts.

The prosecution claim is that all these defendants were involved in a student-led conspiracy to overthrow the Park regime. The main evidence of such a conspiracy seems to be the fact

that large numbers of students throughout the country defied police orders and joined anti-government demonstrations in early April. The group which led the demonstrations, the National Federation of Democratic Youth and Students, has since been declared a North Korean front and banned, along with the leading student Christian organisation. Any connection with these student federations is now defined as subversion: the former president, Yun Po Sun, is being tried for donating \$1,000 to student funds.

The red smear is familiar enough in South Korea, where it has long been used to discredit anyone who falls out of

favour with the Park regime. But a witch-hunt on the present scale is not standard, nor is the provocative tone of current anti-communist propaganda (President Park declared on Tuesday that relations with North Korea were approaching a state of war). The partial American

withdrawal from the Asian mainland has made many Asian leaders take drastic action to protect their governments from the communist challenge. But President Park seems to be approaching a state of mind very little different from that of his rival in Pyongyang.

Thursday, August 8, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

South Korea's Kim:

'I Know How Solzhenitsyn Felt'

By Don Oberdorfer

Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL—"It has been most difficult to control myself during this past year. I had to try hard to keep from bursting out, to keep serenity in my own mind. I think I know how Solzhenitsyn and some of the other Russian dissenters felt. I'm not surprised that some of them were placed in mental hospitals."

Kim Dae Jung was sitting in the living room of his closely watched house, chatting with visitors over steaming cups of Korea's famous ginseng (herb root) tea. A black secret-police sedan was parked up the street near the "real estate office" where lights burn all night despite the city's strict midnight curfew.

Three years ago Kim was the opposition party's unsuccessful candidate for president against incumbent Park Chung Hee. A little over a year ago he was shuttling between the United States and Japan as the most articulate outside critic of President Park's seizure of unlimited power under martial law.

Then on Aug. 8, 1973, Kim was abducted in broad daylight from a Tokyo hotel, spirited out of Japan in a fast boat and taken, bound and gagged, to the doorstep of his Seoul home. There he has remained ever since, first under house arrest and then under heavy surveillance, while international controversy has continued about his case.

One year after his kidnapping, Japanese newspapers and television are giving coverage to reviews of developments in Japan-Korea relations since the sensational incident. The Japanese Foreign Ministry has reiterated its unhappiness

that Kim is not free to travel abroad and instead is being tried by a Korean court on old charges stemming from his unsuccessful presidential campaign.

The South Korean government has ignored repeated appeals from Prof. Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. ambassador to Japan, and others that Kim be released to accept a previously offered fellowship at Harvard University. A House Foreign Affairs subcommittee has asked for Kim's appearance in Washington as a witness in a study of human rights in Korea—but there's no sign the request will be granted.

Until a few days ago Kim was virtually a nonperson in Seoul, with little news of him and none of his opinions permitted in the controlled Korean press. Then an Associated Press correspondent reported Kim's opinion that U.S. military assistance to South Korea should not be reduced or terminated, and stories about this viewpoint blossomed forth on the front pages here.

It has been his long-held and consistent view that cessation of American support would spell the doom of South Korea. "I think American military aid and the stationing of American troops here is still necessary in principle—but I think the U.S. should check any abuses . . . to make sure your military aid is used for defense, and not used against the Korean people," he said in an interview.

He added, as in the past, his protest against reduction of political freedoms in the southern half of the divided peninsula. "We are the same race as the North Korean people, with the same language, the same blood. The same cultural heritage. There is no reason to fight against North Korea except for freedom. If we lose our freedoms, we have no reason to resist," he maintained.

Whatever the condition of his countrymen, Kim himself has very little freedom in a practical everyday sense. His suburban house is surrounded by agents, who follow him conspicuously anytime he leaves his small walled compound.

His telephone is tapped. Any Korean who comes to see him is likely to be pulled in for police interrogation. For security reasons and to avoid difficulty to his friends, he leaves home only to attend Catholic Mass on Sunday and to attend sessions of the district criminal court where he is being tried on the old election charges.

Kim's kidnaping has been nearly universally attributed to the Park regime's ubiquitous CIA, the secret police-intelligence-thought control agency. His suspected kidnapers are living better than their victim.

Former KCIA Director

Lee Hu-rak, who was dropped from his high office last December in a bow to Japanese and Korean indignation about the case, slipped out of the country for a time but was persuaded to return. He is reported alternately living in a resort hotel in seaside Chung Mu and on the grounds of a Buddhist temple near Seoul.

Kim Dong-woon, the embassy first secretary in Japan whose fingerprints were found at the hotel abduction site, fled home to Korea and disappeared from view. Exile sources say he is living comfortably on the grounds of the Walker Hill resort in Seoul.

Lee Sang-ho, the former KCIA chief in Washington who is reported to have been the task force director of the kidnap group, is back in Seoul. Korean exile sources say he has been promoted to a high-ranking position in KCIA headquarters under his real name, which is Yang Doo-won.

Other members of the KCIA team that allegedly abducted Kim Dae Jung are said to have been scattered throughout the world—to Canada, Mexico, Chile, Los Angeles and other posts. So far nobody has come forward to tell the full story of the kidnaping last Aug. 8. Officially it is still an unsolved crime.

Seoul Feels Backlash of Repression

By Don Oberdorfer

Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, Aug. 4—Pressures are mounting for President Park Chung Hee to roll back the wave of internal repression, before irreparable damage is done to his leadership at home and his country's standing abroad.

Despite resolute talk in public, nearly all the second-echelon figures of the Korean government are reported to be privately dismayed by the reaction to the recent series of arrests, closed military trials and harsh sentences, and to be pretty well convinced that Park has gone too far. The problem is that there's no sign yet that the president agrees. It would be a bold aide indeed who risked displeasure by being the first to suggest a change in direction.

A former general in the government camp recalls that he and several others successfully faced down the president in the 1960s when Park wanted to take a particularly ruthless and unacceptable action. Today Park's one-time military peers have died or been downgraded, and nobody is in position to tell him "no" and make it stick.

"Until two or three years ago I was able to go in and discuss things with him," said a man known for his close connection with the president and who is performing major jobs for the regime. "I can't get to him anymore," Park's old friend said.

The isolation of the man in power, which is a serious problem in many lands and political systems, seems to have grown apace since Park seized total control under martial law 22 months ago.

For the past 10 days, the Korean chief of state has been vacationing at the official summer resort at Chin Ilae, near Pusan, and thus is more removed than usual from the workaday worries of the capital. U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib, soon to depart for Washington to become assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, has been sending American press reports and other messages to the beachside retreat—presumably to warn Park about the growing reaction in Congress and elsewhere against his crack-down on political opponents.

Two subcommittees of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee held public hearings last Tuesday on human rights in Korea, and another day of hearings is scheduled for this week. The chairmen of both subcommittees, Rep. Donald Fraser (D-Minn.) and Rep. Robert Nix (D-Pa.) urged cuts in U.S. military aid to Korea to show disapproval of what is taking place.

Another sign of Congressional opinion was the Foreign Affairs Committee's action—approved by the full House last week—denying funds to the U.S. Information Agency for relocating powerful Voice of America transmitters to Korea from Okinawa. At Japan's insistence, the United States has agreed to remove the transmitters from Japanese territory by 1977, and Korea was considered the prime relocation site.

While such a relocation may be justified on technical grounds, the committee is of the opinion that present conditions in that country (Korea) do not make it the most desirable alternative," said the congressional report denying the funds.

For a state that owes its very existence to the United

States and continues to depend heavily on U.S. military, economic and diplomatic support, such disaffection could be extremely serious in the long run.

In an interview with foreign correspondents, Park's second-in-command, Premier Kim John Pil, suggested last week that international opinion has emboldened "a handful of disgruntled people" at home to act as if the whole world were behind them. Whether for this reason or from sheer desperation, there is no doubt that opposition is beginning to surface again despite the decrees that make it punishable by long prison terms or death sentences.

The thin line of resistance is centered in the churches, both Catholic and Protestant. Despite concerted government maneuvers to silence them, church leaders are increasingly engaged in defending dissidents against complete suppression.

In the Catholic church, the issue was joined by Bishop Daniel Chi, whose court-martial on charges of aiding antigovernment student demonstrators began Thursday. Chi had many chances to avoid arrest and trial, but he rebuffed every one and headed into a confrontation with the state.

The government's reaction has been to charge the bishop with urging "violent revolution" and to call him "a liar" for denying the charge, and to work behind the scenes to cut off Chi's Catholic support.

Secret-police agents have visited Korea's Stephen Cardinal Kim and senior bishops to ask them not to support Chi. Delegations of

Catholic generals and Catholic assemblymen from the government party were also sent to ask church leaders to stay aloof. Despite the pressure, Catholic sentiment in Korea appears to be strongly behind the bishop.

The Protestant hierarchy, which had remained publicly passive despite arrest and court-martial of many Christian ministers and lay leaders this year, has begun to show signs of fighting back.

Nine senior leaders affiliated with the Anglican Church, Evangelical Church, Jesus Presbyterian Church, Methodist Church, Presbyterian Church of the Republic of Korea and the Salvation Army have asked to see Park or Premier Kim to ask for repeal of "emergency decrees" and release of persons arrested or convicted under them. If no satisfaction is forthcoming, they plan a public rally Aug. 11 despite the strict ban on antigovernment expressions.

Some of the previously cautious churchmen appear to have been affected by recent trips outside the country, which exposed them to the international condemnation of the Park regime. Others were affected by the allegations of torture and other abuses inflicted on recently convicted students and intellectuals.

In an effort to identify leaks from the closed courts-martial, police have called in and grilled relatives of the defendants. The wife of a prominent church leader was interrogated, placed under heavy surveillance and limited in her movements.

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, August 8, 1974

Korean Legislator Hits Decrees

By Edward Schumacher

Special to The Washington Post

SEOUL, Aug. 7—An opposition lawmaker attacked the emergency measures of President Park Chung Hee in the National Assembly today, the first public challenge from the opposition since criticism of the measures was forbidden eight months ago.

Rep. Kim Won Man, 53, in statements harsher than those for which many dissenters are now in jail, declared, "You can't secure political stability with oppression and suppres-

sion."

Premier Kim Jong Pil told the assembly, in its first day of debate on any issue in seven months, that the government will not perpetuate the emergency measures taken to quell dissent and that trials of persons accused of plotting to overthrow the government would end soon.

"I understand even President Park himself considers these measures to be only temporary in nature," he said.

Informed sources said the premier also told a group of

Protestant leaders at a meeting two days ago that some of the measures might be relaxed. Because of that and the premier's meeting with American Ambassador Philip Habib yesterday, the Protestants canceled a demonstration planned for Sunday. It was unclear what the ambassador said or who requested the meeting.

These events increased speculation that Park might back off. Counterbalancing them, however, were a report from an informed source that Catholic Bishop Daniel Chi, who is being tried by court-martial,

was secretly put back on trial today, and the announcement by Justice Minister Lee Pong Sung that the lawyer who defended poet Kim Chi Ha at his recent court-martial has been arrested.

Lee told the assembly that the arguments of the lawyer, Kang Shin Ok, constituted contempt of judges and a violation of emergency decrees. Kim Chi Ha is serving a life sentence for allegedly aiding a dissident student group.

The Defense Ministry said today that Bishop Chi has

pleaded guilty, but it did not specify to what offenses.

The Catholic Church continued to press its support of the bishop, which could lead to a showdown with the government. A steering committee of four bishops, who apparently represent all 13 Korean

bishops plus Korea's Stephen Cardinal Kim, yesterday sent the country's 700 parishes a statement which in effect denied the government's claims against Bishop Chi.

The harshness of the National Assembly speech by Rep. Kim startled members

of the ruling party. They tried to shout him down, but the lawmaker from Seoul, a city which voted against Park in the last election in 1972, persisted.

"People are uneasy," he said. "Foreign investors are uneasy. The number of tour-

ists has dropped by half. People with means are emigrating."

Referring to the Japanese occupation that ended in 1945, he added, "Even imperialistic, colonialistic Japanese had not so much abused emergency measures."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 August 1974

Korean freedoms ebb Roman Catholic bishop tried under tightest secrecy; curbs to continue

By Elizabeth Pond
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Tokyo

President Park's authoritarian regime has taken yet further steps against the Christian churches and democratic freedom in Korea.

The latest move is against Roman Catholic Bishop Daniel Chi, who was put on trial Aug. 1 in an especially secret court martial in Seoul on charges of giving money to and inciting anti-government students who were allegedly trying to overthrow the South Korean Government by violence.

At a luncheon the same day, Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil told reporters that curbs on democratic freedom in South Korea would continue until the achievement of economic affluence.

This phase would probably extend until 1981, "by which time we hope to have achieved our objective of \$1,000 per capita gross national product and \$10 billion annual exports," he said.

Neither freedom nor democracy can be ensured without money, Mr. Kim explained. "The same is true with national security. If we do not have money . . . we will be overrun by [Communist North Korean leader] Kim Il sung."

The Prime Minister appealed for international understanding, especially from the United States, which has recently charged South Korea with increasingly harsh repression.

Some of the U.S. concern centers on a series of South Korean military

court sessions that have recently sentenced 55 students and other dissidents to death, life imprisonment, or 15- to 20-year prison terms. All have been closed sessions. But some notice of the trial dates has usually been given to prisoners' families and, at least in theory, one member of the immediate family has been allowed to be present at each of these trials.

Criticism outlawed

In the case of Bishop Chi, however, no outsider other than his lawyer was informed of the trial, and no witness friendly to Mr. Chi was present. Catholic sources in Tokyo were not even sure if Mr. Chi's lawyer was present at the trial.

Military courts have been trying the cases of students who demonstrated against the government under presidential decrees of January and April outlawing criticism of South Korea's strongman constitution and support for anti-government student demonstrators.

Among other prominent Christians on trial or in jail for supporting the students are the former president of South Korea, a well-known Presbyterian minister, the dean of the Yonsei University School of Theology, and almost the entire leadership of the Korean Student Christian Federation.

Nonclerical clothes

The only news about Bishop Chi's trial and present detention has come from a Japanese reporter who saw Mr. Chi being taken out of a hospital behind Korean CIA (secret police)

headquarters at 8 o'clock Thursday morning. The journalist reported that four guards put Mr. Chi, who was wearing ordinary nonclerical clothes, into a car and took him away.

Late in the day a Defense Ministry spokesman said that in the trial Mr. Chi admitted giving financial support to a student movement to overthrow the Park Chung Hee government.

In a public statement on July 23 Mr. Chi announced that he would never go to a court martial trial voluntarily. He also warned the public not to believe any words attributed to him in the censored Korean media.

In the statement Mr. Chi acknowledged that he gave funds in support of "oppressed Christian-minded students," but added that he was being "falsely accused by forged documentation of instigating a revolt."

The extra secrecy in Mr. Chi's case is apparently occasioned by his daring in making public calls for restoration of democracy in South Korea — and by South Korean Government concern over the possible reaction to Mr. Chi's stand among South Korea's 800,000 Catholics.

The South Korean Catholic Church is basically conservative, ready to support any restrictive measures the government says are necessary to fight against communism. Since Mr. Chi, an outspoken social activist and critic of government repression, was arrested a month ago, however, the Catholic Church has rallied behind him, holding nationwide masses for him.

Mr. Chi was originally scheduled to go on trial July 23, but the trial was postponed, apparently because of the wave of international protests to his arrest.

More recently, the South Korean dragnet was extended to include two Irish priests who are associates of Bishop Chi resident in South Korea. They, too, were interrogated overnight by secret police and were reported exhausted after the ordeal.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, AUGUST 8, 1974

60 More Are Put on Trial Secretly as Seoul Intensifies

Political Crackdown

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Aug. 7.—In a major intensification of the recent series of political trials here, 60 more persons have been taken secretly before military courts in the last week.

Many are believed to be students, including several under 20 years of age, at Sogang University, a Catholic school in Seoul. According to members of the families of

one group of 8 students from Sogang, they were not notified that the trials had begun and discovered it only after visiting Westgate Prison in Seoul to bring the prisoners fresh clothing.

The disclosure that 60 additional defendants were on trial was made by Lee Yang Woo, the chief legal adviser to the Ministry of National Defense, which is conducting the courts-martial. Mr. Lee said in an interview today

that the new trials had been going on for 10 days and some were over. In that 10-day period, his office denied repeatedly that such trials were going on.

Outlawed League Cited
Mr. Lee, who is a former naval officer, said that the 60 were "suspect of participation in treason led by the National Democratic Youth Student Leagues, a student or-

ganization outlawed by President Park Chung Hee's emergency decree.

Ninety-one persons, including two Japanese, have been convicted so far in the spreading series of political trials. Five more, including Yun Po Sun, the 77-year-old former President of South Korea, are currently on trial.

The sudden step-up, at a time

when President Park is involved in a controversy with South Korea's Protestants and Roman Catholics over detention of Christian clergymen, apparently took many Government officials by surprise.

Premier Hints of Letup

Some diplomats here, citing the Government's sensitivity to trials and their international implications, believe that policy related to the crackdown is being made by a tiny group in the national leadership and is not too well coordinated.

There were also these developments today:

¶Premier Kim Jong Pil, in an address to the National Assembly, hinted that the Government might lift the emergency decrees, which Mr. Park proclaimed last winter and spring and which provide the legal basis for the courts-martial. Mr. Kim said, "I understand President Park himself considers these measures to be only temporary in nature."

¶Also in a speech to the legislature, a member of the opposition, Kim Won Man of the New Democratic party, denounced the decrees, saying, "You can't secure political sta-

bility with oppression and suppression." Under Decree No. 4, such criticism is punishable by death, but Mr. Kim was not prevented from speaking.

¶Bishop Daniel Chi Hak Soun, an outspoken Catholic prelate who is charged with subversion, was taken before a military court today for the second time. According to Mr. Lee of the Ministry of National Defense, Bishop Chi testified that his trial was being conducted "fairly" and that if the court showed leniency, "in the future I will devote myself only to religious activities." Another spokesman said today's proceedings concluded the taking of testimony and that the prosecution would make known its demands for punishment at the next session.

¶The steering committee of the Council of Catholic Bishops in Korea issued a statement suggesting that in view of the Government's account of the Bishop's arrest and trial as made public in the press here, "the faithful will not accept the face value of the newspaper articles." No Catholic leader, not even Stephen Cardinal Kim, has been permitted to attend the Bishop's trial.

There were fresh accounts of police abuse of political opponents of the Park Government.

The mothers of two defendants already convicted were said to have been knocked unconscious by policemen seeking to find out who had provided foreign newsmen with stories of torture of the prisoners.

The 26-year-old wife of another defendant, An Chae Ung, has reportedly told friends that she was interrogated for three straight days without sleep by a team of 10 policemen from a Seoul district police station. As a result, she is said to have related, she suffered from nervous exhaustion and her arms and hands became immobilized.

Asked today to comment on the charges, Mr. Lee suggested that the women "should appeal to the authorities concerned, or even report them to me."

None Sentenced, He Says

The ministry's legal offices said of the 60 new defendants that they had been divided into five groups, "according to school or profession." Mr. Lee asserted that some of the 60 were not students, but when

asked to describe what jobs they held, he remarked, "I can't remember."

He also stated that "a part of the trials may have concluded," but said no prisoners had been sentenced. Asked what sentences the prosecution had demanded, Mr. Lee said that it had not asked the death penalty.

As for why his office had repeatedly denied during the past 10 days that trials were being held Mr. Lee insisted that there had been "no effort at deception" and that it was not a regular practice for the Government to announce every court-martial session. In the earlier 91 cases, most sessions were announced.

Catholics contacted today said they doubted seriously whether Bishop Chi would repent in any form or promise to cease his activities against President Park. The Government has often cited a prisoner's reported repentance as a ground for a pardon or for reducing a sentence.

It was speculated in some circles that the Government might do that in the bishop's case.

WASHINGTON STAR
6 August 1974

Korean Insanity

The wholesale attack on political dissent in South Korea has reached such ridiculous proportions as to raise doubts about the Seoul leadership's grasp of international realities. President Chung Hee Park and his associates in tyranny have shown no understanding of how their indiscriminate crackdown on domestic critics has devastated the image of their regime, hurting rather than helping South Korea's prospects for national survival and economic development.

Park's obsession about maintaining his absolute power has led him to appalling excesses, in decreeing the death penalty for virtually any dissent and in using the police and military power with the grossest lack of judgment. A recent count indicated that 55 students and other dissidents, including the country's leading poet, have been sentenced to death, life imprisonment or 15-to-20-year terms. Hundreds more await secret military trials.

Defendants include Catholic Bishop Daniel Chi, on trial for his life for giving money for student protests, and former President Yun Po Sun, 76, arrested on a similar charge. The Christian churches have provided many targets besides the bishop: five priests and a nun, a Presbyterian minister, a theology-school dean and the leaders of the Korean Student Christian Federation. The National Council of Churches, representing more than 2

million South Korean Protestants, threatens a mass protest Sunday if Park's repressive emergency decrees are not withdrawn. The very letter announcing the rally is illegal. The current uproar is rife with charges of torture and other abuses attributed to Park's police forces.

Nothing is more illustrative of Seoul's lack of insight than the laughable defense voiced by Premier Kim Jong Pil. Applying a sort of reverse means test, he said Koreans are too poor to be allowed more democracy. When per capita annual income has doubled to \$1,000, in 1981, it will be possible to ease up.

There is nothing funny about the loss of freedom that many Koreans would endure in the meantime, or about the larger tragedy that could result from Seoul's alienation from the democratic world. South Korea is heavily dependent on American support for security from the aggressive Communist regime of North Korea. Now there are congressional calls to cut or suspend South Korea's \$241.5-million military-aid allocation this fiscal year, and there will be new pressure to withdraw the 38,000 American troops remaining on the truce line since the 1950-53 war. The administration wants to stand pat despite the beating democracy is taking from our ally, but Park seems bent on eroding even that amoral position.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 July 1974

Korea and U.S. policy

It is time for the American Government to declare publicly and forcefully its concern about the wave of political arrests and trials which is still sweeping through South Korea.

The attention of South Korean President Park Chung Hee should be drawn specifically to Section 32 of the current U.S. Foreign Aid Act:

"It is the sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes."

Nearly 100 South Korean citizens so far have been jailed for long terms, or sentenced to death, on charges that amount to little

more than being publicly critical of the Park government's increasingly authoritarian rulership. More recent arrests and trials have included South Korea's only living former president, Yun Po Sun, and a prominent bishop.

Although some of the death sentences have been commuted to life imprisonment, this was expected, and is no indication that the government is reconsidering its policies.

What must be brought home to the Park regime is the danger it is bringing to itself, to South Korea and the delicate international balance of the whole region by its attempt to repress all political dissent.

Lesser provocation has already produced one popular uprising in

recent South Korean history, bringing down the government of Syngman Rhee. Today the possibilities for chaos are even greater. But the American troops in Korea did not attempt to bail out Mr. Rhee then, and they cannot be expected to intervene for Mr. Park now, should another rebellion take place in the South.

Such a disturbance could even invite intervention by the North, confronting the U.S. with more warfare.

It should be made clear to President Park that Congress and the American people would not tolerate further involvement in Asia under such circumstances. And that if he does not reverse his course, Washington may be forced to reassess its policy of military and economic support.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
15 July 1974

A plea for reason in Korea

The Government of South Korea has pushed to its ultimate the policy of labeling political dissidents as "enemies" who endanger "national security."

A three-man military tribunal set up under emergency decrees has sentenced 14 South Korean citizens to death, and 39 others to long prison terms, some for life. Another 200 are under court martial and face similar treatment.

Among the 14 receiving death sentences are five students from Seoul National University and the poet Kim Chi Ha who has been called the Solzhenitsyn of Korea.

The severity of the sentences seems obviously intended to frighten away any further political opposition to the rule of Park Chung Hee.

That opposition, suppressed under martial law since 1972, finally boiled to the surface in the spring of last year with student protest demonstrations involving thousands of students in almost every major university.

President Park yielded momentarily, pulling back somewhat the Korean CIA's domestic surveillance operations and replacing its unpopular chief. But that temporary tactic was soon followed by the extraordinary decrees that

made virtually any whisper of dissent punishable in the extreme.

Mr. Park's excuse is the need for vigilance against the North.

But South Korea has never been stronger economically and militarily. There is less reason now for authoritarianism than ever and, indeed, every condition exists for the country to adopt more democratic practices.

Kim Chi Ha's "crime" was that he gave some money (about \$450) to one group of student protesters.

Previously, the well-known poet had been jailed a number of times and once committed to a sanatorium — in a move similar to the Soviet Union's treatment of prominent dissidents — because of poetry satirical of government policies.

Inevitably, one compares the Soviets' final disposition of Mr. Solzhenitsyn with the Park regime's "solution" to Kim Chi Ha.

To the extent that world protest helped to obtain the release of Solzhenitsyn to exile, might it now obtain more lenient and reasonable treatment for Kim Chi Ha and his fellow South Korean dissenters?

It is possible, and there is time. Here is one such protest.

Western Hemisphere

Friday, August 2, 1974
... R1

THE WASHINGTON POST

Chile Junta Deals Democracy Out of Long-Term Plans

By Joseph Novitski

Special to The Washington Post

SANTIAGO — The Chilean military junta, after governing for 10 months with improvised policies and structures, has settled down for a long stay in power.

The junta, which replaced President Salvador Allende after the coup in which he died last September, began its tenth month by reordering the country's government, burning the national voter registry and breaking off relations with Chile's largest political party, the Christian Democrats. It all added up to a declaration that the military plans to govern for an indefinite span, without elections or organized civilian political support.

Government spokesmen, when asked how long military rule may last, answer, "We have plans, not deadlines."

The plans are for the long term and on a large scale.

"If we don't do big, lasting things, we might as well go home now," an adviser to the junta said recently.

Thus far, in what it calls "the second stage," the junta has made known its intention to rebuild the economy, to make it grow with the help of foreign investment, to reduce and reorganize the government bureaucracy and to enforce a total ban on civilian political activity by continuing the detentions and military-court trials that have been the rule since last September.

The first step of government reorganization came late in June, when the armed forces agreed to shift

from a four-man junta to a one-man presidency. Since the military overthrew Allende and uprooted his Marxist-oriented government, the commanders of the army, the navy, the air force and the carabineros, Chile's national police force, had exercised the powers of the presidency. They also took over the law-making power of the Congress, which was closed last year.

Now, Gen. Augusto Pinochet, commander-in-chief of the army and leader of the junta, has been named president for an indefinite term with the formal title of "supreme chief of the nation."

The point of the change, government sources said, was efficiency. The four-man junta had been slower in reaching decisions than one man would be, they said. The commanders of the army, navy, air force and police have retained the role of drawing up laws for promulgation by decree.

Pinochet's rise also represents the ascendancy of the Chilean army over the navy, air force and police. Some civilian observers, believing that the army officers in government had shown more moderation than air force and navy officers, thought this might mean an easing of repression. This has not yet been the case.

Chilean families report that men and women are still disappearing for days and sometimes weeks. A businessman told friends recently he had been arrested, held for four days alone in a tiny cell and then released without charges.

While Gen. Pinochet was

forming a new Cabinet of 14 military men and 3 civilians, two of them technocrats with international reputations, the government burned the national voter registration records. A government spokesman explained that the lists of 4 million voters were "notoriously fraudulent." No plans were announced for making new lists or reregistering voters.

The remote expectation that the junta might call elections to carry out its announced aim of restoring Chilean democracy disappeared with the electoral records. There remained another possibility, suggested to the junta by leaders of the Christian Democratic Party. The party leadership, who opposed Allende and publicly accepted the coup as a necessary evil, had hoped for a return to civilian government within three to five years.

That hope, according to Christian Democrats familiar with party affairs, disappeared when the junta publicly broke off its semipublic relations with the party in July. Formally, there has been no political party activity in Chile since the junta outlawed the country's Marxist parties and declared the others, including the Christian Democrats, in recess.

During the recess, Christian Democratic leaders continued to meet privately. Last January they presented a memorandum to the government that criticized the military's treatment of prisoners and its disregard for legal and human rights.

Also in January, former Sen. Patricio Aylwin, recognized by the junta as the party's president, suggested privately to a military minister that Christian Democrats saw no need for more than five years of military dictatorship in Chile.

It was not Christian Democratic political opinions, but censorship imposed on a Santiago radio station owned by the party that caused the party's complete break with the junta.

After an exchange of letters, the government called the party an "instrument of international Marxism" and told Aylwin bluntly to keep a respectful tongue in his head when he spoke to the military government.

Christian Democrats said the government's move looked like a signal from the army that its contacts with Christian Democrats were at an end.

Some party leaders said the break helped the party overcome the reputation of having helped in the coup. Even former President Eduardo Frei, the grand old man of Chilean Christian Democracy who had gone, with other former presidents, to a thanksgiving Mass with the junta last year, was reliably reported to be critical of the military government now.

"In the end it's probably better this way," said a Christian Democratic lawyer. "They tell us to shut up and we stop arguing. It shows everyone that this is a dictatorship and that's that."

the party's president and one of the nation's top military commanders.

The two men involved, Party chief-tain Patricio Aylwin Azocar and Defense Minister Oscar Bonilla Bradanovic, once enjoyed a friendly relationship, but the tone of the letters suggests that this is no longer the case.

Mr. Aylwin wrote: "History shows that no stable or just order can be built on a foundation of unilateral imposition of the will of those who govern."

40

Chile politicians regret support of military junta

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin America correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Chile's Christian Democratic Party has come to lament its early support

of the military government now running the South American nation.

The extent of the party's disenchantment became apparent recently with the release of a sharply worded exchange of letters between

The Aylwin letter, which was understood to reflect the views of top Christian Democratic leaders including former President Eduardo Frei Montalva, was in response to a harsh letter by General Bonilla.

Exchange began in June

The exchange originally got under way in June when the military junta imposed stiff censorship on Radio Balmaceda in Santiago, the flagship station of the Christian Democratic Party. Mr. Aylwin wrote to General Bonilla, then Interior Minister, protesting the action.

In response, General Bonilla wrote Mr. Aylwin in a tone that implied the political leader had no business criticizing the military.

"Please do not write to me in any terms that are not those of an administrative authority of a recessed party respectfully addressing the government of the nation," General Bonilla wrote.

The Christian Democratic Party was declared "in recess" soon after

the military takeover last September, as were other political parties. Marxist-oriented parties that supported the deposed government of Salvador Allende Gossens were "outlawed forever" by the military.

Repetition charged

Mr. Aylwin's latest letter accused the government of trying to impose its will unilaterally, thus "repeating the error" of the Allende government.

He also protested the junta's treatment of the Christian Democrats, which he said amounted to "systematic distrust."

"Our patriotic efforts to tell the government what we believe to be true and good for Chile," he wrote, "have received no other response than repeated signs of hostility."

The Aylwin letter was the sharpest public criticism yet of the military leaders ruling Chile since the takeover last September 11.

Christian Democrats had been smarting under the restrictions

placed on them by the military long before the censorship of Radio Balmaceda. They argue that they have been played false by the military whom they originally supported.

Support anticipated

They also felt that they had a friend in General Bonilla, who as a colonel was a military aide to Mr. Frei during his presidency from 1964 to 1970. Indeed, in initial reaction to the members of the military government last September, General Bonilla was regarded as one of those supporting the concept of civilian, constitutional government.

"We may be wrong about that," a Christian Democratic official said last March when commenting on earlier actions taken by General Bonilla. But some Christian Democrats, at the time, still held out the view that General Bonilla would favor them.

The exchange of letters appears to dash that hope.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 July 1974

U.S. overtures to Cuba— renewed ties in the wind

By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

A growing number of signs point toward revision of the 10-year-old diplomatic quarantine of Cuba. Even at the U.S. State Department, where the official signals still read "stop," there are suggestions of approaching change.

The latest of these is the visit to Cuba of Pat M. Holt, staff director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Holt interviewed Fidel Castro, First Deputy Premier Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and leading member of the Communist Party secretariat, including Blas Roca.

Mr. Holt has just returned, via Mexico, from his trip, which began June 28, and has yet to make any public report on his findings.

The visit is being hailed, however, among analysts of Latin American affairs as an oblique American overture to the Castro regime with which the U.S. Government broke relations in January, 1961. Although Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger approved only reluctantly the visa for Mr. Holt, for which he had been waiting since 1966, the fact that he did so was significant.

Mr. Holt's trip to Cuba coincided with evidence that the reason for which the United States in 1962 led the Organization of American States to exclude Cuba from inter-American affairs, and in 1964 to cut diplomatic and trade ties, no longer applies and that Latin American states are beginning to move toward a resumption of ties with Cuba.

The reason was that Cuba was identified as the center of a Communist revolutionary movement that sought to export revolution to the rest of the hemisphere. Most analysts think that Dr. Castro has almost entirely halted this kind of activity, but State Department officials are not yet ready to concede the point.

According to a department spokesman there has admittedly been a decline in such activity, but the department holds that it continues.

Official position

The department's official position is that the meeting of Latin American foreign ministers in April decided to leave it up to Argentina to report to the next meeting, at Buenos Aires in March of next year, as to whether there are grounds for making concessions to Cuba, and the U.S. is willing to wait for that report.

But the rest of the continent does not appear willing to wait. Peru, Argentina, and four Caribbean countries have joined Mexico, which never did break off relations, in restoring diplomatic ties with Cuba.

Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Venezuela are expected soon to follow suit, to be followed by Panama, Colombia, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Anxious Castro

The President of Mexico, Luis Echeverria Alvarez, furthermore, is touring seven Latin American countries with the avowed purpose of seeking a lifting of the restrictions on trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Although the State Department offi-

cially scoffs at the idea, many analysts see the U.S. becoming increasingly isolated in its Cuban policy.

From Cuba there are reports, meanwhile, that Dr. Castro is anxious to encourage the trend because he is weary of Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union from which he receives a subsidy of about \$1 million a day, much of which is spent under the direction of about 7,000 Soviet technicians and advisers.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 August 1974

World Council of Churches Says Chile Violates Rights

GENEVA, Aug. 5 (Reuters) — The World Council of Churches alleged today that citizens' rights were being systematically violated in Chile and appealed to churches throughout the world to do everything to help restore the rule of law there.

A statement by the council's commission on international affairs said that at least 6,000 people were in prison or concentration camps in Chile and that there had been an alarming new wave of arrests.